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ABSTRACT  
 
The premise of this thesis is that complex socio-environmental problems, such as those 
associated with urban disaster risk and climate change, cannot be managed by individual 
organisations or hierarchical forms of organisation, but require integrated, inclusive, and multi-
actor forms of governance. By adopting the concept of ‘disaster governance’ and by drawing on 
governance discourse, this thesis argues that multiple actors with various capacities and 
understanding of the problem should be involved in disaster management processes. This thesis 
demonstrates that in practice, however, a collaborative, decentralised, and inclusive disaster 
governance approach, which often involves actors outside of taken-for-granted networks, is 
harder to design, implement, and maintain in cities of the global South.  
 
In this thesis, an embedded qualitative case study approach is adopted to explore how the local 
municipality in Cape Town manages flood risk in one of their high-risk informal settlements 
called Sweet Home, which is located in Philippi on the Cape Flats. Qualitative data is collected 
from in-depth, semi-structured interviews and multi-actor workshops with local government 
officials in Cape Town, residents from Sweet Home informal settlement, and non-governmental 
organisations involved in flood management activities. This research uses a nodal governance 
approach to describe and analyse the unique mentalities, resources, technologies, and 
institutions that shape actors’ actions and decisions with regard to flood governance. Added to 
this is an in-depth look at what barriers might be present as a product of these characteristics, 
and how these barriers impact on the ability of these actors to collaboratively address disaster 
risk. This thesis demonstrates that by unpacking these characteristics and the potential barriers, 
the conditions needed to strengthen disaster governance can then be identified.  
 
The empirical research in this thesis suggests that unclear roles and responsibilities, a lack of 
monitoring and accountability mechanisms, unclear definitions of flooding, and a lack of human 
resources are significant barriers to collaborative flood governance in Cape Town. Addressing 
these barriers, through multi-actor platforms and inclusive partnership, is seen as one approach 
to creating a more inclusive environment for local disaster risk reduction in Cape Town’s 
informal settlements. It is concluded in this thesis that in order to strengthen collaborative 
disaster governance in the context of cities of the global South, inclusive partnerships and multi-
actor platforms need to be complemented by strengthened institutional structures and more 
deliberate, systematic approaches to fostering collaboration between multiple actors. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Greater attention is being paid to disasters worldwide because they are happening more 
frequently, costing countries more, and taking more human lives (IFRC, 2010, UNISDR, 2011, 
Djalante, 2012). UNISDR’s (2015) Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction emphasises 
the increasing economic impact that disasters have had on many developing and developed 
countries around the world (see Figure 1 on page 3). Disasters are also increasing in complexity, 
especially in urban environments where a number of socio-economic and political compounding 
factors underpin disaster risk and the impacts that they have on society and the environment 
(UNISDR, 2011, Djalante, 2012, Tierney, 2014, Twigg, 2015, UNISDR, 2015).  
 
Disaster risk management (DRM) discourse recognises that urban environments, where the 
majority of the world resides, is highly dynamic, complex, and uncertain; these environments are 
embedded in and shaped by social, economic, and political realities (Pelling and Wisner, 2009, 
UNISDR, 2011, UNISDR, 2013, Tierney, 2014, UNISDR, 2015). The underlying social, spatial, and 
political factors, as initially explored by theorists from the behavioural paradigm, are still seen 
today as the root causes that make the urban poor in cities of the global South the most 
vulnerable to urban risk (Fay et al., 2003, Pelling, 2003b, Douglas et al., 2008, IFRC, 2010). 
Addressing these underlying factors means altering deeply-ingrained power structures within 
society (Wisner et al., 2004, Mercer et al., 2008); a process that Mercer et al. (2008) argue 
governments are reluctant to do. Critics of state-led DRM approaches argue that governments are 
not always ideally placed to alter these underlying, politically-sensitive issues. Mercer et al. 
(2008) support this view, arguing that governments often prioritise technical, short-term 
approaches because it is politically more viable and easier than addressing the underlying 
entrenched and deeply-ingrained political and socio-economic imbalances.  
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Over the years, there has been increasing recognition that disaster risk is embedded within global 
environmental issues such as climate change and environmental degradation, and developmental 
concerns such as poverty, food insecurity, and informality (Douglas et al., 2008, O'Brien et al., 
2008, Pelling and Wisner, 2009, UNISDR, 2009b, Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010). Tierney (2014) 
dedicates her new book to discussing how all types of contemporary disasters (e.g., technological, 
natural, and economic) are the result of human actions (and inaction) and are thus rooted in 
social, political, historical, and economic decisions that individuals, governments, organisations, 
and communities have made. To reflect this, theoretical approaches to understanding disasters 
have shifted to focus on the complicated interactions between nature and society (Kasperson et 
al., 2005), the multiple factors amplifying disaster risk at multiple scales (Blaikie et al., 1994, 
Wisner et al., 2004), and how disasters are increasingly characterised by complexity and 
uncertainty (Morss et al., 2005, Berkes, 2007, Aerts et al., 2008, Renn, 2008a).  
 
Major disaster events, such as the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2010 
Pakistan floods, and the 2011 Fukushima earthquake, have impacted on the way contemporary 
disaster risk is managed and analysed in developed and developing countries (Thomalla and 
Larsen, 2010, Walker et al., 2010, Ikeda and Nagasaka, 2011, UNISDR, 2011). The 2011 
Fukushima earthquake, for example, highlighted how the technologies that modern society has 
become dependent on have led to new, complex, and compounded risks and vulnerabilities 
(UNISDR, 2011). This earthquake also revealed that Japan, which has implemented multiple 
earthquake preparedness and mitigation actions (Norio et al., 2011) and is often seen as the 
example of best practice for DRM (Foster, 2011), is still vulnerable from mega (large-scale) 
disasters that can overwhelm local coping capacities (Norio et al., 2011, Tierney, 2012). The 2010 
volcanic eruption in Iceland and the 2011 flooding in Thailand highlight how disasters do not 
always respect political borders (Wachtendorf, 2000, Boin and Rhinard, 2008), and can have far-
reaching impacts on global industries and their supply chains1 (Tierney, 2012).  
 
Disaster events worldwide have highlighted changing patterns of socio-economic vulnerability 
and hazards and demonstrated how limited current attempts at reducing and mitigating complex 
contemporary disaster risk really are. From climate change science, there is increasing 
recognition that disasters are also increasing in complexity and uncertainty. The IPCC’s (2012) 
recent SREX report argues that there is and will continue to be increases in extreme events, such 
as extreme high/low temperatures, extreme droughts, extremes of intense precipitation, and 
extremes associated with sea level rise. Tierney (2012) highlights how hurricane Sandy in 2012 
                                                             
1 For example, the volcanic eruption in Iceland in 2010 affected air travel throughout Europe, while the 2011 flooding 
in Thailand disrupted the global supply of electronics to countries around the world. 
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was a wake-up call for many climate change sceptics and those who did not think that the effects 
of climate change would be felt now. These extreme events will have far-reaching impacts on the 
economies and development of cities across the world and the livelihoods and activities of its 
citizens (IPCC, 2012). Several authors agree that these impacts will be felt most acutely in cities of 
the global South, which are already facing many development-related and governance challenges 
and have large proportions of urban poor who are already socio-economically and politically 
marginalised (Schipper and Pelling, 2006, Huq et al., 2007, Satterthwaite et al., 2007, Tanner et al., 
2009, Ziervogel and Smit, 2009, CDKN, 2012). Although total economic losses (including insured 
losses) as a result of disasters are higher in developed countries, fatality rates and economic 
losses expressed as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) are reportedly much higher 
in developing countries (IPCC, 2012). Important to note is that losses in low and middle-income 
countries are not always the result of large-scale and extreme disaster events (which receive a lot 
of media attention), but more often the result of small, recurring, everyday disaster events that 
impact people’s livelihoods, housing, and critical public infrastructure (UNISDR, 2015).  
 
The uncertainty of climate change, the predicted increases in frequency and magnitude of 
extreme events, the impact of disasters on global, interconnected economies, the increased 
complexity and compounded nature of contemporary disaster risk, and the shortcomings of DRM 
in developing and developed countries all underscore the need for conversations on how to 
strengthen DRM. The IPCC’s (2012) SREX report emphasises the need for a multi-faceted 
approach to understand and address current and future disaster risk, and increase the resilience 
of cities and communities exposed to extreme events. The IPCC’s (2012) multi-pronged approach 
to addressing current and future disaster risk is exemplified in the SREX report in the way that it 
draws on knowledge and information from multiple actors, including experts in physical climate 
systems, experts in the impacts of climate change and disaster risk, and experts who are 
specialists in managing and reducing disasters.  
 
The conversation about the need for a multi-disciplinary approach to reduce society’s exposure 
and vulnerability to disaster risk and increase their resilience in the face of this exposure is not 
new. Van Aalst (2006) and Mercer (2010) have argued for disaster practitioners to integrate 
climate change adaptation (CCA) strategies into existing disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies 
and strategies. O’Brien et al. (2006) and Schipper (2007) argue similarly for CCA work that does 
not simply address the impacts of climate change, but also addresses the underlying factors 
causing vulnerability, within the context of development. O’Brien et al. (2008) and Schipper 
(2009) argue for DRM and CCA communities to develop coordinated efforts to jointly tackle the 
pressing, complex challenges posed by climate change and disasters. The take-home message 
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from these authors and others is that contemporary disasters have become too complex and 
diverse for traditionally centralised, technocratic, and narrow DRM approaches (Burris et al., 
2008, Walker et al., 2010, Holley et al., 2011).  
 
Recognising this shortcoming in DRM approaches, disaster communities are calling for more 
innovative, interdisciplinary, and integrated DRR approaches that address disaster risk 
holistically and systematically (Fung, 2006, Ikeda et al., 2008, Renn, 2008a, Fuchs et al., 2011, 
Ikeda and Nagasaka, 2011). These authors emphasise the benefits of drawing on a broader range 
of actors’ expertise, diversifying DRR measures, improving the assessment of causal factors, 
improving the communication of risks to civil society, and increasing the participation of civil 
society in disaster planning and activities (Fung, 2006, Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006, Ikeda et al., 
2008, Renn, 2008a, Fuchs et al., 2011, Ikeda and Nagasaka, 2011).  
 
In this thesis, I draw heavily on the emerging concept in DRM and environmental management of 
‘disaster governance’; a concept that emphasises the increasingly polycentric nature of DRM, the 
decentralisation of DRM activities, and how these activities are now dispersed amongst multiple 
and diverse sets of actors beyond the traditional ‘state’ actors (Holley et al., 2011, Tierney, 2012). 
In this thesis, I view the inclusion of a plurality of actors as encompassing the need to include 
people who are, or are likely to be, affected by disaster risk, as well as those with technical 
expertise, financial resources, and the authority for making decisions and developing policies. I 
argue further that multi-actor platforms and multi-level and cross-scalar partnerships are a 
necessary tool for shifting from traditional top-down, hierarchical DRM to more inclusive, multi-
actor, and collaborative ‘disaster governance’. 
 
 
2. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
 
In the face of environmental change, increased extreme events, and the increased complexity of 
disaster risk, the concept of ‘resilience’ has taken centre stage in climate change and DRR debates 
(Mayunga, 2007, Bahadur et al., 2010, Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010, Djalante, 2012). Resilience 
thinking in DRR discourse has resulted in a shift from focusing on identifying and reducing 
vulnerabilities and risks (Van Niekerk, 2013), to considering what is needed to make society and 
affected communities more resilient and adaptive to shocks and stresses (Twigg, 2007, Bahadur 
et al., 2010, IFRC, 2010). In my thesis, I do not contribute towards literature on resilience 
arguments, but rather draw on the concept of resilience as a frame for exploring what ‘disaster 
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governance’ can contribute towards DRM thinking, if the outcomes of disaster governance are 
argued to be the resilience of society and communities to disaster risk. Van Niekerk (2013:2) 
argues that resilience is an important concept in DRM discourse because it “involves 
accommodation of and adaptation to changing conditions over the long-term”. This implies that a 
‘resilient’ society is able to learn to adapt to constantly changing risks and vulnerabilities. 
Therefore, I argue in this thesis that multi-actor collaboration and information-sharing is critical 
for building resilience to contemporary and future disaster risk.  
 
In order to conceptualise the ‘how’ of ‘how to strengthen DRM’ within a resilience framing, I argue 
that bringing together different groups of actors and forms of knowledge, through multi-actor and 
cross-scale platforms, as well as within networked governance systems, is able to stimulate 
learning, the co-production of knowledge, and innovation in DRR approaches (Berkes, 2007, 
Bahadur et al., 2010). Linked to this is the understanding from disaster discourse that bringing 
multiple actors together is one way to encourage the exchange of knowledge and practice 
between multiple actors (De Bruijin et al., 2007, Ikeda et al., 2008, IFRC, 2010, Djalante, 2012) 
and in turn strengthen DRM practice. The disaster community supports this view, arguing that 
creating resilient cities requires the implementation of integrated approaches that rely on the 
action of a range of actors (IFRC, 2010, Newell et al., 2012).  
 
Although the need to include a broader range of actors in DRM processes has been recognised, 
most of the literature within disaster scholarship is still largely theoretical and normative. There 
have been few empirical attempts to identify and analyse the factors that might inhibit multiple 
actors from governing disaster risk collectively. Examples of methodologies developed to 
measure a community’s ability to collectively manage disaster risk include Cutter et al.’s (2008) 
Disaster Resilience of Place model, and their Disaster Resilience Index. These models extend 
Cutter et al.’s earlier work on measuring social vulnerability2, by proposing a set of composite 
indicators for measuring the baseline characteristics of communities that foster social resilience. 
Using this Disaster Resilience Index, Cutter et al. (2010) are able to identify the most and least 
resilient counties in the USA, according to five categories: social, economic, institutional, 
infrastructure, and community capital. Bevc (2010), Lassa (2010), and Kapucu (2011) have all 
used a mixed-method approach, which relies on qualitative and quantitative data, as well as social 
network analysis, to analyse and map disaster governance and disaster governance arrangements 
for their respective case studies. Tierney (2012) argues that although these types of network 
                                                             
2 Cutter et al.’s (2003) Social Vulnerability Index assesses social vulnerability by taking into account available hazard 
data and socio-economic data, while Cutter’s (1996) earlier ‘hazards of place’ model was useful for examining 
vulnerability as the intersection and interaction of socio-economic factors, geographic context, biophysical context, 
hazards, and technological factors.    
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analysis approaches are well suited to studying and analysing governance arrangements, the use 
of these types of approaches to study disaster governance has been very limited in the literature. 
 
Thus, the research outlined in this thesis attempts to contribute towards the emerging 
scholarship around the concept of disaster governance: what it means in theory and practice, 
what the challenges and barriers are to adopting a disaster governance approach in cities of the 
global South, and how to strengthen disaster governance in these cities. I contribute towards this 
scholarship by providing a theoretically-informed research approach to analyse the capacities of a 
case study city in terms of its ability to manage a particular disaster risk. I argue that a deeper 
understanding of the capacities of a city to manage and respond to disaster risk is an important 
step towards understanding the conditions necessary for strengthening collaborative DRM 
approaches, and thus how to strengthen their ability to address disaster risk. Although there have 
been many case studies and much empirical research on DRR at the government, municipal, or 
local level, missing from this body of research are case studies of cities that have tried to integrate 
actors across levels, including the state, local communities, and other actors (e.g., NGOs and the 
private sector) (i.e., a multi-actor governance approach), and the barriers that these cities face in 
doing so. This research aims to fill this empirical gap using a case study of flood risk management 
in Cape Town, South Africa (Figure 2), and how the City of Cape Town (CCT) municipality has 
attempted to integrate a diversity of actors, not always successfully, into existing DRM activities. 
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Figure 2: Location of the case study city of Cape Town in South Africa 
(Source: Google Earth and Joy Waddell) 
 
 
 
One of the contentions in this thesis is that although disaster discourse and rhetoric highlight the 
need for bringing multiple actors together to collaboratively address disaster risk, simply 
bringing these actors together to govern risk will not automatically lead to them working 
collaboratively. Bringing multiple actors together (from state actors and engineers, to non-
governmental organisation (NGO) representatives and local communities) also means that 
multiple ideologies, capacities, and institutional frameworks are brought into the mix. Although 
this is arguably the strength of and rationale for bringing multiple actors together to address 
complex issues, these multiple ideologies and capacities can be contradictory and can complicate 
the process of collaboratively addressing disaster risk. 
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With current rhetoric and theory arguing that disaster governance needs to move beyond the 
confines of local government to including local communities and non-state actors, my research 
aims to question what this means in practice, in cities of the global South, which are often 
characterised by development backlogs, lack of critical services and infrastructure, weak 
governance, and marginalised (politically and physically) poor and informal communities 
(Satterthwaite et al., 2007, Satterthwaite and Dodman, 2013, UN-HABITAT, 2014). Cities of the 
global South are currently stifled by top-down, hierarchical, and technocratic approaches to DRM, 
with solutions sought internally and not in participation with local communities who often have a 
better understanding of localised hazards and local politics (Pelling and Wisner, 2009, 
Satterthwaite, 2011, Van Niekerk, 2011, Van Niekerk and Coetzee, 2012). In theory, bringing 
multiple actors together onto platforms with the collective goal of reducing and addressing 
disaster risk can strengthen the resilience of communities and cities to disasters, but in practice, 
there are many socio-political and logistical barriers.  
 
Informed by nodal governance theory, I argue in this thesis that certain characteristics dictate the 
actions of different actors (called ‘nodes’). For example, different actors bring with them multiple 
rationalities, which dictate their mandates, priorities, and actions (Burris et al., 2005, Tefre, 
2010). The multiple rationalities of multiple nodes can often lead to conflict and 
misunderstandings, but if understood properly, can provide opportunities for facilitating shared 
understanding, improving the use and channelling of resources, and enabling more effective 
decision-making and collaboration. Coming from the climate change literature, Ekstrom et al.’s 
(2011) barriers to adaptation framework recognises that certain factors exist within any 
decision-making and planning processes, which might inhibit and limit the outcomes of those 
processes. The barriers to adaptation framework provides a road map to help actors diagnose the 
nature and source of different existing and potential barriers, in order to strategically plan how to 
overcome or lower those barriers. With a combined understanding of the characteristics guiding 
nodes’ actions, and the factors (‘barriers’) that might inhibit nodes from carrying out a certain 
role, I argue that we can develop a better understanding of the conditions under which 
collaborative disaster governance can take place, and from there, how collaboration can be 
strengthened to more effectively govern disaster risk. 
 
South Africa, where the case study in this thesis is based, was one of the first African countries to 
legislate DRM (Van Niekerk, 2011). More importantly, South Africa’s DRM legislature is described 
as progressive and significant by Holloway (2003) and Van Niekerk (2011) because it strives to 
promote proactive DRM as opposed to traditionally reactive thinking, as well as emphasising the 
need to decentralise DRM activities across local, provincial, and national government, and within 
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government departments. The decentralisation of DRM activities is a way to shift the DRM 
structure from a traditionally centralised, autocratic approach, to one that includes a plurality of 
actors. In Van Niekerk’s (2011) analysis of the Disaster Management Act no. 57 of 2002, and the 
National Disaster Management Policy Framework in 2005, he highlights a mismatch between 
what is outlined in this legislation and what takes place in practice. Although this DRM legislation 
explicitly outlines the various institutional arrangements needed, at national, provincial and 
municipal levels, there is a lack of the necessary institutional structures needed at these levels 
(Van Niekerk, 2011); although as Van Niekerk (2011) adds, more of these structures seem to exist 
at the municipal level. Holloway (2003) critiques South Africa’s DRM legislation, arguing that 
although it promotes proactive DRM, current DRM practice is often reactionary with a focus on 
narrow technical solutions and on the provision of disaster relief.  
 
In South Africa, polarised priorities and contestation with regards to service delivery, 
unemployment, inequality, and poverty, have resulted in challenges in implementation and 
planning (Isandla Institute, 2011). This polarisation of priorities and interests is attributed not 
only to the contentious nature of these socio-economic factors, but the current, often divided and 
fractured politics at all levels, as well as the inherent differences in interests and priorities within 
government structures and local communities (Isandla Institute, 2011). Fatti and Patel’s (2013) 
research on flood management highlights similarly how differences in perceptions that municipal 
officials and communities have, shape the responses these different groups of actors prioritise. 
GNDR’s (2011) global research project, which aims to assess country-specific progress to 
implementing DRR in local governments, found that effective local governance was when local 
governments strive to not only link different line ministries and sectors, but work together with 
civil society, the private sector, and at-risk communities. Collaborative governance theory 
promotes the bringing together of diverse sets of actors onto decision-making platforms, yet in 
practice, as shown by the Isandla Institute (2011) and Fatti and Patel (2013), these different 
actors often do not see eye-to-eye on the same issues. In South Africa’s current context, despite 
DRM legislation that facilitates and endorses inclusive, participatory DRM, these different 
priorities and perceptions present one of the key challenges to effective collaborative disaster 
governance. By shifting focus from the activities and outcomes of DRM processes, to the 
governance of disaster risk, this research seeks to understand the actions of the diverse sets of 
actors currently governing disaster risk in a particular South African context, questioning whose 
actions have a bearing on DRM outcomes, and how. 
 
In light of the above arguments, the overall aim of this research is to explore how a nodal 
governance approach can be used to identify and understand the potential barriers and 
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opportunities to collaborative disaster governance. Through a qualitative case study of flood 
governance in Cape Town, the following specific objectives will be addressed:  
 
1. to understand the actors integral to, and the nature of, the disaster governance 
system investigated; 
2. to draw on a nodal governance approach to help identify the unique mentalities, 
resources, technologies, and institutions that shape the perceptions and actions of 
the multiple actors governing disaster risk; 
3. to analyse these four nodal governance characteristics and how they interact, in 
order to determine the barriers and opportunities for collaborative disaster 
governance; 
4. to identify the conditions required to inform a more inclusive and collaborative 
approach to disaster governance; and 
5. to contribute towards the emergent discourse on disaster governance by 
fundamentally enhancing the debate to include issues of nodal governance and 
barriers to governance.  
 
 
3. THESIS FORMAT 
 
This thesis comprises ten chapters, which are divided across five larger ‘parts’.  
 
PART ONE comprises the introductory chapter. 
 
In Chapter One, I present the background, scope, aim, and objectives of this thesis.  
 
In PART TWO, I set out the theoretical framework and approach within which this thesis is 
framed. 
 
In Chapter Two, I discuss why there is a need to re-imagine current DRM thinking 
because of (a) a broader decentralisation trend in DRM, and (b) a recognition of the 
increasing complexity and transboundary nature of current disaster risk (and 
events), which requires that a diversity of actors be involved in decision-making and 
planning. Building on this, I use the concept of disaster governance, as introduced by 
Tierney (2012), to frame the analysis. In order to develop this concept, I draw on 
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broader understandings of governance and collaborative governance as a means for 
exploring the role that multiple actors, beyond the confines of the state, play in 
collectively managing complex and uncertain disaster risk.  
 
In Chapter Three, I review briefly some of the key literature on urban flood risk in 
cities of the global South and flood risk management more broadly because the case 
study for this thesis is based on how local government in Cape Town, South Africa, 
manages flood risk in their informal settlements. I reinforce the idea that although 
multiple actors need to be brought together to collaboratively manage flood risk, as 
conceptualised by disaster governance discourse, doing so is challenging in practice.  
 
In PART THREE, I present the conceptual framework that guided the analysis of the case study, 
as well as the research approach and methodology.  
 
In Chapter Four, I present the conceptual framework that guided the empirical 
research and theoretical development. By drawing on insights from both nodal 
governance theory and barriers to adaptation literature, this conceptual framework 
allows me to unpack the characteristics of the key actors governing disaster risk and 
the unique characteristics shaping these actors’ decision-making and activities; 
allowing me to analyse the potential barriers impeding actors’ abilities to govern risk 
and collaborate with other actors.  
 
In Chapter Five, I outline the methodology adopted for this study. I begin with a brief 
discussion on the single-case embedded case study approach, which was used to 
guide the research and inform the choice of qualitative methods used to gather the 
data. I then present the specific qualitative methods employed in this study. One of 
the key methods used was semi-structured, in-depth interviews, which helped me to 
gain in-depth insight into and analysis of ‘who’ manages disaster risk in a particular 
context, as well as the conditions that enable or impede collaboration between 
multiple actors. I also present and discuss the data analysis process, and the ethical 
considerations and limitations of the study. 
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In PART FOUR, I present the case study and an analysis of flood governance in Cape Town, South 
Africa, framed by the conceptual framework and in relation to broader literature.  
 
In Chapter Six, I provide an in-depth overview and broad analysis of flood 
governance in Cape Town, with a particular focus on the challenges related to 
informal settlements. I identify and describe the main actors (called ‘nodes’) 
governing flood risk in Cape Town, with a particular focus on the nodes engaged with 
during the fieldwork: City of Cape Town (CCT) municipal departments represented 
on the Flood Task Team, NGOs active in flood relief provision and flood awareness, 
local politicians (ward councillors), and residents living in an informal settlement. I 
focus on the actions of Cape Town’s Flood Task Team and the experiences of flood 
risk in the informal settlement called Sweet Home.  
 
In Chapter Seven, I explore how the different actors governing flood risk in Cape 
Town have multiple and often contested perceptions of the nature of the problem and 
its solutions (i.e., their mentalities). I explore how these different mentalities impact 
on the types of decisions that are made and which activities are selected. I conclude 
that bringing multiple actors together to reach consensus and carry out collaborative 
disaster governance is a complex and messy process because multiple actors bring 
multiple capacities, technologies, and ideologies with them. I argue that this makes it 
challenging, in practice, to adopt a collaborative disaster governance approach. 
 
In Chapter Eight, I explore the different types of resources and institutional 
structures that are available or lacking to actors governing flood risk in Cape Town. I 
explore the disagreement that exists in the literature, as well as between actors 
governing floods in Cape Town, on whether local government or local communities 
are best equipped to drive the planning and implementation of DRR activities. I 
highlight that in order to strengthen disaster governance, we need to identify what 
the constraints are in terms of nodes’ resources and capacities, and the institutional 
structures available (or lacking) for accessing particular resources. I also present the 
formal and informal institutional structures that actors in Cape Town have to work 
within to access and channel resources, and the impact that these structures have on 
the ability of actors to mobilise resources and coordinate activities. I relate this 
empirical evidence to broader discussions on community resilience and how multiple 
actors are needed to govern disaster risk because they bring with them a diversity of 
key resources and capacities.  
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PART FIVE comprises the synthesis and conclusions of this thesis. 
 
In Chapter Nine, I identify some of the barriers to collaborative disaster governance 
that emerged from the case study in Cape Town. I then discuss the role of multi-actor 
platforms and inclusive partnerships as one way to strengthen collaboration between 
multiple actors. I discuss the need for partnerships with external actors, who bring 
with them, critical resources, such as social capital. I also highlight the critical role 
that external actors can play as intermediaries and bridging organisations between 
local government and communities. 
 
In Chapter Ten, I conclude the thesis. In particular, I highlight the key contributions 
of this research in terms of broadening current disaster governance thinking. I also 
highlight the importance of engagement between multiple actors, across various 
institutional and social boundaries, with inclusive partnerships and multi-actor 
platforms recognised as one way to overcome barriers to collaborative governance, 
as long as they are complemented by strengthened institutional structures.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
 
RE-IMAGINING DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT: 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT AND APPROACH 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Three themes drawn from three sets of literature have contributed towards the theoretical 
framing of this thesis. Firstly, the underpinning tenet of this thesis is that there needs to be a re-
imagining of contemporary DRM, as emphasised in and borrowed from risk governance 
literature. The nature of risks and the way society responds to these risks is changing, which 
requires a shift in our thinking of how risks are managed (Walker et al., 2010). This 
understanding is linked to the reality that contemporary disasters have become increasingly 
global, both in scope and consequences (Kapucu, 2011), and that disaster risks and modern 
society have become too complex and diverse for traditionally centralised, technocratic, and 
non-inclusive DRM approaches (Tierney, 2012).  
 
Secondly, I recognise in this thesis that there has been a decentralisation and democratisation of 
activities that were managed traditionally by governments and experts (Shearing, 2005). 
Tierney (2012), reflecting on contemporary disaster and environmental management activities, 
explains how these activities are no longer carried out by state entities, but are now dispersed 
amongst a diverse set of actors who include private and civil society entities, as well as 
governmental institutions. New governance and collaborative governance literature embraces 
this decentralisation of activities and recognises the strength that it can provide to 
environmental outcomes (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003, Holley et al., 2011). In light of the above 
arguments, this thesis concurs with the arguments in various governance literature that call for 
more approaches that bring together multiple actors and consider the plurality of actors acting 
across various scales and engaging in DRM decision-making (Ansell and Gash, 2007, Holley et 
al., 2011).  
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Thirdly, this thesis draws on the concept of resilience, as it is reflected in DRM and CCA 
literature (Mayunga, 2007, Bahadur et al., 2010, Djalante et al., 2011, Berkes and Ross, 2013, 
Satterthwaite and Dodman, 2013, Tierney, 2014). The drive in DRM practice is to strengthen the 
resilience of cities and communities to disaster risk and climate change (Bahadur et al., 2010, 
IFRC, 2010). In this thesis, it is understood that building the resilience of cities and communities 
emphasises the importance that diverse types of collaboration and partnerships play in building 
and sharing knowledge, bridging gaps in understanding, and creating innovative approaches to 
tackling current and future risks (Berkes, 2007, Bahadur et al., 2010, Djalante et al., 2011, 
Tierney, 2012). 
 
These three themes come from three different sets of literature: risk governance, 
collaborative/new governance, and resilience thinking in DRM and CCA literature. The 
theoretical framing of this thesis is created by linking these three themes from these three sets 
of literature, building on some preliminary links that have already been established, especially 
between risk governance and collaborative/new governance. When re-imagining DRM, in light 
of the above themes, this research draws from and builds on the concept of disaster governance. 
Disaster governance is itself an emerging concept in DRM and environmental management 
scholarship, and therefore there is very limited literature that explicitly uses this concept, and 
so is not presented as one of the sets of literature. Tierney (2012), as one of the very few but 
most prominent authors that uses this concept within a DRM context, highlights how this 
concept emerged from the recognition that activities once carried out by state entities are now 
dispersed amongst multiple and diverse sets of actors who include actors outside of the 
government (Tierney, 2012). Recognising that there is a decentralisation of activities, I explore 
in this chapter what disaster governance means for DRM, the extent to which there has been a 
decentralisation of responsibilities related to DRM activities, how it reflects broader global 
trends, and the extent of decentralisation in South Africa and other countries. 
 
In order to expand on and unpack the concept of disaster governance, this thesis draws on 
governance literature, in particular from ‘risk governance’, ‘new environmental governance’ 
(also referred to simply as ‘new governance’), and ‘adaptive governance’ literature. In this 
chapter, I explore the literature that has contributed towards understandings of disaster 
governance, highlighting how disaster governance fits into current DRM theory and debates, 
and the role it plays in providing an alternative theoretical approach to managing complex 
social and environmental problems, such as those associated with disasters and climate change. 
I go on to unpack the concept of ‘building resilience’ in urban DRM and how it can support and is 
supported by disaster governance processes. Although the concept of disaster governance has 
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its foundation in broader governance literature, it has not been linked to the concept of 
resilience, which has become a key concept in DRM practice and scholarship. This is a gap that I 
identify and then address by exploring some of the key linkages that can be made between the 
concept of disaster governance and resilience. Finally, I reflect on collaborative governance 
theory and practice to explore the concept of how different priorities and capacities of the 
actors, who are central to governance processes, can have an impact on the outcomes of these 
processes.  
 
 
2. DECENTRALISATION AND THE AGE OF DIVERSITY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
More recently in disaster scholarship and practice, there has been increasing recognition of the 
critical role that collective action can play in the reduction of disaster risk, especially in cases of 
extreme events (UNISDR, 2004, GNDR, 2011, UNISDR, 2011, GNDR, 2013, Van Niekerk, 2014). 
Van Niekerk (2014:862) argues that the ‘tenor’ of the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR, 
2005), as well as research by UNISDR’s Global Assessment Reports (UNISDR, 2011, UNISDR, 
2013), is that “communities should benefit from the decisions taken at a strategic level and that 
an incremental process of decentralising DRR may be the best way forward”. Tierney (2012) 
describes how large-scale disasters increasingly require cross-institutional and cross-border 
collaboration, as well as complex governance arrangements made up of multiple actors and 
entities, in order to manage and address the related impacts. This decentralisation of DRR 
activities and the reliance of collective action between a wider range of actors have also been 
documented in the international relief arena. For example, Kapucu (2011), describes how 
international disaster relief is increasingly made up of independent actors responding to 
disasters individually, with their own individual capacities, but ultimately collaborating with 
each other in order to coordinate their activities and more effectively mobilise disaster relief.  
 
Tierney (2012) argues that the shift towards collaboration and coordinated action between a 
diversity of actors is a reflection of broader globalisation trends. Tierney (2012) is referring to 
examples of complex socio-environmental issues (i.e., large-scale disasters and climate change) 
when she explains how these disasters, which can often have transnational impacts, require 
transnational governance processes and institutions to address them. With governments not 
existing at global scales, transnational governance processes and institutions with the ability to 
coordinate a diversity of agencies and actors are increasingly needed (Tierney, 2012). Tierney 
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(2012) also scales her discussion to the national level, arguing that the shift towards 
collaborative decision-making and multi-actor networks is also a response to the rise of 
contracting and outsourcing, new forms of collaboration (e.g., public-private partnerships and 
joint ventures), and the replacement of hierarchical, bureaucratic systems of control with more 
decentralised networked forms of organisation.  
 
Speaking from a USA-based public administration context, Lynn et al. (2001) discuss similar 
shifts, attributing the decentralisation of operations in the USA towards pressures in the 1970s 
on resources for all levels of government, growing voter’s mistrust of government and 
resistance to taxation, and budgetary constraints that pushed governments towards contracting 
third parties (e.g., non-profit and non-governmental organisations, contractors, and the private 
sector). Lynn et al. (2001) describe how the administration of public policies and programmes 
in the USA shifted away from the traditional 1960-70s ‘bureau model’ whereby government 
agencies provided all the services. These alternative forms of public administration and service 
delivery have since shifted to include collaborations, partnerships, and networks between and 
with third parties (i.e., actors outside of the ‘government’) (Lynn et al., 2001). Gupta et al. 
(2015a) attribute the rise of non-state actors in decision-making processes to the push towards 
increased public participation in these processes in the 1960s, and a growing emphasis on the 
decentralisation of government tasks in the 1970s-1980s. This resulted in increased 
subsidiarity, with local authorities increasingly making decisions instead of national 
government (Gupta et al., 2015a). 
 
South Africa has not been immune to the decentralisation and diversification of services, as 
experienced at global scales and in the global North. For example, in the case of South Africa’s 
policing services, Shearing (2005) describes what he sees as the emergence of a new paradigm 
of policing, where there is a diversification of the actors governing security; he refers to this 
new paradigm as ‘the age of diversity’. Marks et al. (2009) see the diversification of policing 
activities as a result of the demands for policing exceeding the capacities of the government and 
police, as well as a recognition that a more networked approach to policing provides a broader, 
more effective reach in service delivery. In South Africa, the decentralisation of DRM is evident 
to a much smaller extent. Many earlier critiques of South Africa’s disaster legislation (i.e., the 
Disaster Management Act No. 57 of 2002 and the National Disaster Management Policy 
Framework of 2005) highlight the progressiveness of this legislation because: 
 
1. it promulgates proactive DRR thinking instead of traditionally reactive disaster 
response thinking; 
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2. it integrates DRR into the government’s hierarchical structure by decentralising 
responsibilities across the three tiers of South African government (i.e., national, 
provincial, and municipal); and 
3. it emphasises the need to engage with communities, external actors, and across 
sectors (Holloway, 2003, Pelling and Holloway, 2006, Van Niekerk, 2006). 
 
More recent critiques, however, highlight how there has been a failure to translate this 
legislation into practice; many local municipalities have failed to establish functioning DRM 
centres and they often lack the capacity and authority to implement DRR-related activities (Van 
Riet, 2009a,b, Van Riet and Diedricks, 2010, Van Niekerk, 2011, Wisner et al., 2011, IFRC, 2012, 
Van Niekerk, 2014). Bulkeley et al. (2011:149) draw on various case studies from around the 
world to explore the role of institutions in climate policy and action; these authors argue that 
the capacity and authority of local governments determines their ability to act:  
 
“Municipalities that have a broader range of competencies have been able to 
intervene across the different modes of governing climate change, whereas those 
with more restricted authority have had less scope to become directly involved.”  
 
These competencies are arguably related to the amount of resources at their disposal. For 
example, Bulkeley et al. (2011) describe how Seoul had sufficient access to funds, which enabled 
the city to implement numerous significant initiatives. Similarly in Indonesia, Djalante and 
Thomalla (2012) highlight how national government has decentralised their DRR programmes 
and given more autonomy to provincial and local government authorities. This move, which is a 
reflection of the decentralisation of governance in Indonesia, has many advantages, such as 
providing better allocation of revenues and resources and more effective and targeted 
development results (Djalante and Thomalla, 2012). The reality, however, is that a lack of 
capacity in terms of human and financial resources at provincial and district/municipal levels 
has resulted in different levels of progress between local government entities, with very few 
provinces and districts (only 144 of the 497) actually developing their DRR agencies and plans 
(Djalante and Thomalla, 2012).  
 
In the context of DRM in Africa, there is a dearth of research that critiques the extent to which 
DRR activities have been decentralised and diversified. Most of this research is limited to 
critiquing African countries’ very top-down approach to managing disasters and how there is 
often very low cooperation, coordination, and communication with non-state actors: in Ghana 
(Oteng-Ababio, 2013); the Cameroon (Bang, 2013, Gaston et al., 2013, Bang, 2014); the Greater 
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Horn of Africa (Baudoin and Wolde-Georgis, 2015); and Zimbabwe (Bongo et al., 2013). In other 
studies, authors have considered the effectiveness of African governments in establishing multi-
actor DRR platforms at the national level. For example, Van Niekerk and Coetzee (2012) and 
Baudoin and Wolde-Georgis (2015) argue that African governments have made lots of progress 
in establishing national-level multi-actor platforms, but have failed to translate these national 
efforts to the local level. GNDR’s (2013) Views from the Frontline report highlights how many 
countries have national platforms for DRM, but that these platforms only have the capacity to 
exchange information and lack the authority for decision-making and for formally coordinating 
DRR activities. Baudoin and Wolde-Georgis (2015) attribute the failure of national DRM 
platforms in Africa to communication gaps that exist between policymakers, climate 
information producers (i.e., experts and scientists), and end-users (i.e., communities). This is in 
contrast to the Philippines, where DRR and DRM councils exist from national to local 
government level; these councils have representatives from government and civil society, act as 
an important communication channel between communities and local government, and have 
the capacity to coordinate DRR activities and allocate funding to DRR (GNDR, 2013).  
 
As highlighted so far in the literature review, there is lots of research that explores issues of 
decentralisation and diversification of DRM responsibilities and activities from a very 
theoretical approach; e.g., from a governance approach, which will be presented in the next 
sections of this literature review. As highlighted so far in this chapter, there is also lots of 
research that examines how DRR legislation, which allows for and promulgates the 
decentralisation of DRR responsibilities across spheres of government, has failed to do so in 
practice, particularly at the local level. What is missing from this body of research, however, are 
case studies of cities that have tried to integrate actors beyond just the state (i.e., a multi-actor 
governance approach), and the barriers that these cities face in doing so. This research aims to 
fill this empirical gap using a case study of flood risk management in Cape Town and how the 
CCT municipality has attempted to integrate a diversity of actors, not always successfully, into 
existing DRM activities.  
 
Acknowledging these different actors and the important role that they can and do play in DRM is 
necessary in order to avoid ‘crises’ where there are many different actors competing for 
resources and political power. This can have detrimental effects on the outcomes of governance 
processes if not addressed properly. Kapucu (2011) emphasises the importance, in the 
international disaster relief arena, of better understanding how the international coordinated 
system of multiple actors is structured. By structure, Kapucu (2011) refers to how actors within 
the particular network are situated with other actors, socio-politically and economically; in 
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other words, what these actors’ relationships with each other are, what the power dynamics 
are, what their perceptions of each other are, and what influence their position in the network 
has on their capacities, functions and outcomes, and on other actors. Kapucu (2011) argues that 
understanding the network properly can help managers to better identify key organisations and 
their specific activities and resources in times of a crisis, and in turn decrease the response time 
during a disaster emergency.  
 
The emphasis that Kapucu (2011) places on understanding the ‘network’ of actors echoes the 
emphasis that is placed on the interactions between multiple actors in ‘interactive governance’ 
discourse (Kooiman et al., 2008, Torfing et al., 2012). Torfing et al. (2012:2-3) define interactive 
governance as “the complex process through which a plurality of social and political actors with 
diverging interests interact in order to formulate, promote, and achieve common objectives by 
means of mobilising, exchanging, and deploying a range of ideas, rules, and resources”. From an 
interactive governance approach, decisions are understood to be made from either bottom-up 
or interactive processes; although these can be orchestrated or initiated by government 
agencies, multiple actors are involved in the interactions (Torfing et al., 2012). There is a range 
of literature that focuses on the ‘networks’ between actors, such as in networked governance, 
which was made popular by Castells (2000, 2011) and is captured nicely in Powell (1990). 
Considering the ‘interactions’ between actors, which is a much more recent concept in the 
literature, is an approach that draws on the notion of ‘networked governance’. In the context of 
this research, I argue that the process of identifying the multiple actors who can and should 
form part of a particular network, and understanding the DRM network (and interactions 
between actors) in a particular context, can help address any gaps or overlaps in disaster risk 
reduction and response activities. 
 
 
3. THEORISING THE AGE OF DIVERSITY FROM A GOVERNANCE 
APPROACH 
 
In the previous section, I discussed the global trend of decentralised decision-making processes, 
the resultant diversification of actors beyond the state, and the extent to which it is evident in 
countries such as South Africa, as well as in DRM. This global trend led to the rise in theories on 
‘governance’, which essentially captures what Shearing’s (2005) ‘age of diversity’ means from a 
theoretical perspective. In order to find a broader, more inclusive term to help conceptualise 
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this diversification of actors providing and managing public goods, common-pool resources, and 
key services, I turn to the literature on governance.  
 
Speaking to broader governance theory, Burris et al. (2008:4) see the contemporary world as 
polycentric; comprising “multiple agencies and sites of governance that govern through a 
variety of forms of power”. This concept of polycentric governance is presented most notably in 
Ostrom’s (2010) paper, which explores the emergence of diverse institutional arrangements, 
beyond the ‘market’ and the ‘state’, for governing common-pool resources and public goods at 
multiple scales. Ostrom (2010) argues for polycentric governance as an alternative to previous 
assumptions of seeing the world through simple models of organisation. These former models 
identified the ‘market’ as the institution best suited for governing private goods, and the 
‘government’ as best suited for imposing the rules and regulations necessary for governing non-
private goods and “forc[ing] self-interested individuals to contribute necessary resources and 
refrain from self-seeking activities” (Ostrom, 2010:2). Ostrom (2010:2) explores in her article 
how this ‘dichotomous view of the world’ fails to “adequately deal with the wide diversity of 
institutional arrangements that humans craft to govern, provide, and manage public goods and 
common-pool resources”. 
 
In the literature, the term ‘governance’ has been applied in a variety of disciplines, with very 
similar overlapping theoretical understandings of what ‘governance’ is; although the theories 
underpinning ‘governance’ are the same, the context, factors, and exact terminology considered 
are specific to the discipline. Torfing et al. (2012:2) see this “spate of concern about governance” 
in the social sciences as a reflection of the interest in trying to “understand changing 
institutional and social patterns in society”, as well as a desire to focus on institutions and 
organisations (i.e., political science) instead of individual behaviour and rational choice theories, 
which have traditionally dominated social and political science. Examples of the term 
‘governance’ being applied to other disciplines include: 
 
 ‘interactive governance’ in fisheries and coastal management literature 
(Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009, Jentoft et al., 2010);  
 ‘risk governance’ in risk and hazards management literature (Renn, 2008b, Van 
Asselt and Renn, 2011); 
 ‘urban governance’ in urban management literature (Pierre, 2005, Tanner et al., 
2009, Gupta et al., 2015b); and 
 ‘global environmental governance’, ‘climate governance’, or even ‘adaptive 
governance’ in climate and environmental change literature, depending on the 
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specific context or themes discussed (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003, Djalante et al., 
2011, Berkhout, 2012, Djalante, 2012, Fatti and Patel, 2013). 
 
Authors making similar observations in the disaster arena have adopted the terms ‘risk 
governance’ (Renn, 2008a, Van Asselt and Renn, 2011), ‘disaster risk governance’ (Ikeda and 
Nagasaka, 2011, Kelman, 2015), or more recently, ‘disaster governance’ (Tierney, 2012). For the 
purposes of this thesis, theoretical understandings of ‘governance’ are drawn from authors who 
discuss governance within the context of collaborative, adaptive, new environmental, risk, and 
disaster governance.  
 
At the simplest level, governance is defined as the intentional shaping or ‘management’ of the 
flow of events in a particular social-ecological system (Burris et al., 2005, Ansell and Gash, 2007, 
Wood and Shearing, 2007, Djalante, 2012). From a new environmental governance perspective, 
governance is seen as capturing the shift from state-centred, autocratic, hierarchical regulation 
to more decentralised, collaborative approaches of governing complex environmental systems 
(Holley et al., 2011). Definitions of governance therefore need to capture the collaboration 
between a diversity of private, public, and non-state actors acting together towards a commonly 
agreed (or mutually negotiated) goal; reaching agreement collectively rather than as 
individuals. From a global environmental governance perspective, Bulkeley and Betsill (2003) 
argue that a governance approach to understanding systems needs to recognise the roles played 
by the state and non-state actors, as well as the complex interactions and relationships between 
them. An interactive governance approach similarly emphasises how problems can be solved 
and opportunities created through the complex interactions that exist between a plurality of 
actors: private, public, and civil (Kooiman et al., 2008, Torfing et al., 2012).  
 
Governance takes on its full meaning when contrasted to the concept of ‘government’. 
‘Governance’ and ‘government’ are not synonymous; there can be governance without the 
presence of the government (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992, Rhodes, 1996, Kelman, 2015). There 
are many examples of this type of governance without government. For example, Millstein et 
al.’s (2003) research on South African grassroots organisations and Boonyabancha et al.’s 
(2012) research in poor communities in Thailand, both help to illustrate the ability for non-state 
actors to access and manage resources outside of government structures. Rosenau and Czempiel 
(1992:4) differentiate between ‘government’ and ‘governance’, arguing that the key differences 
do not necessarily lie in the outcomes of the processes, but in who manages and controls those 
processes:  
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“Both refer to purposive behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; 
but government suggests activities are backed by formal authority… whereas 
governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive 
from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities.”  
 
Drawing on political theory and administrative theory, Freeman (1997) links ‘government’ to 
urban bureaucracy, political authority, and state control, with Kjaer (2009) characterising 
‘government’ by its inherent hierarchies and clear separation between state and society. 
Conceptualisations of ‘governance’ in governance discourse, however, blur the lines between 
public-private spaces and shift the focus from state-oriented hierarchies to the networks and 
actors outside of the state sphere who are involved in the attainment of public goals and the 
management of public resources and services (Pierre, 2005, Meijerink and Dicke, 2008, 
Somerville and Haines, 2008). In other words, while ‘government’ infers a top-down, 
hierarchical approach to the management of public goods, ‘governance’ infers a networked 
approach that includes actors beyond just the state. Powell (1990:303) articulates this 
difference well, when he differentiates hierarchies from networks: hierarchies have “clear 
departmental boundaries, clear lines of authority, detailed reporting mechanisms, and formal 
procedures”, while networks are “lighter on their feet” and allocate resources not through 
discrete exchanges, but through “networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, 
mutually supportive actions”. 
 
The shift in thinking from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ is important for understanding who 
participates in governance processes. Bulkeley and Betsill (2003) see the government as playing 
a role in governance processes, but not as the only or most important actor. Renn (2008a) 
expands on the ‘who’ of governance, arguing that governance takes into consideration civil 
society and organisations external to the state and how they should also be included in decision-
making processes, through public-private partnerships. Burris et al. (2005) have a much 
broader understanding of governance, highlighting not only the actors involved, but the 
institutions, social norms, and practices through which social goods are managed and shared, at 
all scales; including the smaller, local community, and the broader, global community. This 
understanding of governance is particularly useful when applied to global, national, and 
transnational environmental issues (i.e., disasters and climate change) because it takes into 
consideration the plurality of processes, institutions, and actors operating at multiple scales 
(Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003).  
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Important to note here is the use of the term ‘actor(s)’ throughout this thesis, as opposed to 
‘stakeholder(s)’, which is more widespread and accepted in DRM discourse. ‘Actor(s)’ is the 
concept widely used in ‘governance’ discourse, and therefore the term that I use throughout this 
thesis. I prefer the term ‘actor(s)’ because it implies that the individual or group of people are 
‘actively’ engaging with the process and making decisions, as opposed to just being brought into 
the process because they have a ‘stake’ in it.  
 
In the section that follows, I take a closer look at the emergence of the ‘disaster governance’ 
concept. I argue that ‘disaster governance’ as a concept is necessary for the re-imagining of 
DRM; no longer seeing DRM as the traditionally state-centric, top-down management approach, 
but as a networked approach that brings together multiple actors, including state and non-state 
actors. 
 
 
4. DISASTER GOVERNANCE: RE-IMAGINING DISASTER RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Disaster governance is not a commonly used term in disaster literature, and only a few authors 
have started exploring what this term means within a disaster and hazard context (see: Lassa, 
2010, Ikeda and Nagasaka, 2011, Kapucu, 2011, Tierney, 2012, Kelman, 2015). Tierney (2012) 
conceptualises what disaster governance is and addresses some of the theoretical implications 
of this concept, while Kapucu (2011) presents a methodology for mapping multiple actors 
governing risk and relief activities at the international scale. Other authors have applied the 
concept of disaster governance to particular case studies: Kelman (2015) examines the extent to 
which there is collaborative disaster governance in Pacific island communities; Ikeda and 
Nagasaka (2011) apply their understanding of disaster governance to local DRR in Japan; and 
Lassa (2010) presents a thorough assessment of disaster governance at micro-, meso-, and 
macro-scales in Indonesia. There is a lot of literature and several empirical studies that focus on 
DRM activities at various scales (Bosher et al., 2007, CBDRR, 2007, Pelling and Wisner, 2009) 
and DRR legislation and policies (ADPC, 2006, Faling, 2012, IFRC, 2012). There is, however, very 
little DRM literature that focuses explicitly on governance processes and its implications for 
how disasters are managed or should be managed. There is also no methodology other than 
social network analysis that is suggested for mapping and analysing the actors who do and/or 
should govern disasters at the local scale (for example, see Kapucu, 2011).  
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This thesis addresses this gap in theory and methodology by presenting a framework for 
mapping and analysing multi-actor governance at the local scale; this framework is presented in 
Chapter Four. The emphasis in this framework is placed on the actors (and their capacities) 
managing DRR activities, rather than examining the DRM activities themselves. This approach is 
in contrast to common approaches in disaster scholarship, which often focus on the 
government’s activities, legislation, regulation, and government planning, and not governance 
itself (Tierney, 2012). Tierney (2012) highlights the importance of analysing disasters through a 
disaster governance lens because it is a more inclusive concept that recognises how DRM and 
DRR activities take place within the context of broader societal and political contexts, and that 
these contexts either enable or constrain DRM and DRR activities. Disaster governance not only 
takes these contexts into consideration, but focuses on a much wider array of actors and the 
diverse mechanisms that do or do not encourage collaborative actions within the context of 
DRM (Tierney, 2012). 
 
By adopting the concept of ‘disaster governance’, this research highlights key shortcomings in 
traditional DRM approaches. Despite the theoretical paradigm shifts in disaster thinking, there 
tends to still be a ‘paternalistic’ view of what’s best, operationally, in DRR. The term 
‘paternalistic’ is one that Weichselgartner and Obersteiner (2002) use when they refer to DRM 
approaches that ignore local needs and knowledge, and venerate expert- and state-driven 
initiatives. In their chapter on African experiences of community-based DRM, Van Niekerk and 
Coetzee (2012) argue that communities in African countries and cities are often excluded from 
DRR planning because of the prevalence of top-down approaches to DRR by African 
governments. This prioritisation of top-down approaches and communities remaining as 
passive recipients of DRR interventions is attributed to African governments still seeing 
themselves as “the only entity that poses the necessary skills, technologies, and expertise to 
address the impact of disasters” (Van Niekerk and Coetzee, 2012:338). Gaston et al. (2013) also 
see examples of this top-down management approach in the Cameroon’s legal and institutional 
framework for DRR, which places the state as the central, leading actor.  
 
In disaster scholarship, it is widely recognised that there are limitations to top-down DRM 
approaches (Weichselgartner and Obersteiner, 2002, Mercer et al., 2008, Tanner et al., 2009, 
Manyena et al., 2013). These limitations include the meaningful participation of at-risk people in 
DRR planning, getting buy-in from people in DRR activities, empowering people to mitigate 
risks, and ensuring local knowledge is included in assessments. Weichselgartner and 
Obersteiner (2002) argue that as a result of these limitations, DRR strategies that integrate 
hazard assessments, socio-economic factors, and participatory decision-making processes are 
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rare. Participatory DRR strategies also require significant time, commitment, and resources, 
which often discourages policy-makers and government officials from adopting them; 
politicians instead want immediate returns because their terms of office are short, and they 
want sector-based strategies instead of multi-disciplinary, cross-sector approaches 
(Weichselgartner and Obersteiner, 2002, Mercer et al., 2008, Van Riet, 2009a, Djalante, 2012, 
Waddell and Ziervogel, 2014). Tierney (2012:6) argues that although the knowledge already 
exists for how to reduce disaster risk, “applying that knowledge is difficult because of 
institutional inertia and especially because of the benefits those in power obtain through 
activities that increase risk”. 
 
There is a wide range of DRM and CCA literature that emphasises the importance of including 
communities (i.e., civil society) in decision-making and planning, in order to strengthen their 
resilience to disasters and climate change (Pearce, 2003, IFRC, 2004, Cannon, 2008, Cutter et al., 
2008, Thomalla and Larsen, 2010, Gaillard and Mercer, 2012, Fois and Forino, 2014). 
Participatory techniques have been used as a way to try and address this failure to involve at-
risk people in top-down decision-making processes (Mercer et al., 2008). Participatory 
techniques, which aim to ensure that at-risk people play a central role in developing research 
and DRR agendas, are a response to what some authors see as limitations of top-down 
approaches in DRR (Mercer et al., 2008). Although there is extensive literature and research on 
community-based DRR and CCA, which are rooted in participatory DRR approaches, I strongly 
agree with Gaillard and Mercer (2012) when they argue that a top-down or bottom-up approach 
(i.e., either/or approach) to DRR will not be able to reduce disaster risk in the long run. As 
Gaillard and Mercer (2012:98) argue, “reinforcing the ability of people to face natural hazards 
necessitates reducing their vulnerability, which requires intervention from the top, and 
strengthening their capacities, which draws upon actions from the bottom up”. 
 
Important to note here is that despite a strong emphasis in DRR literature on the need to 
include communities in decision-making, and integrate local knowledge and community-based 
DRR into existing DRM practice (IFRC, 2004, Wisner et al., 2004, UNISDR, 2005, Shaw, 2006, 
Shaw, 2012), there is also much evidence from the global South that there is still a lag in this 
regard (Weichselgartner and Obersteiner, 2002, Mercer et al., 2008, Manyena et al., 2013, 
Oteng-Ababio and Sarpong, 2015). In practice, this more recent thinking in disaster scholarship 
is often not institutionalised in policies and budgets (Meijerink and Dicke, 2008, Manyena et al., 
2013). Even in countries where the inclusion of communities is emphasised in their DRR 
legislation, recent research highlights how governments of developing countries have failed to 
translate this into practice (Bang, 2014, Van Niekerk, 2014). O'Brien et al. (2006) argues that in 
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developing countries there is often a lag between planning and implementation, and the 
institutionalisation of these plans; this impacts greatly on the outcomes of the plans and the 
translation of these plans at the local or municipal level, where they are needed most.  
 
The extent to which this is evident in South Africa is an issue raised by Van Niekerk (2011, 
2014). South Africa’s Disaster Management Act No. 57 of 2002 (South Africa, 2002) outlines the 
need for multiple actors, both state and non-state actors, to be included in the various advisory 
forums and intergovernmental structures at the national, provincial, and municipal level. Van 
Niekerk (2014) identifies these non-state actors as at-risk communities, the private sector, 
government parastatals (i.e., utilities companies), academic institutions, traditional leaders, and 
non-governmental organisations (including faith-based, and community-based, and relief 
organisations). South Africa’s (2002) Disaster Management Act also stipulates the need for 
participatory DRM programmes and disaster risk assessments (DRAs) at the municipal level, 
which actively involve communities in assessing and reducing disaster risk. Despite this 
progressive legislation, South Africa’s local municipalities are failing to implement those 
objectives in practice (Van Riet, 2009a,b, Van Niekerk, 2011, 2014, Van Niekerk, 2014). 
 
Although there have been shifts in DRM towards more inclusive, participatory DRR, I argue that 
this is insufficient and that there needs to be a further ‘re-imagining’ of current DRM 
approaches. Coming from risk governance discourse, Walker et al. (2010) argue that broader 
changes in how society is organised, as well as changes in the types of hazards and risks 
societies currently face, impact on and demand different ways of managing these hazards and 
risks in society (Figure 3). In other words, not only do global trends, such as decentralisation, 
outsourcing, and globalisation impact on the way that disaster risk is addressed (i.e., by non-
state actors), but increasingly complex, multi-faceted hazards and vulnerabilities demand a 
change in the way that disaster risk is addressed.  
 
 
Figure 3: Two rationales for changing current risk management approaches 
(Adapted from: Walker et al., 2010:8) 
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Authors writing from new environmental governance discourse and adaptive governance 
discourse propose a similar argument, emphasising how complex and dynamic social-
environmental systems have become too complex and diverse for centralised, top-down, state-
centred management approaches (Burris et al., 2008, Holley et al., 2011). Based on this 
argument, Holley et al. (2011) argue that management approaches need to shift from 
traditionally fragmented command and control mechanisms, to more decentralised, integrated, 
and localised approaches that involve multiple sets of actors acting across large scales. Adaptive 
governance calls similarly for governance systems that are less rigid, prescriptive, and 
hierarchical, and more innovative and effective in managing complex socio-environmental 
problems such as disasters (Holley, 2010, Djalante, 2012). 
 
When conceptualising ‘disaster governance’, important ideas can be drawn from risk 
governance discourse. Risk governance is seen as a tool for describing how decisions are made, 
with the ultimate aim of improving decision-making structures and processes in the face of 
complex and uncertain risks (Van Asselt and Renn, 2011). Risk governance is also understood to 
be a multi-disciplinary activity that: 
 
“looks at the complex web of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms 
concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analysed and 
communicated, and how management decisions are taken” (Renn, 2008a:9). 
 
Risk governance therefore argues that decisions about risks are taken within complex webs of 
actors, rules, processes, and institutional arrangements (Walker et al., 2010, Van Asselt and 
Renn, 2011). Risk governance provides a framework for recognising the need to bring multiple 
actors together to manage complex risk in a decentralised manner; furthermore, it provides a 
framework for understanding how decision-making processes should accommodate diverse or 
conflicting interests. Within risk governance discourse, attention is also shifted from the 
product(s) of disasters and risk management, to the process of risk management (Van Asselt and 
Renn, 2011). In my conceptualisation of disaster governance, I therefore emphasise the process 
of managing and intentionally shaping events. Tied in to this is the process of identifying the 
multiple actors who are and should be involved in decision-making and understanding how 
these actors interact and impact on the process as a whole. By analysing the governance process 
itself and those actors shaping this process, I argue that the disaster governance process itself 
can be strengthened, thus increasing the capacity of the system to cope with and reduce risk. 
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5. BUILDING RESILIENT SYSTEMS: LINKING THE CONCEPTS OF 
RESILIENCE AND DISASTER GOVERNANCE 
 
With the onset of environmental change and the increased complexity of social-ecological 
systems (what Cutter et al. (2008) refer to as ‘human-environment interactions’), the concept of 
‘resilience’ and ‘building resilient cities’ has taken centre stage in CCA and DRR debates (Twigg, 
2007, Bahadur et al., 2010, IFRC, 2010). There are multiple definitions and understandings of 
the concept of resilience (Bahadur et al., 2010), and there exists a rich body of scholarship on 
resilience, which elucidates its potential and shortcomings with regard to its application in DRM 
and CCA discourse (Manyena, 2006, Davoudi, 2012, Alexander, 2013).  
 
From a human-centric, sociology perspective, Tierney (2014:6) defines resilience as “the ability 
of social entities to absorb the impacts of external and internal system shocks without losing the 
ability to function, and failing that, to cope, adapt, and recover from those shocks”. Cutter et al. 
(2008:599) define resilience as “the ability of a social system to respond and recover from 
disasters and includes those inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb impacts and 
cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive processes that facilitate the ability of the 
social system to re-organise, change, and learn in response to a threat”. Tierney (2014) adds 
that resilience arises from social order and is rooted in social, economic, and cultural conditions.  
 
Roberts and O'Donoghue (2013) reflect on how definitions of resilience either implicitly or 
explicitly refer to the ability of socio-ecological systems to ‘bounce back’ to a previous state, and 
how this view of resilience is not useful for South African cities. Roberts and O'Donoghue (2013) 
use the city of Durban as an example, explaining how in its current form, current factors such as 
high unemployment, high inequality and poverty levels, and lack of services and infrastructure 
are not sustainable and should not be preserved. In thinking about resilience in South African 
cities, and arguably in many cities of the global South, Roberts and O'Donoghue (2013) prefer 
the terms ‘bouncing forward’ and ‘transformation’. Transformation is defined in the IPCC’s 
(2012:5) SREX report as the “altering of fundamental attributes of a system (including value 
systems; regulatory, legislative, or bureaucratic regimes; financial institutions; and 
technological or biological systems”. This idea of bouncing forward relates to how Folke (2006) 
sees disturbances (such as disasters and climate change) not as something to resist, but as an 
opportunity to change. Resilience is therefore seen by Folke (2006) as providing an opportunity 
for systems to develop new trajectories.  
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In defining resilience, I draw on UNISDR’s (2004) definition, which is framed within DRM 
discourse. Resilience is defined by UNISDR (2004:6) as: 
 
“the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social 
system is capable of organising itself to increase this capacity for learning from past 
disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.” 
 
UNISDR’s (2009a:24) more recent definition adds a disaster response/relief angle to resilience, 
highlighting the need for the impacted “system, community or society… to resist, absorb, 
accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and 
functions”. 
 
UNISDR’s (2004) definition highlights the ability of the system to adapt by resisting or changing 
in order to reach acceptable levels of functioning. Here, ‘resisting’ can be applied to cities of the 
global North, where their current form and functions are sustainable; for cities of the global 
South, on the other hand, ‘to change’ by either ‘bouncing forward’ or through ‘transformation’, is 
needed in their context of high levels of inequality, poverty, and weak governance. UNISDR’s 
(2004) definition of ‘resilience’ highlights the concept of ‘adaptive capacity’, which has strong 
linkages to the concept of ‘vulnerability’ (Smit and Wandel, 2006, Engle, 2011). Adaptive 
capacity is defined by the IPCC (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001:894) as “the potential, capability, or 
ability of a system to adapt to climate change stimuli or their effects or impacts”. In one of IPCC’s 
reports (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001), the features that are argued to determine a community or 
region’s adaptive capacity include economic resources, technology, information and skills, 
infrastructure, institutions, and equity.  
 
Berman et al. (2012) differentiate between ‘coping capacities’ and ‘adaptive capacities’, arguing 
that CCA processes need to transform ‘coping’ capacities into ‘adaptive’ ones. Berman et al. 
(2012) define coping capacities as “the ability of actors to draw on available skills, resources, 
and experiences as an immediate response to manage adverse stress or shocks”, whereas 
adaptive capacities are the ability to “prepare in advance […] and to adjust, respond, and adapt 
to” potential stresses and shocks. Coping capacities here are just a different term for ‘coping 
strategies’ that other authors refer to in DRM literature (Few, 2003, Paul and Routray, 2009). 
Important to note here is that ‘coping’ with potential stresses and shocks is seen as undesirable 
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and not sustainable, whereas being able to ‘adapt’ to stresses and shocks implies a level of 
resilience. To frame this differently, as O'Brien et al. (2006:71) explain, by adopting the concepts 
of adaptive capacity and resilience, the focus shifts from a more negative “what is missing in a 
crisis (i.e., needs and vulnerabilities)” to a more positive “what is already in place (i.e., resources 
and adaptive capacities)”. Further, identifying the elements already in place can help decision-
makers to explore ‘what’ can be done with existing capacities and resources. I argue that the 
focus on adaptive capacities and resilience is important for understanding disaster governance 
processes because it highlights the importance of assessing and identifying what actors, 
resources, capacities, and institutions are already in place; by identifying these elements, we can 
then move to a place of exploring how to use and share these elements in a way that strengthens 
the resilience of cities and communities.  
 
UNISDR’s (2009a) definition of resilience shifts the focus from households and individuals, 
which previous theories about vulnerability focused on (Cannon et al., 2003, Wisner et al., 
2004), to broader systems (i.e., socio-ecological or socio-technical), communities, or society. In 
the case study presented in this thesis, this system can refer to the whole city, including at-risk 
communities, relevant infrastructure (i.e., drainage in a flooding context), communication 
systems, local government, and so on. As I will argue in Chapter Eight, the ‘system’ cannot only 
focus on at-risk communities because an important component of building a community’s 
resilience to risk is their access to resources and networks outside of their socio-political and 
geographically-demarcated boundaries; therefore the focus needs to shift to consider the 
linkages between government, communities, and other external actors.  
 
Resilience denotes the ability of a social-ecological system to cope with risk, in the sense that it 
is able to deal with a change in the system and continue functioning without being completely 
overthrown (Lopez-Marrero and Tschakert, 2001, IFRC, 2010). Because of environmental 
change and the impacts it is having and will continue to have on the frequency, magnitude, 
uncertainty, and complexity of disasters, I argue that it is impossible to comprehensively 
prepare for a range of scenarios. While traditional DRM approaches aimed to resist risk and 
stop disasters, resilience thinking recognises the need for management approaches to be more 
flexible and proactive, with a longer-term view, in order to better deal with uncertainty and 
complexity (Bahadur et al., 2010). Tierney (2014) argues similarly that because risk cannot be 
eliminated completely, strengthening someone’s resilience can help them to contain the risk, 
reduce the likelihood of disaster events happening, and cope better when disasters do happen. 
Tierney (2014:7) argues that risks and related losses can be reduced or contained if people 
“undertake actions that make them less ‘brittle’ and failure-prone, and more robust, flexible, and 
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adaptable”. Recognising the complexity of social-environmental problems such as disasters, 
Tierney (2012) argues that these problems need to be addressed beyond the confines of 
individual organisations and institutions. Instead, socio-environmental problems need to be 
managed “through networks of collaborating and diverse entities… because networks are 
flexible, adaptable, and capable of mobilising diverse resources” (Tierney, 2012:343).  
 
Explicit in UNISDR’s (2004) definitions of resilience is the need for systems to be able to 
‘organise itself’, ‘increase its capacity to learn from past disasters’, ‘protect itself from future 
disasters’, and ‘improve its risk reduction measures’. Berkes (2007) outlines four characteristics 
of a resilient system, which links to the idea of resilience as a way to ‘bounce forward’, 
‘transform’, and ‘improve adaptive capacities’:  
 
1. A resilient system is able to learn to live with change and uncertainty by 
building social (e.g., rules of conduct in an event) and ecological memory (e.g., 
which vegetation survives particular events) from experiences of past events.  
2. A resilient system nurtures diversity ecologically, economically, and in 
partnerships. Diversification is able to reduce risks by spreading them out, and 
increase available options before, during, and after a particular event. Diversity 
in partnerships, for example, recognises how bringing multiple actors into 
decision- and policy-making increases the potential for knowledge-sharing and 
new knowledge.  
3. A resilient system combines different forms of knowledge, such as scientific, 
traditional/indigenous, and local knowledge, from a range of actors. Bringing 
together different forms of knowledge through multi-actor and cross-scale 
platforms is able to stimulate learning and innovation, and bridge gaps in cross-
scale and cross-sector understanding.  
4. A resilient system creates opportunities for self-organisation and re-
organisation. This can be achieved by strengthening the capacity of 
communities to socially and politically organise themselves when facing 
disasters, as well as building linkages across scales of governance through 
multi-level partnerships (e.g., from the community level, to regional and 
national levels). 
 
In thinking about disaster governance as an approach to building resilient communities and 
cities, two key points emerge from Berkes’ (2007) view of what makes a system resilient. 
Firstly, there is the notion of building knowledge and diversifying knowledge. Different forms of 
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knowledge, including skills and information, are recognised as critical for helping cities (as 
systems) learn from past disasters, understand present risks, predict future risks, and improve 
on current risk reduction measures. The second point, which informs the ‘how’ of building and 
diversifying knowledge, is to bring multiple actors into governance networks and to diversify 
partnerships. I argue that it is the latter that helps to bring different forms of knowledge 
together in a way that can stimulate learning and knowledge, create social and ecological 
memory, and bridge gaps in understanding. Bringing multiple actors together and diversifying 
partnerships within a disaster governance framework will in turn enable actors to build, 
diversify, and share knowledge in a way that will strengthen the capacity of communities and 
cities to self-organise and re-organise in the face of disasters; essentially strengthening their 
resilience to disasters and climate change. Armitage et al. (2011) argue similarly that networks 
and interactions between multiple actors allow actors to contribute and combine a plurality of 
knowledge sources and types. This type of collaborative, knowledge co-production enables 
learning, which can strengthen an individual or group’s adaptive capacity to cope with 
variability and uncertainty inherent in complex environmental problems (Armitage et al., 2011). 
In DRM practice, this would require that a broader range of actors, from multiple disciplines and 
levels in society with different types of knowledge sources, be encouraged to participate in 
DRAs, decision-making, and planning.  
 
Implicit in these definitions of resilience is that resilience is a process, not a static concept. As 
Smucker and Wisner (2008) argue, resilience is a social process whereby communities or cities 
continually respond and adapt to environmental and/or socio-economic and political change. 
Referring to resilience as a process avoids creating an artificial snapshot in time and space, and 
recognises instead the process of ‘building’ and ‘strengthening’ the necessary elements that 
create resilience. This mindset also recognises that resilience fluctuates over time in relation to 
internal and external socio-economic, political, and environmental factors.  
 
Also implicit in the above arguments is that in order for a system to be considered resilient, 
there needs to be a combination of different forms of knowledge, from a range of actors. 
Although previous definitions of ‘governance’ emphasised how decision-making processes have 
(and should) become decentralised and now (and should) include actors beyond the state, 
missing from this is an explicit appreciation for the role that actors other than the state and civil 
society can and should play. Here I am referring to actors who include scientists and other 
experts, as well as NGOs and ‘intermediaries’. Bulkeley and Betsill (2003) draw attention to the 
role of scientists in governance systems; scientific communities, they argue, can provide 
information that helps to influence decision-makers. Baudoin and Wolde-Georgis (2015) reflect 
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on current DRR efforts in the Greater Horn of Africa, arguing that one reason why there is a 
failure to translate DRR efforts into positive outcomes at the community level is because there 
are communication gaps between local communities, scientists (i.e., especially in the case of 
climate change and climate information), and decision-makers. These authors emphasise the 
need for linkages to be built between these groups of actors, in order to strengthen current DRR 
practice in this region of the world. In particular, Innocenti and Albrito (2011) argue that in 
order to address disaster risks and climate change, there needs to be participatory dialogue 
between the scientific community and policy makers, while Shannon et al. (2014) emphasise the 
importance of collaboration between local communities and scientists for ensuring the co-
production of DRR expertise and to improve knowledge exchange. Gaillard and Mercer (2012) 
also recognise the additional role that local knowledge plays in DRR; they argue that local 
knowledge and scientific knowledge need to be included, thus an array of actors need to 
contribute to DRR. 
 
It is also important to recognise the contributions that internal ‘expert’ actors and local 
communities can provide to risk assessments and decision-making. Weichselgartner and 
Obersteiner (2002) draw attention to the situation found in developing countries where often 
‘external’ experts (e.g., scientists and researchers who do not live in a particular community) 
overlook the immediate priorities of people living in hazard-prone areas. For example, 
communities might prioritise solutions that address immediate issues such as a lack of health 
and education services, or a lack of political representation, whereas ‘external’ experts might 
miss this nuance while focusing on more disaster-related factors. Therefore, I argue that it is 
critical to also include local communities in DRAs and DRR planning.  
 
In addition, this raises the importance of including NGOs and community-based organisations 
(CBOs) in DRR planning and decision-making. As stressed by Benson et al. (2001), more 
attention needs to be paid to NGOs and CBOs in DRM processes because they are well-placed to 
support DRR activities at the local level; they are based ‘on the ground’, have connections and 
social capital with communities, and are already involved in DRR-related activities, even if they 
are not explicitly labelled as such. The critical role that NGOs and CBOs can play as 
intermediaries is explored in Chapter Nine.  
 
Mayunga’s (2007) understanding of resilience, which draws on DFID’s (1999) sustainable 
livelihoods approach and capitals-based discourse, provides further insight into the idea of 
social capital playing an important role in strengthening decision-making between multiple 
actors. Mayunga (2007) sees social capital, which represents trust, norm, and networks, as 
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necessary for ensuring high levels of coordination and cooperation within a particular system. 
Bahadur et al. (2010) add to this, arguing that for there to be social capital between actors, there 
needs to be trust and accountability. Drawing on these arguments, I argue that social capital, in 
the form of trust and accountability, is critical for there to be collaboration between actors and 
effective flood governance processes. Not only is social capital critical for there to be 
collaboration, but Cowan and Arsenault (2008) argue that social capital is also a key outcome 
and benefit of collaboration. According to Cowan and Arsenault (2008:23), collaboration 
between multiple actors helps to build social capital of, and between, actors, by “breed[ing] 
social trust, foster[ing] norms of reciprocity, and creat[ing] stores of goodwill that can prove 
invaluable during times of crisis”, and that even cross socio-political divides.  
 
In summary, I have drawn linkages between the key characteristics of resilience and disaster 
governance, in order to inform how cities and communities can better govern disasters. The 
types of linkages that I have identified in this section are very similar to the interlinkages that 
Djalante et al. (2011) identify between building resilience in the context of DRR and the key 
characteristics of adaptive governance. Djalante et al. (2011) present a diagram (Figure 4) that 
shows these linkages, which also captures the arguments that I have presented so far. Important 
to note here is that in order to build and strengthen adaptive capacities and resilience through a 
disaster governance approach, there needs to be a diversity of actors at multiple levels, a 
decentralisation of responsibilities, participation and collaboration between these actors, social 
capital and trust to enable collaboration, a diversity and co-production of knowledge, and 
bridging organisations that can support and enable dialogue and collaboration. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Interlinkages between the key characteristics of adaptive governance in relation to 
building resilience 
(Source: Djalante et al., 2011:4) 
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6. DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE: STRENGTHENING 
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE PROCESSES 
 
I argue in this thesis that collaborative processes, as understood within collaborative 
governance discourse, are key to strengthening the resilience of cities and communities. 
Collaborative governance is defined by Ansell and Gash (2007:543) as a process that brings 
“multiple stakeholders together in common forums with public agencies to engage in 
consensus-oriented decision-making”. Collaborative governance has become a popular 
catchphrase in management and policy-based discussions and documents. The concept 
essentially emerged from various sources within governance scholarship, often as a response to 
failed governance attempts, the high politicisation of regulation, and the accountability failures 
within broader management approaches (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Normatively, collaborative 
governance has connotations of working together and cooperating with multiple actors. 
Theoretically, collaborative governance draws on broader governance theory. Ansell and Gash 
(2007) argue that collaborative governance captures the way in which multiple actors can 
actively engage with one another through formal, deliberative processes that aim to build 
consensus, reach a common goal, and implement and manage public policy, programmes, and 
assets. 
 
In developing their model of what collaborative governance is, Ansell and Gash (2007) identify 
key components or principals of what collaborative governance should be. They argue that 
collaboration implies the agency for all actors to communicate and influence decision-making in 
a deliberative, multilateral process, as opposed to mere consultation (Ansell and Gash, 2007). 
Implicit in this is the idea that all actors have a responsibility for policy outcomes, and therefore 
all actors (particularly non-state actors who are often sidelined in these processes) should be 
engaged directly in all stages of decision-making processes (Freeman, 1997, Ansell and Gash, 
2007).  
 
It is recognised in the literature that although collaborative governance calls for all actors to be 
directly involved, distinctive leadership roles and the ultimate authority on decisions often 
remain with public agencies (Leach et al., 2002, Ansell and Gash, 2007). I argue that this should 
not, however, prevent non-state actors from participating in decision-making processes. Ansell 
and Gash (2007) see collaborative governance as being a formal process, in order to distinguish 
it from conventional forms of agency-interest group interactions, implying an explicit, public 
strategy with shared activities, structures, and resources. Central to collaborative governance is 
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therefore the “institutionalisation of a collective decision-making process” (Ansell and Gash, 
2007:548). In order to distinguish collaborative governance from others forms of partnerships, 
mediation, and consensus decision-making, Ansell and Gash (2007) highlight the need for 
collaborative governance to focus on public policies, issues, and affairs.  
 
Referring to water conflict issues, Tarlock (1999) highlights some of the conditions that he sees 
as necessary for ensuring that multiple actors are successful in consensus-building processes. I 
argue that the conditions highlighted from his research are transferrable to a discussion on the 
conditions necessary for disaster governance: 
 
1. The state must play a major role in creating incentives for actors to manage risk; 
2. Institutional players with the capacity to bear risks should play a major role in 
the process because individuals at the local level cannot be expected to assume 
substantial new risk and management obligations; 
3. Incentives for negotiation should be created through actual shifts in political or 
legal power; and 
4. There must be scientific basis for proposed management strategies and 
solutions. 
 
Tarlock (1999) argues further that this type of collaborative governance should not be seen as 
devolution of power, but rather as ensuring that there is shared responsibility for the 
management of water resources. Devolution here is defined as the process whereby authorities 
(e.g., the state) delegate their authority and responsibility, and transfer their decision-making 
power to another entity (e.g., communities, external actors) outside of their own immediate 
jurisdiction; by doing so, they surrender their control (Armitage, 2005). Devolution of rights and 
responsibilities by the state to communities and external actors is most notably seen in 
community-based natural resource management literature (St. Martin, 2001, Armitage, 2005). 
Whether this process is good or bad is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the idea of devolution 
within the context of collaborative governance is applicable to disaster governance processes. 
Disaster governance should not be seen as a way for the state to relinquish (‘devolve’) their 
responsibility and pass it on to non-state actors, but instead to ensure that all actors, at all 
levels, actively participate in consensus-oriented decision-making and ultimately assume equal 
responsibility for reducing flood risk. 
 
In cities of the global South, disaster governance and adaptation to climate change activities are 
faced with different challenges than the North. Satterthwaite (2011) considers the implications 
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for cities of the global South trying to adapt to climate change, with ineffective or 
unrepresentative local governments. Talking from a resilience perspective, Folke (2006) argues 
that transforming a system from its current state to a more desirable state is not an easy 
process. This idea relates well to building resilient cities and how transforming cities from their 
current state is easier said than done. Faced with a wide array of challenges, cities of the global 
South are finding it extremely difficult to transform to a more desirable state.  
 
The World Bank’s (2013) ‘World Development Report 2014’ argues that in order to effectively 
manage risk, whether systemic3 or idiosyncratic4, the state, civil society, the private sector, and 
the international community need to work together to manage risk. The World Bank’s (2013) 
report defends this position by highlighting how governments, although they are expected to 
provide public goods and services and manage risk, can and have often failed to provide these 
goods and services and manage risk on behalf of civil society and the private sector. The World 
Bank’s (2013) report supports these views, arguing that the state needs to play an overarching 
role by supporting and enabling processes of risk management at different scales, including 
household, community, enterprise sector, financial system, macro-economy, and international 
community. Satterthwaite (2011) and Van Niekerk and Coetzee (2012) expand on this, 
explaining how African governments and cities of the global South often lack financial and 
physical resources, skills, and technical capacities, which impacts on their ability to effectively 
address development and disaster risk issues. By bringing multiple actors together to 
‘collaboratively’ govern disaster risk, this research argues that governments can draw on 
multiple sources of resources, knowledge, skills, and technical capacities, to more effectively, 
and holistically address disaster risk and build more resilient cities.  
 
Collaborative governance recognises the diversity of actors working collectively towards a 
common goal, as well as the reality that a diversity of actors brings a wide range of ideologies 
and resources. This is particularly pertinent for managing urban risk with its multiple 
underlying risk factors, particularly in developing countries with high levels of inequality and 
informality. Despite this theoretical understanding, collaborative governance is difficult to 
achieve in practice. In practice, collaborative, decentralised governance approaches, which 
involve a wide range of actors often outside of taken-for-granted networks, are harder to design, 
implement, and maintain. Stoker (2004) argues that although collaborative governance can help 
solve conflicts about the distribution of resources, it cannot resolve the often deeply-entrenched 
                                                             
3 A systemic risk is a large-scale risk that affects the majority within a particular system (e.g., country or region); 
examples include economic or financial crises, increased food and commodity prices, large-scale natural disasters, 
pandemics, conflict, and war (World Bank, 2013).   
4 An idiosyncratic risk only affects the minority within a smaller system (e.g., community, household, or city); 
examples include injuries, loss of income, loss of a job, and illness (World Bank, 2013). 
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ideological differences between actors, which often lead to conflicts and barriers in 
collaborative processes. Collaboration literature recognises the challenges of collaboration and 
the conditions which might hinder effective collaboration. Cowan and Arsenault (2008:24) 
explain how collaboration might fail “because a stakeholder feels disenfranchised, conflict 
derails the process, and/or parties either disagree or change their minds about the project 
goals”. Although public participation and multi-actor collaboration are recognised in the 
literature as essential for strengthening resilience of at-risk communities, there are a number of 
barriers inhibiting society’s ability to govern risk. In this thesis, I consider what some of these 
barriers are in the context of the Cape Town case study and in relation to disaster governance 
processes more broadly. The conceptual framework presented in Chapter Four helps to identify 
some of these barriers; these barriers are then presented and discussed in Chapters Seven to 
Nine. 
 
The diversification of actors, which is a foundation for and a by-product of disaster governance, 
has broader theoretical and practical implications for understandings and outcomes of DRM 
processes. Shearing (2005:58) reflects on how a diversification of actors providing services also 
results in a multiplication of “mentalities, institutions, and technologies”, which these multiple 
actors use to produce a diverse set of styles and practices. One of the potential implications of 
diversification is the potential for conflict and a lack of collaboration between actors, as a result 
of these differences in priorities and ideologies. Ballard et al. (2005), reflecting on the multiple 
civil society actors in South Africa who managed to establish themselves in various forms and 
organisations in post-Apartheid South Africa, explain how there was very little uniformity 
between these groups. This resulted in a diversity of social movements and groups, with 
multiple priorities and concerns, and different ideologies informing their actions (Ballard et al., 
2005). These differences meant that engagement between social movements and the state “[fell] 
on a continuum between in-system collaborative interactions on the one extreme, and out-of-
system adversarial relations on the other” (Ballard et al., 2005:625).  
 
Inclusive governance theorists argue for transparent measures that unpack the vested interests 
of diverse actors governing, in order to reconcile them and ensure these actors trust each other 
and have confidence in the management process (Renn, 2008a). Institutional and individual 
mandates, rationales, perceptions, and vested interests are seen as contributing factors in these 
cultural differences and diverse framing of the issues (Renn, 2008a). Inclusive governance fails, 
however, to propose a framework for unpacking the differing rationales and individual 
characteristics of the actors involved. I argue in this thesis that these different rationales and 
individual characteristics can often lead to conflict, but if understood properly, can provide 
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conditions for more effective decision-making and opportunities for collaboration. This thesis 
addresses this gap by providing a theoretically-informed framework that helps identify and 
analyse the multiple actors within a particular networked governance system, in order to better 
understand “their internal constitutions, their cultures, their resources, and the strategies they 
use to amass and project power” (Burris et al., 2008:127). A more in-depth discussion on this 
framework and how it draws on nodal governance theory and Ekstrom et al.’s (2011) barriers 
to adaptation framework is provided in Chapter Four.  
 
 
7. SUMMARY 
 
The nature of risks and the way society responds to these risks is changing, requiring a shift in 
our thinking of how they are managed. These systemic risks, embedded in social, economic, and 
political realities, have become too complex and diverse for traditional centralised and 
technocratic management approaches. With environmental change exacerbating existing 
patterns of global disaster risk, DRM approaches need to be able to function in highly dynamic 
and complex social-ecological systems. This is especially the case in cities of the global South, 
where majority of the urban poor live in marginalised communities and face ongoing shocks 
and stresses. In response to higher levels of uncertainty and complexity, the disaster community 
needs to adopt more innovative, integrated and flexible risk management approaches that are 
able to holistically and systematically address urban disaster risk. Resilience thinking 
contributes towards this gap in disaster discourse, advocating for systems to not simply resist 
change, but increase their capacity to learn, re-organise, and diversify. DRM literature calls for a 
shift towards bottom-up, participatory approaches where the public are involved in DRR 
decision-making and planning. New governance literature calls for decentralised, yet more 
holistic and integrated approaches that consider the interests of a plurality of actors acting 
across various scales. Similarly, collaborative governance recognises the need to engage with a 
plurality of actors and bring them together onto common platforms where they can engage in 
consensus-oriented decision-making.  
 
Effective DRM needs the cooperation of multiple actors working towards a common goal. This is 
particularly applicable in urban areas facing flood risk, where these risks are complex and often 
compounded, and solutions therefore need to be approached holistically. This requires not only 
a range of approaches and strategies to holistically reduce risk, but recognition that multiple 
actors with multiple skill-sets, tools, and understanding of the problem should be involved in 
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governance processes. Particularly for cities of the global South, where natural hazards interact 
with exogenous factors such as weak governance, lack of adequate basic services, densification, 
and socio-economic instability, the complexity of contemporary disaster risk demands a multi-
actor approach to governing risk. Governance theory recognises the development of more 
complex networks that include public and private actors working collectively, yet using their 
own distinctive ways and particular processes to contribute towards the common goal. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
 
URBAN FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter Two, I focused on the theoretical concepts that have assisted my conceptualisation 
and understanding of disaster governance as an approach to strengthen cities’ resilience to 
disaster risk. Since the case study for this thesis is based on Cape Town and how its local 
government manages flood risk in its informal settlements, I present a brief literature review on 
urban flood risk management in this chapter. The literature review provides insight into some 
of the theory related to flood risk management and how it fits within my understanding of 
disaster governance. In this chapter, I discuss briefly the effects of urban flooding on the urban 
poor living in cities of the global South. I also highlight current theory on ‘sustainable’ and 
‘integrated’ flood risk management, arguing that sustainable flood governance lies at the 
interface of socio-political and technical considerations (i.e., non-structural and structural 
measures respectively) of flood risk management. This chapter therefore presents a slightly 
more focused discussion on current thinking and practice in flood risk management discourse, 
with a focus on cities of the global South and experiences in informal settlement contexts. Many 
of the discussions presented in this chapter, in particular the socio-political and economic 
challenges to flood risk management faced by many cities of the global South, will be picked up 
in later chapters of this thesis when I present the findings from the Cape Town case study.  
 
 
2. THE IMPACT OF URBAN FLOOD RISK ON CITIES AND THE URBAN 
POOR 
 
Recognised in the literature on floods and flood management is that urban flood risk is 
increasing globally because of an increase in populations living in cities that are located next to 
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large bodies of water (e.g., riverine and coastal) (Butler and Davies, 2004, Ashley et al., 2007, 
Zevenbergen et al., 2008, Swiss Re, 2013). The African continent continues to have the highest 
urbanisation rate in the world, with its rapidly expanding cities pushing many of its new 
immigrants into marginal, unsafe areas that remain largely un-planned, un-serviced, and un-
governable hotspots of disaster risk (Pelling and Wisner, 2009, Ziervogel and Smit, 2009). 
Urbanisation also results in an increase of impervious areas such as roads, buildings, and paved 
areas, which reduces infiltration and increases the amount of surface runoff; when combined 
with inadequate or unmaintained stormwater drainage infrastructure, localised flooding takes 
place (Parkinson and Mark, 2005). Vulnerability to flooding is a growing concern in many cities 
of the global South because these cities tend to have higher population densities, and majority of 
their urban poor are forced to settle in informal, unregulated housing in flood-prone areas 
(Schipper and Pelling, 2006, Satterthwaite et al., 2007, Douglas et al., 2008, Tanner et al., 2009). 
 
Douglas et al. (2008:187) argue that “floods are natural phenomena, but damage and losses 
from floods are consequences of human action”. Lack of adequate services and infrastructure 
(e.g.,. sanitation, stormwater, water, and health services), as well as poor housing quality, 
increase the risk of people living in informal settlements to hazards such as flooding and a 
changing climate (Armitage and Rooseboom, 2000, Pelling, 2003a, Huq et al., 2007, 
Satterthwaite et al., 2007, Douglas et al., 2008, Ziervogel and Smit, 2009, Graham, 2010). 
Weather-related disaster events, which include flooding, storms, cyclones and hurricanes, and 
storm surges, will be exacerbated in cities of the global South by ongoing urbanisation, 
population and economic growth, and high rates of floodplain occupancy (Mitchell, 2003, Dicke 
and Meijerink, 2008, Hegger et al., 2013). Compounding these existing challenges are the 
predicted impacts of climate change: increased frequency, duration, magnitude, and severity of 
hydro-meteorological hazards such as flooding, landslides, storms, drought, and temperature 
extremes, as well as vector-borne and water-related diseases (Huq et al., 2007, Pelling and 
Wisner, 2009, Tanner et al., 2009, Ziervogel and Smit, 2009). 
 
Although overall flood mortality5 in the world is decreasing, mortality to all weather-related 
hazards is increasing in countries with weak governance and low GDPs (UNISDR, 2011). 
Economic loss from flood events and tropical cyclones continues to rise across the world, 
seriously threatening the economies of countries with low GDPs (UNISDR, 2011). Table 1 
illustrates how the numbers of people per year exposed to floods have doubled globally in the 
last 40 years, particularly in East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                             
5 Flood-related deaths per capita. 
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(UNISDR, 2011). Table 2 illustrates further the economic implications of flood exposure, 
highlighting the average annual global GDP exposed to floods.  
 
 
Table 1: Flood exposure by World Bank Region (million people per year) 
 
(Source: UNISDR, 2011:26) 
 
 
Table 2: Average annual global GDP exposed to floods (in billion 2000 US$) 
 
(Source: UNISDR, 2011:32)  
 
 
Notable in these two tables is that OECD countries, which comprise the global North and so-
called ‘developed’ countries, have relatively low numbers of people who are exposed to floods 
each year, yet their GDP exposed to floods is significantly higher than other regions of the world. 
Although economic losses due to floods are increasing faster in OECD countries, the impact of 
economic losses relative to GDPs of countries of the global South is much higher and thus 
threatens their economies more (UNISDR, 2011).  
 
The urban poor, who often live in marginalised urban communities, are situated in risk-prone 
environments without property ownership titles, often outside of formal jurisdiction, and 
excluded and discriminated from formal decision-making processes and DRR activities 
(Ahammad, 2011, Bulkeley et al., 2011). In many cities of the global South, there is a lack of 
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institutionalised mechanisms that enable the urban poor to participate in DRM and CCA 
planning and decision-making (Action Aid, 2006, Haque et al., 2014). Where these types of 
participatory mechanisms do exist, they still frequently exclude residents living in informal 
settlements from participating (Haque et al., 2014); this is particularly true for cities where 
informal settlements and slums are considered illegal and are therefore not formally recognised 
by government (Pieterse, 2008, Michelutti and Smith, 2014).   
 
Although government is often seen as best placed to manage flood risk, governments of cities of 
the global South are argued to lack the capacities (e.g., finances, resources, authority, and 
technologies) to respond to and address disaster risk and the needs of the urban poor (Action 
Aid, 2006, Huq et al., 2007, Tanner et al., 2009, Poapongsakorn and Meethom, 2012, Vedeld et 
al., 2012, Hardoy et al., 2014, Vedeld et al., 2015). In developing countries, DRM and CCA 
programmes have to compete for scarce resources and against socio-political issues and 
development agendas that are seen as more pressing, such as infrastructure and service 
delivery backlogs, poor housing quality, poverty, and so on (Chan, 2012, Hardoy et al., 2014). 
These issues, which also apply to Cape Town, are considered in more detail in Chapters Seven 
and Eight of this thesis.  
 
Parkinson and Mark (2005) attribute many of the flood and pollution-related problems that are 
associated with urban runoff in developing countries to institutional challenges: 
 
1. Investments to improve and prioritise drainage infrastructure in public 
spending is only realised once there is a major problem (i.e., large-scale floods); 
2. Deficiencies in the administration systems for urban planning and control often 
result in insufficient controls over new developments;  
3. Planning authorities lack resources to develop and implement effective 
solutions to control runoff and mitigate floods; 
4. DRM departments, urban stormwater departments, and sanitation and water 
departments are often separate and there is a lack of coordination between 
these departments, which leads to contradictions, confusions, and overlapping 
functions and gaps in responsibility; 
5. The boundaries of the stormwater catchment (hydrological boundaries) and 
administrative boundaries (e.g., the city boundary) do not overlap, and this 
makes it challenging to develop and implement holistic drainage systems; 
6. The pace of cities’ growth in developing countries often outpaces the availability 
of funds to extend, rehabilitate, and maintain existing drainage systems. 
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Some of these above challenges are also highlighted in the case study of flood governance in 
Cape Town’s informal settlements, in Chapters Six to Eight.  
 
 
3. SHIFT IN PRACTICE FROM FLOOD DEFENCE TO FLOOD 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Flood risk management is understood in this research as the “combination of all activities [i.e., 
structural and non-structural] that aim at maintaining and improving the ability of a region to 
cope with peak discharges or extreme rainfall events” (De Bruijin et al., 2007:63). In the face of 
environmental change and urbanisation, De Bruijin et al. (2007:63) argue that flood risk 
management needs to “move away from the traditional focus of defending against floods to a 
focus on managing flood risks”. Traditional approaches in flood management centred on 
managing the physical phenomena of flooding through technocratic, engineered ‘flood 
defences’, such as building dams, embankments, and dikes (Plate, 2002, De Bruijin et al., 2007). 
Plate (2002) describes how this engineering-focused approach was driven by professionals 
possessing the engineering-driven, technical knowledge of how to reduce the risk of floods 
impacting on communities or social-ecological systems.  
 
Ashley et al. (2007) highlight how there is widespread recognition that it is impossible to 
provide universal flood protection for people, their livelihoods, and their activities, as a result of 
the rate of environmental change (e.g., climate change) and because of the high costs involved. 
In light of this, Ashley et al. (2007) argue that the benefits of engaging with multiple actors 
(including communities) need to be recognised. Zevenbergen and Gersonius (2007) support this 
view, arguing that engagement with and between multiple actors means that more people are 
better prepared for flooding and they can take an active role in decision-making about where, 
when, and how investments are made and which measures should be taken. Added to this is the 
recognition that contemporary flood risk is dynamic and complex, with climate change and 
global changes providing new challenges and uncertainties (De Bruijin et al., 2007, Pahl-Wostl 
et al., 2008). Therefore, a more integrated approach to flood management needs to be taken, 
which addresses all aspects of flood management, including policy, regulation, decision-making, 
engagement, and technical approaches (Ashley et al., 2007, Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). An 
integrated approach to flood management integrates structural and non-structural aspects of 
flood management into a more holistic approach that aims to build the resilience of systems to 
flooding (Ashley et al., 2007, Zevenbergen and Gersonius, 2007). This approach places 
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importance on softer, non-structural measures, such as policy, insurance, risk awareness, risk 
assessments, and communication, while still recognising the need for technical, structural 
solutions that are supported by non-structural measures (Zevenbergen and Gersonius, 2007, 
Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008).  
 
De Bruijin et al. (2007) argue that flood risk management approaches need to be considered 
within the context of sustainable water management and development, as captured by the 
concept of ‘Integrated Water Resource Management’ (IWRM). IWRM not only aims to 
systematically manage all aspects of water and its use, but also aims to manage catchments as a 
whole (i.e., both the water and the land) (De Bruijin et al., 2007). Current flood risk management 
discourse, which reflects broader DRM thinking, attempts to be more holistic and emphasise the 
need for a diversity of structural and non-structural measures, a plurality of actors contributing 
to decision-making, and a broader understanding of flood risk, which includes looking at the 
catchment as a whole (De Bruijin et al., 2007, Hegger et al., 2013). When talking about a 
diversity of structural and non-structural measures, current flood risk management discourse 
recognises the need to rely on both structural engineered measures that reduce flood risk (e.g., 
embankments and drainage infrastructure) and non-structural flood defences that complement 
structural measures (e.g., wetlands and parks, early warning systems, by-laws, and policy) 
(Plate, 2002, Werritty, 2006, Zhai et al., 2006, Kelman, 2007). This requires that engineers and 
government actors continue to play a key role in flood management activities and decision-
making because they bring the relevant expertise, technical knowledge, and resources that 
other actors (e.g., NGOs and residents) might lack. Despite comprehensive flood management 
plans in some developing countries that outline the need for both structural and non-structural 
approaches to managing flood risk, the reality is that structural, engineered projects are often 
favoured and prioritised financially because they are more visible and quicker to implement 
(Chan, 2012, Poapongsakorn and Meethom, 2012, Desportes, 2014, Ziervogel et al., 2014b, 
Desportes et al., 2015). 
 
Flood risks need to be managed in the short-term and the long-term (De Bruijin et al., 2007). 
Managing the short-term means strengthening the capacity of systems to cope with extreme 
peak discharges and extreme rainfall events as a result of everyday weather and climate 
variability (De Bruijin et al., 2007). Managing the long-term means strengthening the capacity of 
systems to deal with the uncertainty related to predicted climate change and its impact on flood 
probabilities (De Bruijin et al., 2007). This uncertainty is often used as an excuse for delaying 
the implementation of proactive DRR and CCA measures (Adger et al., 2009, Hallegatte, 2009, 
Measham et al., 2011). For this reason, strengthening the capacity of systems to deal with this 
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uncertainty needs to form a crucial part of any flood risk management strategy. The latter can 
be achieved, as advocated in resilience thinking, by increasing the system’s flexibility, 
redundancy, and capacity to learn and re-organise (Berkes, 2007, Folke et al., 2010, Djalante et 
al., 2013). Resilience in the face of uncertainty can therefore be achieved by strengthening the 
system’s capacity to learn from past events and predict future events, and diversifying its 
options for managing current and future risks. The diversification of options here refers to not 
only the strategic implementation of both structural and non-structural measures, but also the 
inclusion of a broader range of actors who can provide both local and expert knowledge in 
decision-making processes.  
 
In South Africa and many other developing countries, centralised management of flood risk is 
still prevalent, with governments driving responses (Van Niekerk, 2011, Chan, 2012, Jha et al., 
2012, Poapongsakorn and Meethom, 2012, Trung, 2012, Van Niekerk, 2014). Parkinson and 
Mark (2005) argue that this type of centralised, top-down flood management and decision-
making approach is unresponsive to the needs and concerns of local actors and fails to 
recognise the wide range of actors who need to be part of the solutions and planning. South 
Africa is impacted by floods annually (DRMC, 2009) and current flood management approaches 
reflect not only the hierarchical nature of management approaches, but the prioritisation of 
engineered, structural measures that rely on input from experts rather than the communities 
most at-risk (Desportes, 2014, Ziervogel et al., 2014b, Desportes et al., 2015). Despite increased 
efforts by the CCT to manage annual flooding and strengthen the resilience of the urban poor 
who are impacted most, the reported reliance on large-scale relief and response activities 
highlights the CCT’s failure to proactively manage flood risk across the city and in particular, its 
informal settlements (Ziervogel and Smit, 2009, Desportes, 2014, Ziervogel et al., 2014b, 
Desportes et al., 2015).  
 
I argue that in order for flood risk management to be more resilient and responsive to the 
priorities and needs of civil society, actors at various scales and from various backgrounds (e.g., 
scientific, policy-making, and local communities) need to be included in decision-making. 
According to De Bruijin et al. (2007) and Innocenti and Albrito (2011), resilient flood 
management systems are only possible when there are multiple actors, with multiple 
knowledge and resources, included in decision-making and governance processes. Parkinson 
and Mark (2005:xii-xiv) argue similarly that urban drainage systems require multiple actors, 
with different sets of resources, capacities, and forms of knowledge:  
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“…to achieve the benefits of IWRM in practice requires much more than simply 
adopting new concepts and the development of new management tools. It requires 
interdisciplinary teams involving engineers, urban planners, economists, 
environmental scientists and social scientists who need to actively engage with 
communities through local politicians, community development workers, social 
activists, and representatives from non-governmental organisations and 
community-based groups”. 
 
Parkinson and Mark (2005) argue further that engineers and state actors need to work with 
communities at the grassroots level, in order to better understand and appreciate the local 
context these communities live in, so that better, more appropriate, and context-specific 
drainage systems can be designed. It is therefore important to consider residents’ perceptions 
of, and responses to, flooding, when designing appropriate forms of drainage intervention or 
developing flood mitigation measures.  
 
Writing from a UK perspective on flood risk management, Cashman (2008) highlights how UK 
flooding policy is also moving from more top-down, technocratic and structural approach 
towards non-structural, people-centred mitigation actions. Cashman (2008) argues that there is 
an emergence of local government arrangements in the UK which try to resolve the limitations 
of the state and its responsibilities, as well as limits of agencies within the state. In the cities of 
Bradford and Glasgow in the UK, flooding has been represented as a community and economic 
issue, which Cashman (2008) argues has created the space for non-state actors to be brought 
into the institutional field of flood management. In these cities, emphasis was placed on 
engagement with communities. Cashman (2008) also reflects on the role of political elites and 
‘policy entrepreneurs’, who he argues are critical actors for ensuring (‘promoting’) a shared 
vision in terms of flood management, and ensuring stronger, more effective networks of 
relationships between actors, both vertically and horizontally. 
 
Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008) see social learning as an important component of the new paradigm of 
management. Social learning, on the one hand, is a combination of individuals learning from 
their observations of others and social interactions within a group; this is seen as an iterative 
feedback process between individuals and their environment, with individuals changing the 
environment and these changes affecting the individual (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). Social learning 
is also understood as a collective process, whereby actors come together into ‘communities of 
practice’ that are made up of individuals that share the same collective goals and objectives. By 
participating in these collective communities, which often develop an identity of its own that is 
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different to the individuals, people continually redefine themselves and that community, 
through the decisions they make, their understandings of issues, and the solutions that are 
created and/or chosen (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). I argue that this collective social learning 
enhances the flexibility and capacity of systems to respond to change, because it not only results 
in improved, collective decisions and solutions to problems, but it also increases the capacity of 
individuals and groups of people (within their communities of practice) to solve issues and 
collaboratively reach a decision.  
 
Although the theory on flood risk management recognises this need to include multiple actors, 
and cities of the global North have adopted these principles in current approaches (Godschalk et 
al., 2003, DEFRA, 2005, Gill, 2008, Hegger et al., 2013, Warner et al., 2013), there is still a lag in 
thinking and practice in cities of the global South (Diagne and Ndiaye, 2009, Lebel et al., 2011, 
Bang, 2013, Gaston et al., 2013, Hiwasaki et al., 2014, Ziervogel et al., 2014b). Current 
stormwater management plans and floodplain management plans in South Africa, for example, 
still focus exclusively on the roles and responsibilities of engineers and experts, referring to civil 
society only in discussions on how to communicate decisions to them and educate communities 
on how to use the services provided (for example, see CCT, 2002b, CCT, 2009).  
 
The CCT’s flood management plans (DRMC, 2009) recognise the importance of drawing on 
multiple knowledge from multiple experts, yet their plans still only prioritise municipal 
departments and officials, with references to ‘external stakeholders’ meaning provincial and 
national government departments, or NGOs funded by the municipality to carry out very 
specific activities on their behalf. Any references to civil society in these flood plans are along 
the same lines as the stormwater management plans; how to communicate decisions to 
communities and educate them on how to protect themselves from and during floods. In cities 
of the global South and in South Africa in particular, flood governance discourse needs to realise 
that flood management is and should no longer be the exclusive mandate of the state, but new 
public and private actors need to enter the scene. I argue in this thesis that this increasing 
decentralisation in disaster management, as well as flood management, means that 
management and decision-making processes are no longer found within the confines of a top-
down, autocratic systems, but are made up of multiple actors governing flood risk. In addition, I 
argue that shifting focus from technocratic, reactive solutions to managing flood risk to 
developing and implementing proactive, participatory risk reduction strategies requires that a 
different set of actors take part in decision-making and planning.  
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4. SUMMARY 
 
This chapter discussed how flood risk is increasing globally because of an increase in 
populations living in cities, which are often built next to bodies of water. In cities of the global 
South, the urban poor are particularly at risk from flooding and hydro-meteorological risk 
because of a lack of adequate services and infrastructure, poor housing quality, and being forced 
to settle on marginal, flood-prone land. This chapter highlighted how flood management in 
developing countries and particularly in South Africa is still technocratic and centralised, 
despite legislation that calls for more inclusive, participatory approaches. This management 
approach is in contrast to the global paradigm shift within flood risk management discourse 
from expert-driven, technocratic approaches that ‘defend’ against floods, to more integrated, 
decentralised approaches that address all aspects of flood management, including policy, 
regulation, decision-making, engagement, and technical approaches. These decentralised 
approaches also focus on bringing multiple actors together (including the state, technical 
experts, and local communities) to inform and make flood management-related decisions. This 
chapter reiterated the discussion in Chapter Two, which highlighted the importance of including 
a diversity of actors in disaster governance processes, in order to strengthen their resilience to 
flood risk.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
 
CAPTURING THE COMPLEXITY OF DISASTER 
GOVERNANCE: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to conceptualise disaster governance, I have drawn on understandings of the concept of 
‘governance’ in its broadest sense. ‘Governance’ is therefore considered to be the plurality of 
actors ‘intentionally shaping’ or managing the flow of events within a social system (Burris et 
al., 2005, Ansell and Gash, 2007, Wood and Shearing, 2007). By focusing on the ‘governance’ of 
events within a social system, attention is drawn to the ‘plurality of mechanisms’ through which 
social goods and services are managed and shared, and through which decisions are made, at 
multiple scales (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992, Burris et al., 2005, Van Asselt and Renn, 2011). 
Implicit in this recognition of the ‘plurality of mechanisms’, is the understanding that there are, 
and needs to be, multiple actors, beyond the confines of the state, who actively participate in 
and contribute to decision-making processes.  
 
In order to bridge the gap from a theoretical understanding of disaster governance to analysing 
what disaster governance looks like in practice in a particular case study, this research draws on 
two theoretical frameworks: nodal governance (Burris et al., 2005) and barriers to adaptation 
(Ekstrom et al., 2011). These two theoretical frameworks are combined in a novel way to form 
the conceptual framework that is used in this thesis to guide the data collection and analysis 
processes, and to help unpack the complexity of disaster governance in the case study on flood 
management in Cape Town. In this chapter, I begin by conceptualising nodal governance and 
unpacking the key characteristics used to define the actors (called ‘nodes’). My discussion then 
focuses on the barriers to disaster governance, drawing on insights from the barriers to 
adaptation framework. This chapter ends with a diagrammatic representation of the conceptual 
framework. 
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2. NODAL GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
Nodal governance is based on contemporary network theory, which seeks to unpack how 
multiple actors operate within social systems, along networks (Burris et al., 2005). These 
networks are recognised as the means through which nodes exert their influence, enabling them 
to govern the systems that they form part of (Burris et al., 2005). Whilst contemporary network 
theory considers networks as a central element in governance theory (Rhodes, 1990, Burris et 
al., 2008), nodal governance places emphasis on the nodes themselves and how the nodes exert 
influence within those broader networks (Burris et al., 2008, Tefre, 2010). Nodal governance 
therefore highlights how these nodes are the sites where governance takes place, seeking to 
better understand how they govern (Burris et al., 2008, Tefre, 2010). By analysing the nodes, 
nodal governance draws attention to what Burris et al. (2008:127) characterise as the nodes’ 
individual “internal constitutions, their cultures, their resources, and the strategies they use to 
amass and project power”. Nodal governance therefore provides a theoretical model for 
understanding governance and for empirically describing what is, rather than normatively 
arguing what ought to be (Tefre, 2010). 
 
Burris et al. (2005, 2008) define nodes broadly, explaining how they may take any form: they 
can be individual actors or a group of actors, formal or informal institutions, government or 
non-government entities, or even local communities and organisations. Braithwaite (2004:300) 
defines nodes more narrowly, arguing that they are “a point in time and space where a cluster of 
actors collaborate to mobilise pooled resources”. Braithwaite’s (2004) understanding of nodes 
reflects network theory, in the sense that networks are seen as an outcome of interdependent 
actors coming together to pool resources (Powell, 1990). The exchange and allocation of 
resources in this context does not take place through discrete exchanges, but through “networks 
of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions” (Powell, 
1990:303). Shearing and Johnston (2010:501) combine these two understandings of nodes, 
arguing that nodes are brought together not only by the resources they pool, but by similar 
activities or tasks:  
 
“[Nodes] may comprise individuals, groups (and parts of groups), organisations 
(and parts of organisations) or states – may be large or small, tightly or loosely 
connected and inclusive or exclusive in membership; they may engage in similar 
activities, or they may be specialised to undertake particular tasks.”  
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When establishing nodes, there are two important factors that need to be taken into 
consideration. Firstly, a node is seen as a node when it actively plays a role in the identified 
governance network. A collaborative governance approach, as envisioned by Djalante (2012) 
and Holley et al. (2011), would define a node more broadly as any actor within traditional 
‘government’ spheres, as well as external actors who work together in mutually beneficial ways 
to shape the flow of events. Ansell and Gash (2007) differentiate these two groups of actors as 
‘public’ actors (referring to government agencies and departments) and ‘non-state’ or ‘private’ 
actors (referring to all other interest groups and concerned citizens as individuals and as 
organised groups). In line with a disaster governance approach, this thesis leans towards a 
collaborative governance definition of actors, arguing that a node includes any public or private 
actor(s), institution(s) or groups directly or indirectly involved in the management of disaster 
risk and carrying out particular DRR activities.  
 
Secondly, the type of node needs to be established: nodes can be single unitary actors (or 
institutions and groups), assemblages of nodes, or a super-structural node (Drahos, 2004, 
Burris et al., 2005, Burris et al., 2008). Nodal assemblages comprise many nodes, thereby 
integrating multiple networks in order to govern more effectively. A super-structural node, on 
the other hand, does not integrate networks, but rather brings together the nodes representing 
particular networks, in order to concentrate resources and technologies for more effective 
governance. In other words, a nodal assemblage is made up of various nodes with the same 
overall common goal, whilst the super-structural node brings together nodes with different 
goals, simply to rely on their often different and diverse technologies and resources, in order to 
achieve a higher-level goal. According to Drahos (2004:404), a super-structural node is the 
“organisational product of two or more networks [of nodes] which are tied together for a 
common purpose”. These super-structural nodes are seen as the command centres of 
networked governance (Drahos, 2004, Burris et al., 2005); super-structural nodes do not 
integrate networks, but rather bring nodes and their networks together, so as to concentrate 
resources and technologies in order to achieve a common goal. Burris et al. (2005:38) 
summarise this concept in the following way: 
 
“Tying together networks is one very important way in which nodes gain the 
capacity to govern a course of events. This tying together creates a node with 
increased resources at the same time as it creates a structure that enables the 
mobilisation of those resources to produce action by other nodes in the network.”  
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In the international emergency relief literature, Kapucu (2011) describes how the international 
disaster relief arena is made up of independent nodes responding to disasters individually, with 
their own individual capacities, with nodal assemblages and superstructural nodes forming as 
these nodes see the benefit of coordinating their actions. Pooling resources in this type of 
collaborative, networked structure is seen as not only beneficial to all actors reciprocating 
within the network, but crucial for addressing such complex issues that require a diversity of 
resources: financial, physical, and knowledge- and information-based (Powell, 1990, Lipson, 
2005, Kapucu, 2011). A national-level or city-level multi-actor platform that brings multiple 
nodes together to make decisions about disaster risk (e.g., the Flood Task Team in the Cape 
Town case study) could, for example, be seen as a nodal assemblage. This nodal assemblage 
brings multiple nodes together to pool the multiple resources and technologies that each node 
has, as well bring together the unique knowledge that helps this nodal assemblage make more 
informed decisions. 
 
 
2.1. Characterising the nodes 
 
Nodes differ in their ability to shape events and govern, as a result of their different mentalities, 
access to resources and technologies, and institutional structures enabling them to govern 
(Burris et al., 2005). Analysing these four characteristics provides a better understanding of 
how nodes govern, what constrains or enables them to govern effectively, and what influence 
they exert on other nodes and on the system that they are governing. It is these four 
characteristics that nodal governance seeks to unpack and analyse, and onto which this 
conceptual framework focuses: mentalities, technologies, resources and institutions.  
 
A mentality refers to the way nodes think about and view the world and the ‘events’ they govern 
(Burris et al., 2005, Tefre, 2010). A mentality determines how nodes interpret their perceptions 
and worldview, and therefore how these thoughts are translated into action (Tefre, 2010). The 
intangible, subjective quality of mentalities means that these thoughts and perceptions cannot 
be explicitly determined, but need to be implicitly inferred by analysing the actions of the nodes, 
since the argument with mentalities is that they ultimately shape the actions of the node in 
question. Tefre (2010) argues that the notion of mentalities guiding actions follows with 
Foucalt’s understanding of truths constituted in discourses. This refers to the notion that 
discourses are ways of seeing the world and that they determine how people choose to act 
towards the world (Tefre, 2010). People have agency to choose which discourse they will 
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inhabit and this difference in discourse can often result in people (and their discourses) not 
being compatible with one another (Tefre, 2010).  
 
Resources are the assets that the node uses to support their operation and their exertion of 
influence on the world and events they govern (Burris et al., 2005, Tefre, 2010). Resources refer 
not only to financial resources, but include local knowledge and information, social capital, 
expertise, authority, legitimacy, strategic position, and organisational capacity (Black, 2003, 
Burris et al., 2005, Tefre, 2010). 
 
The technologies refer to the set of methods and tools a node relies on to exert influence over 
and to manage the world and events that they govern (Burris et al., 2005, Tefre, 2010). Tefre 
(2010) sees these ‘tools’ as comprising physical, legal, symbolic, or personal tools; these tools 
vary in strength, differ between nodes, and are dependent on the resources available to the 
node. The capacity of a node to govern, based on the technologies it uses, does not only 
determine the accessibility a node has to a particular tool, but its ability to combine tools (Tefre, 
2010). 
 
Finally, institutions are the structures in place that enable the node to direct resources, 
mentalities, and technologies over time (Burris et al., 2005, Tefre, 2010). As defined by Shearing 
and Johnston (2010:503), institutions within a nodal governance approach relate to the 
“structures that enable the mobilisation of resources, mentalities and technologies in pursuit of 
security” (i.e., in their case, ‘security’, and in my case, flood/disaster risk reduction). Pahl-Wostl 
et al. (2008) define institutions as “the formal and informal rules that provide the framework for 
the behaviour of human beings”. Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008) see formal institutions as comprising 
the laws and regulations, the formal organisational structures, and the formal procedures that 
guide and frame decision-making, while informal institutions are the socially-shared rules and 
norms that have developed in social practice. Burris et al. (2005) argue that nodes can take on a 
variety of organisational forms, be it legislatures, government agencies, neighbourhood 
associations, NGOs, firms, or gangs. In this thesis, institutions refer to the temporary or 
permanent, and formal or informal organisational forms that enable nodes to mobilise 
resources, as well as the regulatory frameworks that a node draws on and is often bound to 
(e.g., policies, laws and by-laws, contracts, and other legal documents).  
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3. BARRIERS TO DISASTER GOVERNANCE 
 
The literature on governance, DRM, and collaboration all recognise that challenges exist, which 
might impact on and hinder activities and processes. Although not a new concept in the above 
discourses, the concept of challenges to particular processes has been packaged differently by 
Moser and Ekstrom (2010) and Ekstrom et al. (2011) within climate change adaptation (CCA) 
scholarship. Barriers to adaptation is a framework presented by these authors as a way to 
identify challenging, but malleable barriers that have an impact on society’s ability to deal with 
climate change impacts and impede CCA. Moser and Ekstrom (2010) use the IPCC’s (2007) 
definition of limits, seeing them as obstacles that are absolute and have a threshold, beyond 
which existing activities and system states cannot be maintained. Barriers, on the other hand, 
are seen by Ekstrom et al. (2011) as instances where those seeming limits can be stretched or 
overcome. Ballard et al. (2010:1) use the terms ‘constraints and enablers’, defining them as 
“issues that lie outside the direct scope of the project or activity in question, but which have a 
significant effect on its outcome”. Chapter 16 of the IPCC’s 2014 report (Klein et al., 2014) also 
refers to the term ‘constraints’ instead of ‘barriers’, highlighting how factors considered to be 
constraints make adaptation planning and implementation more challenging, but unlike ‘limits’, 
they can be overcome or addressed. 
 
Ekstrom et al.’s (2011) framework for barriers to adaptation is centred on actors who are 
actively participating in and governing activities (e.g., adaptation processes), recognising that 
these actors and their actions are embedded in social-political, natural, economic, and 
institutional contexts. This framework also recognises the shift from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’, with regards to there being multiple actors, sectors, and institutions making 
decisions and determining a particular course of action, rather than the state making all the 
decisions (Ekstrom et al., 2011). The omission of certain actors from the governance process, 
for example, is considered to be a barrier, depending on the perspective of the actors analysing 
the process; be it top-down or bottom-up (Ekstrom et al., 2011).  
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3.1. Overcoming potential barriers: Considering the opportunities 
 
Considering the ‘opportunities’ to adaptation and how to overcome potential barriers is less 
explored in climate change literature. This gap in knowledge is highlighted in the IPCC’s report 
(Klein et al., 2014) where the chapter dedicated to discussing adaptation constraints, limits, and 
opportunities, has only three pages dedicated to ‘opportunities’ compared to eleven pages on 
constraints (barriers) and limits. Coming from ecology scholarship is the notion that limits and 
thresholds within natural and ecological systems can be stretched or overcome with the 
implementation of technological innovations (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). An example of this is 
genetically modified crops that have higher heat tolerance (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010) or 
drought tolerant crops. Moser and Ekstrom (2010:22027) argue that barriers can be overcome 
with “concerted effort, creative management, change of thinking, prioritisation, and related 
shifts in resources, land uses, [and] institutions”. Adger et al. (2009) argue similarly that 
malleable barriers are those barriers that can be overcome with sufficient political will and 
social support. Moser and Ekstrom (2010:22030) highlight the conditions necessary for 
overcoming potential barriers, which include “leadership, strategic thinking, resourcefulness, 
creativity, collaboration, and effective communication”. These conditions are what Ballard 
(2013) refers to as ‘enablers’ and the IPCC report (Klein et al., 2014) refers to as ‘opportunities’.  
 
Ekstrom et al. (2011) do not consider overcoming barriers to be a normative must, but rather 
approach this process descriptively, as something that can impact on the adaptation process in 
one way or another. Overcoming barriers, Ekstrom et al. (2011) argue, can be seen as either 
good or bad, depending on the perceptions of the actors analysing or taking part in the process. 
Adger et al. (2009:350) support this view, arguing that: 
 
“what may be interpreted as a limit or a failure of adaptation may in fact be a 
successful adaptation for another actor, resulting from different priorities and 
values held within society.”  
 
If, however, barriers are not overcome, it is recognised that adaptation will be less efficient and 
effective, and more costly in the long-term (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). Moser and Ekstrom 
(2010) highlight the importance of recognising that sometimes barriers might present 
themselves as limits, which cannot be overcome (e.g., laws and regulations). By not questioning 
whether these limits are in actual fact malleable barriers, this perception could in itself become 
a barrier to the adaptation process (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). Although barriers are seen as 
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factors that could stop, delay, or divert the governance process, overcoming these barriers will 
not ensure successful outcomes (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). I argue that recognising and 
addressing barriers is a critical step towards strengthening governance processes and helping 
actors move towards their common goal.  
 
 
3.2. The nature of potential barriers 
 
In the literature on barriers and enablers, various authors have tried classifying the barriers by 
their source, spatial and temporal scale, sphere of influence, or types of impacts that they might 
have. With the aim of deepening understanding of potential barriers to adaptation in developing 
countries, Shackleton et al. (2015) have provided a review of the types of barriers that sub-
Saharan Africa experience, as highlighted from related empirical studies. These authors 
highlight how most of the research on and understanding of barriers in developing countries 
are focused on biophysical, knowledge, and financial barriers; missing from these studies are a 
better understanding of the more ‘hidden’ barriers, which include political, social, and 
psychological barriers (Shackleton et al., 2015). From my own review of some of the literature 
on barriers to adaptation, the common categories of barriers and enablers are summarised in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3: Description of different barriers and enablers from the literature 
Type of 
Barrier/Enabler 
Description Cited by: 
Contemporary or 
legacy 
Interfering with current processes or 
resulting from past decision-making. 
Moser and Ekstrom (2010) 
Ecological and 
physical 
Related to the environment and physical 
hazards or obstacles. 
Adger et al. (2009), IPCC (2012), 
Klein et al. (2014) 
Economic and 
financial 
Market systems and financial structures. 
Available funds. 
Adger et al. (2009), IPCC (2012), 
Klein et al. (2014) 
Governance, 
institutional, and 
regulatory 
Including leadership, guidance, motivation, 
vision, high skill levels, strong integrity, and 
trust. 
Moser and Ekstrom (2010), Ekstrom 
et al. (2011), Measham et al. (2011), 
Klein et al. (2014) 
Knowledge, 
information, and 
communication 
Including technical information; expert, 
indigenous, or local knowledge. Question 
how and what information is interpreted 
and communication, if any. 
Moser and Ekstrom (2010), Ekstrom 
et al. (2011), Measham et al. (2011), 
IPCC (2012), Klein et al. (2014) 
Participation and 
engagement 
Who is allowed to participate and in what 
way. 
Ekstrom et al. (2011) 
Proximate or 
remote  
Within or beyond an actor’s sphere of 
influence. Including scales of influence. 
Moser and Ekstrom (2010) 
Psychological, 
cognitive, and 
behavioural 
How people think and act. Including trust. Adger et al. (2009), Moser and 
Ekstrom (2010), Ekstrom et al. 
(2011), IPCC (2012) 
Resources Including staff expertise and time. Moser and Ekstrom (2010), Ekstrom 
et al. (2011), Measham et al. (2011), 
Klein et al. (2014) 
Socio-cultural  Including values, beliefs, and perceptions. 
Influences how people perceive, interpret, 
and think about certain processes, and what 
information and knowledge they value. 
Adger et al. (2009), Moser and 
Ekstrom (2010), Ekstrom et al. 
(2011), IPCC (2012), Klein et al. 
(2014) 
Technological Related to the use of technology and 
technological development, in various forms. 
Adger et al. (2009), IPCC (2012), 
Klein et al. (2014) 
 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the multiple types of barriers have been grouped in order to 
match the characteristics highlighted within a nodal governance framework (i.e., mentalities, 
resources, technologies, and institutions). This helps to pin-point particular barriers to disaster 
governance that might arise when considering the nodes and how they draw on diverse 
mentalities, resources, technologies, and institutions. In Table 4, the key types of barriers 
reflected in the literature are grouped under the characteristics provided by the nodal 
governance framework. Using the nodal governance approach to identify and explore potential 
barriers and enablers also helps to ensure that the more ‘hidden’ barriers, such as socio-
cultural, behavioural, psychological, political, and institutional barriers are not ignored or 
downplayed. 
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Table 4: Types of barriers applied to the nodal governance framework 
Nodal Governance 
Characteristics 
Types of Barriers and Enablers 
Mentalities Socio-cultural; Psychological, cognitive, and behavioural 
Resources 
Resources; Expertise; Knowledge and information; Financial; Ecological 
and physical 
Technologies 
Technological; Participation and engagement; Communication and 
information-sharing 
Institutions Regulatory and institutional; Participation and engagement 
 
 
I argue that being able to identify different barriers forms a significant part of any governance 
process because recognising barriers in governance processes is a crucial first step before being 
able to address and even overcome these barriers. The process itself of identifying barriers can 
increase the resilience of the governance process, as well as increase the resilience of all actors 
involved because identifying the barriers is a form of increased knowledge and understanding. 
Barriers and opportunities can come in many forms, as summarised earlier in Table 3. By 
aligning the different types of barriers to the four characteristics highlighted under the nodal 
governance framework, the conceptual framework developed in this chapter will help identify 
potential barriers that might impede disaster governance processes in a given context. 
 
 
4. DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
The conceptual framework in its simplest form is shown in Figure 5. This figure represents what 
a node would look like, with its four characteristics and the intersection of potential 
opportunities and barriers. Each node draws on multiple mentalities, institutions, resources, 
and technologies when exerting influence on other nodes and within the network. The four 
characteristics do not operate in isolation, but impact on each other. For example, a node’s 
mentalities often dictate the types of technologies adopted, or the resources drawn on, whilst 
the mentalities might be a product of the institutional framework within which the node 
operates, or a by-product of the types of technologies it can adopt or the resources it has access 
to. The resources available to the node might also be a product of the technologies adopted, 
and/or the institutional framework within which the node operates. The opportunities and 
barriers are seen as both products of and factors impacting on the node’s characteristics and 
therefore the node’s capacity within the network and influence on other nodes. The barriers to 
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flood governance in the case study city of Cape Town, from a nodal governance approach, will 
be unpacked and explored further in Chapters Seven to Nine. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Conceptualisation of a node 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
 
 
 
As understood in this thesis and explored earlier in this chapter, each node does not operate in 
isolation, but forms part of a bigger system, or ‘nodal assemblage’. This nodal assemblage is 
represented in Figure 6. This figure tries to capture, on a very basic level, how each node, with 
its different characteristics that create potential barriers and opportunities, also interacts with 
and impacts on other nodes’ capacities. Some nodes have a much stronger influence (i.e., 
represented as bigger nodes in the diagram), while other nodes have a much smaller influence. I 
argue that disaster governance helps to understand who these nodes are and how they interact. 
Nodal governance, however, adds a layer of complexity and understanding to disaster 
governance, by helping to unpack what the different characteristics of the nodes are, how they 
enable nodes to govern and make decisions, and what impact these have in terms of barriers 
and opportunities for disaster governance. 
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Figure 6: Conceptualisation of a nodal assemblage 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
 
 
 
5. SUMMARY 
 
The conceptual framework presented in this chapter draws on both nodal governance theory 
and barriers to adaptation discourse to help identify and describe each actor within a particular 
governance process, and the barriers preventing them from governing effectively. The 
conceptual framework draws on nodal governance to emphasise the actors (called nodes) 
governing events, arguing that these nodes are the sites where governance takes place and 
where groups of actors collaborate to mobilise resources. Nodal governance is a theoretical 
model for understanding governance and analysing how nodes govern and the capacities that 
they have, which allow them to govern. Nodal governance recognises that nodes differ in their 
ability to shape and govern events, as a result of their different mentalities, access to resources 
and technologies, and institutional structures enabling them to govern. Analysing these four 
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‘characteristics’ enables a better understanding of how nodes govern, what constrains or 
enables them to make decisions and implement interventions, and what influence they exert on 
the world and the social system that they are governing. The conceptual framework enables a 
better understanding of each actor’s unique mentalities, which often dictates their actions, 
responsibilities, and understanding of the nature of the problem. This framework provides a 
way to look at the resources and technologies available to each node, and the institutional 
structures within which they govern and act. 
 
Although public participation and multi-actor collaboration are recognised in the literature as 
essential for strengthening resilience of at-risk communities, there are obstacles that inhibit 
society’s ability to collaboratively manage risk. Recognising that there are barriers constraining 
nodes from governing, this framework helps to identify key barriers that can impede or prevent 
governance processes from taking place. Adopting a nodal governance approach to identify and 
understand the potential barriers and enablers to disaster governance helps to better 
understand how nodes govern and what potential barriers might be preventing nodes from 
governing effectively. By better understanding how nodes govern and addressing the potential 
barriers, ways to combine the strengths of different nodes and mobilise resources more 
efficiently can be suggested in order to strengthen collaborative outcomes.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Governments and municipalities that lack the capacity to address disaster risk often respond by 
prioritising reactive responses (Holloway, 2003), without adequately considering the barriers 
that might be preventing them from proactively addressing disaster risk and strengthening the 
resilience of society. Although disaster communities understand the strengths of collective 
action in addressing disaster risk, there is a lag in understanding how the actual process of 
bringing multiple actors together can present challenges. This highlights the need for better 
understanding of which actors should be governing disaster risk, what the various actors’ 
unique ideologies and priorities are, and what potential barriers to collaborative governance 
might arise. This research attempts to address this gap in understanding by using a nodal 
governance approach (as outlined in Chapter Four) to describe and analyse the unique 
characteristics of the actors governing disaster risk and how these characteristics shape their 
actions. Added to this is an in-depth look at what barriers might be present as a product of these 
characteristics and relationships, and how these barriers impact on the ability of the actors to 
make decisions and implement DRR activities.  
 
Emerging from the global South is the recognition that western urban theory is not sufficient for 
theorising and understanding cities of the global South (Kennedy et al., 2011). This western 
urban theory is centred on the notion that the global North is the site for producing theory, 
while the global South is the site for collecting data (Kennedy et al., 2011). Several academics 
critique this notion, arguing that theory needs to be produced from the South in order to 
provide insight on the multiple processes that are unique to the global South and which cannot 
be theorised from a Northern perspective (Oldfield, 2007, Ramutsindela, 2007, Roy, 2009, 
Watson, 2009, Kennedy et al., 2011). There is a recognition also of the role that the global South 
can and should play in addressing taken-for-granted approaches to managing and solving the 
growing problems of poverty, inequality, and informality across the world (Watson, 2009). 
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Cities of the global South are unique as a result of their very different political, historical, and 
socio-economic circumstances; a good example here is the oft-cited impact of Apartheid in 
South Africa’s current housing, socio-economic, and political issues (Oranje, 2010, Bénit-Gbaffou 
and Katsaura, 2014). In order to understand and account for phenomena that is unique to cities 
of the global South, Roy (2009) argues that researchers need to produce theory and different 
types of knowledge from their unique Southern perspective.  
 
In South Africa, there is a dearth of empirical research that explores collaborative mechanisms 
of DRM, in spite of national and municipal legislation that stipulates the need for participatory 
and inclusive DRM strategies (Botha et al., 2011, Van Niekerk, 2011). There are few empirical 
studies on local municipal examples of collaborative DRM platforms; a gap that I aim to address 
by focusing on an embedded case study of flood risk management in the municipality of Cape 
Town, South Africa. This research is explanatory because I attempt to identify the factors 
undermining collaborative disaster governance and explain the nature of collaboration between 
multiple actors governing disaster risk. In order to accomplish this, the methodology adopted 
for this thesis focuses on capturing data on how actors manage and address flood risk in Cape 
Town, at mainly the local government level, but also drawing on perspectives from residents 
living in a high flood-risk informal settlement in Cape Town.  
 
In this chapter, I provide details on the embedded case study research approach that influenced 
the conceptualisation and implementation of my research. This is followed by a discussion on 
the multiple qualitative research methods that were adopted to conduct the research. I also 
address important ethical issues faced while conducting this research and the limitations of the 
research. Finally, this chapter ends with a reflection on the value of this research in DRM 
practice more broadly and the challenges of conducting research on politically sensitive and 
complex governance processes.  
 
 
2. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The methods adopted in this research are framed within an interpretist paradigm, where 
humans are understood as behaving the way they do because of their subjective perceptions 
and realities of the world around them and their immediate environment (Willis, 2007). I argue 
that in order to understand human behaviour, the environment they inhabit needs to be 
understood first; the context in which people make decisions, the perceptions they have of their 
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environment and the people in that environment, and the subjective perceptions others in their 
environment might have of them. This research draws on qualitative methods to examine an 
embedded case study because qualitative methods are seen as best suited to capturing, 
understanding, and describing people’s environment in detail, and exploring their subjective 
perceptions of that environment (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). 
 
The methodology employed in this research facilitated an in-depth understanding of the actors 
governing risk in the context of Cape Town’s flood risk landscape. I understand that the narrow 
case study focus on a specific hazard (i.e., floods) in a specific city (i.e., Cape Town) could limit 
the potential for generalising the findings to other cities, risks, or governance systems. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the methods and conceptual framework adopted in this research, if 
applied to other case studies, can provide important insights and understanding of the multiple 
actors governing risk and the barriers to collaborative governance that might arise in those 
other contexts. The focus in this study is therefore not only on the findings and outcomes of the 
research, but also on the process of identifying, understanding, and analysing the barriers to 
disaster governance. The case study of flood management in Cape Town presents an empirical 
focus for applying the conceptual framework and showcasing how to develop a more systematic 
and informed understanding of the disaster governance process in question. The research 
strategy adopted in this study is qualitative and idiographic because I aim to describe and 
analyse the particular actors and their actions, within the context of flood risk governance in 
Cape Town, and how their actions and perceptions shape events. The research approach that 
this study used to gather and analyse the empirical data is discussed below. 
 
 
2.1. Embedded case study approach 
 
This research adopted a single-case embedded or ‘nested’ case study approach, as opposed to a 
holistic case study (Yin, 2014a,b). The single case is the case of flood governance in the city of 
Cape Town, with the Flooding and Storms Emergency Planning Task Team (referred to as ‘the 
‘Flood Task Team’ throughout this thesis) and the informal settlement of Sweet Home as the 
two embedded units of analysis.  
 
Case study research is a well-known and widely used methodology in many disciplines, 
including social sciences and political sciences. Case study research is also a growing theoretical 
field in itself; this body of literature addresses issues such as building theories from case study 
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research (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2014b), rigour in case study approaches (Eisenhardt, 1991, 
Scholz and Tietje, 2002), qualitative approaches in case study design (Kohlbacher, 2006, Baxter 
and Jack, 2008), and how the case study approach is well-suited for conducting research in the 
global South (Duminy et al., 2013). Orum et al. (1991) explain how case studies have been used 
in the past to uncover social phenomena and provide fundamental insights and detailed analysis 
of the social world. Case studies allow researchers to examine not only the complex realities 
people live in, but also the complex social interactions that happen between people and 
between people and their environment, as well as people’s perceptions of and decisions on 
social interactions and their environment (Orum et al., 1991). Orum et al. (1991:9) argue that 
because case studies allow researchers to study ‘social interaction patterns’, case studies of a 
single phenomenon allow researchers to understand and analyse social action and interaction 
in its “most complete form”. Duminy et al. (2013:163) argue that because case studies pay close 
attention to reality and the details of unfolding events, they are well-suited to unpacking and 
analysing “complex causality, power relation, ethics, and judgments”, and providing nuanced 
views of reality. 
 
Since the research aim in this thesis is to apply a nodal governance approach to understanding 
disaster governance, two groups of actors were seen as the most appropriate units of analysis in 
the Cape Town case study: the municipal officials represented on the City of Cape Town (CCT) 
municipality’s Flood Task Team, and residents living in informal settlements. For the purposes 
of this study, an informal settlement called Sweet Home (Figure 7) was selected as part of the 
case study. These two groups are seen to capture two sides of the same coin: those formally 
selected to make flood management decisions, and those affected by the outcomes of those 
decisions. The Flood Task Team is seen to represent the municipal level of decision-making, 
whilst the residents represent those at the local level who are affected by this decision-making. 
The case study context and details are presented in Chapter Six. 
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Figure 7: Location of Sweet Home informal settlement in Philippi, Cape Town6 
(Source: compiled by Joy Waddell, using images from Bouchard et al., 2007 and CCT GIS) 
 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Orum et al. (1991) argue that case studies are useful for generating 
theories and theoretical generalisation, particularly in terms of generating new ideas and 
theories in social science. Theoretical generalisation is understood by Orum et al. (1991:13) to 
involve “suggesting new interpretations and concepts or re-examining earlier concepts and 
interpretations in major and innovative ways”. Duminy et al. (2013) argue that case study 
research can help to support quantitative data gathering methods by providing critical insights 
into what the quantitative results mean and some of the more nuanced complexities that 
                                                             
6 Subcouncils are the decentralised governmental structures in South African municipalities, which enable residents 
to communicate/engage with local government (see: https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/subcouncils/yoursubcouncil 
/Pages/default.aspx?subcouncilcode=18 [Accessed: 02/01/2016]). Cape Town has 24 subcouncils; Sweet Home 
informal settlement falls within Subcouncil 18, which overlaps the suburb called ‘Philippi’. For more maps showing 
the location of Sweet Home within Philippi, see Appendix 10. 
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quantitative surveys might miss. Although single case studies are often criticised because 
generalisations cannot be made from them, Duminy et al. (2013) argue that case studies can be 
used to disprove or verify propositions and hypotheses, and in this way, contribute towards 
theory. Although governance and flood management is not a new research area or theory, the 
approach of looking at the governance of floods through a nodal governance and barriers lens is 
new. The case study provides a way to limit the scope to a smaller unit of analysis, allowing me 
to apply this theoretical lens and framework to draw new insight and conclusions on 
contemporary flood governance.  
 
I consider Cape Town to be a ‘deviant case’ because although it is a city of the global South, its 
disaster risk and political landscape differs from the rest of South Africa: Cape Town 
experiences winter floods, rather than the more typical summer floods; the Province is led by 
the Democratic Alliance (DA) political party, whilst other provinces are led by the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC); and its Disaster Risk Management Centre (DRMC) is considered to be 
the best in the country, with DRMC officials often called on by other municipalities to share its 
best practices and help set up similar Task Teams. Therefore, insights from this case study 
cannot be generalised in the sense that the findings should be similar across different cities and 
disaster risk profiles, but the aim of this research is to highlight how applying the conceptual 
framework to other cases, as it is done in this case, can help develop different insights into the 
actors governing risk and the potential barriers to collaboration, unique to the different cases. 
Orum et al. (1991), for example, argue that ‘deviant cases’ are able to provide insight into more 
general social processes, or help understand the extent to which more generalised theories are 
applicable to unique cases. In my thesis, the ‘deviant’ case of Cape Town’s flood governance can 
help to build on disaster governance theory, in particular the barriers to collaborative disaster 
governance that other cities of the global South could face or need to address.  
 
 
3. QUALITATIVE METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
This research adopted qualitative methods of data collection in order to provide rich, ‘thick 
description’ (Geertz, 1973) of the actors (called ‘nodes’), their actions, and the events that shape 
and are shaped by their actions. At its core, a qualitative research approach tries to understand 
(‘verstehen’) the social world, through the eyes of the social actors themselves (Bryman, 1984, 
Babbie and Mouton, 2007). Qualitative research implies an intensive, holistic description and 
analysis of a contemporary phenomenon within its natural setting (Merriam, 1998, Hartley, 
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2004, Babbie and Mouton, 2007, Baxter and Jack, 2008). Qualitative approaches allow the 
researcher to focus on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in a study, as well as highlight the 
contextual factors that are seen as significant in shaping phenomenon within a particular 
context (Hartley, 2004, Baxter and Jack, 2008).  
 
In the context of conducting research in African cities, Duminy et al. (2013) argue that it is 
necessary for researchers to adopt qualitative approaches because there is generally a lack of 
reliable city-wide census and survey data to inform policies and planning; even in the cases 
where reliable and up-to-date data is available, qualitative methods are more suited to 
understanding the complex, fluid, and rapidly changing nature of Africa’s cities. This insight is 
extended to this research on disaster governance in cities of the global South because 
qualitative methods are seen as best suited to understanding the socio-political complexities 
and multi-faceted nature of disaster risk, where often disaster data is sorely lacking. 
 
In line with an interpretist and constructivist paradigm, a qualitative approach helps to identify 
and describe how each actor managing disaster risk in a particular context has a different 
reality and logic of the situation; enabling these actors to describe their reality, whilst allowing 
the researcher to construct a deeper, and stronger understanding of these actors’ actions and 
behaviour as they are embedded in their unique realities. Bryman (1984) refers to the fluidity 
and flexibility of qualitative approaches, which not only allow researchers to discover novel, 
unanticipated findings, but to alter their methods to pursue these emerging leads. In addition, a 
qualitative approach favours a deeper, thicker understanding of the behaviour, perceptions, 
mentalities, and less tangible (i.e., not easily quantifiable) aspects of DRM and actors’ capacities 
to make decisions.  
 
This study drew on multiple qualitative methods to: 
 
 help build a more complete understanding of the governance processes within a 
particular setting;  
 triangulate the findings to provide better rigour; and  
 ensure the method selected is best suited for collecting particular data within a 
particular setting.  
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue that qualitative research is inherently multi-method; the use 
of multiple methods, which they call ‘triangulation’, is used not only as a tool for validation, but 
for securing an in-depth understanding of a particular context or phenomenon. In order to truly 
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capture social phenomena, Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue that qualitative researchers need 
to draw on multiple, interconnected methods because combining methods enables the 
development of a fuller, richer, more complex picture of the world. Triangulation is seen by 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011:5) as a “strategy that adds rigour, breadth, complexity, richness, and 
depth to any inquiry”. Understood in this way, triangulation does not help to present data in a 
linear, sequential fashion, but rather presents multiple, smaller pieces of reality (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011). I argue that it is by combining these smaller pieces of reality that you are able to 
develop a deeper, more rounded understanding of the phenomena you are studying. This is an 
important approach for understanding complex phenomena, such as disaster governance, 
where there are multiple actors with multiple interests and priorities, and not all of these are 
clear or visible to outsiders.  
 
Case study research emphasises the importance of multiple data sources to reach a holistic 
understanding of a complex social phenomenon, ensure convergence of data, and enhance data 
credibility (Hartley, 2004, Babbie and Mouton, 2007, Baxter and Jack, 2008). Data sources this 
research relied on include CCT reports, academic research and reports, interviews with multiple 
participants at multiple levels of governance, field visits, direct observations, and participant 
observation. As with other qualitative studies, data collection and analysis occurred 
concurrently and was an iterative process (Hartley, 2004, Baxter and Jack, 2008). The analysis 
kept in mind the original objectives, ensuring that the data collected contributed towards a 
deeper understanding of the flood governance context and the multiple actors within that 
system. This iterative analytical approach not only helped to avoid the temptation of collecting 
data or analysing data beyond the scope of the study, but helped to increase confidence in the 
findings by continuously questioning the data and findings.  
 
The four key methods used in this research, which are presented in the subsections that follow, 
were: 
 
1. Fieldwork; 
2. Participant photography and reporting; 
3. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews; and 
4. Workshops and group discussions. 
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3.1. Fieldwork 
 
Duminy et al. (2013:167) highlight the need for researchers to ‘get their shoes dirty’ and to 
conduct ‘bodily research’; research that relies on in-depth fieldwork where the researcher uses 
their eyes and ears to gather information, and makes gestures that gain the trust and rapport of 
interviewees. Fieldwork is therefore understood in this thesis to be a way to observe the world 
and record it in a way that brings reality to theoretical thinking.  
 
This research formed part of the broader Flooding in Cape Town under Climate Risk (FliCCR) 
project, which was funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the 
Department of International Development (DFID) under the Climate Change Adaptation in 
Africa programme. This three-and-a-half-year project (2010-2013) aimed to identify actors 
involved in inland flood management and sea-level rise, and to explore the potential for 
collaborative mechanisms of flood and sea-level rise management, at both municipal and local 
community levels. The fieldwork for this thesis (2011-2013) fell under the ‘inland flooding’ 
component of FliCCR, which sought to understand the nature of flood risk in informal 
settlements and capture the experiences of flooding and examples of flood risk management at 
the household, community, and municipal level in Cape Town. This research met FliCCR’s aims 
by exploring and assessing existing civic and CCT initiatives to manage flood risk in informal 
settlements, in order to guide the development of more inclusive, collaborative DRM 
approaches. Whilst other FliCCR colleagues conducted research that was focused on the 
community level (Anderson, 2010, Orangio, 2012, Desportes, 2014, Drivdal, 2014), my research 
contributed towards an understanding of flood risk governance from the perspective of local 
government; in particular, the CCT and their Flood Task Team, which is mandated to carry out 
the CCT’s annual flood risk reduction strategy.  
 
The research questions developed for this case study, in order to achieve the aim and objectives 
of this thesis, included: 
 
1. How do (a) municipal officials and (b) residents living in informal settlements 
make decisions on and manage flood risk in Cape Town’s informal settlements? 
2. What flood risk reduction activities are carried out in informal settlements by  
(a) the municipality, and (b) residents living in informal settlements? 
3. How do flood management-related decisions made at the municipal level impact 
on the local level? 
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4. How do flood management-related decisions made at the local level impact on 
development-related activities carried out by the municipality? 
5. What are the perceptions of flood governance processes and outcomes that exist 
at (a) the municipal level and (b) the local level? 
6. What technologies are prioritised to manage flood risk in informal settlements 
by (a) the municipality and (b) the residents? 
7. What policies and legislation guide or challenge flood risk management 
activities? 
8. What resources are needed for effective flood management, and which of these 
are limited or lacking in Cape Town? 
9. What challenges are there to managing flood risk in informal settlements? 
10. How do different actors aim to address the challenges to flood risk management 
in informal settlements? 
11. What combination of actors need to work together to strengthen flood risk 
management?  
12. What is needed to strengthen any existing collaborative processes or to develop 
collaboration between multiple actors? 
 
Although research in an informal settlement was beyond the initial scope of this research, I 
decided that it was important to capture residents’ experiences of flooding, validate and ground 
the findings at the CCT level, and understand how residents in an informal perceived and 
responded to decision-making and activities planned and implemented by local government. It 
was for these reasons that I decided to also conduct research in the informal settlement of 
Sweet Home, which CCT officials had identified as a high flood risk informal settlement. 
 
To ensure the boundaries of fieldwork are created, Katz (1994:67) argues for the clear ‘marking 
off’ of the field ‘in time and space’. The fieldwork for this research was ‘marked off’ in terms of 
which participants were included. In this research, the two main groups of participants were 
clearly marked out: (1) CCT officials engaged in flood risk reduction activities in Cape Town’s 
informal settlements (all represented on the Flood Task Team); and (2) residents living in 
Sweet Home informal settlement who experienced flood risk. A third subset of participants, 
which included NGOs engaged in flood risk reduction activities, were interviewed during the 
last phase of the fieldwork, based on the findings in this research and their participation in 
FliCCR’s multi-actor workshops towards the end of the project. The fieldwork was also ‘marked 
off’ by three phases (presented below), which were carried out over different times, had unique 
aims, included particular participants, and relied on unique methods. 
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3.1.1. Phase 1 (2011) 
 
I conducted several initial, semi-structured, and in-depth interviews with CCT officials 
represented on the Flood Task Team in order to validate data collected during interviews 
carried out by FliCCR colleagues in 2010. These initial interviews also helped me to gain an 
understanding of flood risk reduction initiatives carried out by the CCT and the roles and 
responsibilities of the Flood Task Team. Participant observation was also used during CCT 
meetings: weekly Flood Task Team meetings, and quarterly Disaster Management Advisory 
Forum (DMAF) meetings. These interviews and meetings provided a preliminary understanding 
of the dominant actors involved in flood governance, and which informal settlements were most 
at risk from flooding, as assessed by the CCT. This phase also included a FLICCR-hosted 
workshop7 with Flood Task Team officials in 2011, which was aimed at validating data collected 
in 2010 by FliCCR colleagues and exploring flood risk reduction approaches by the Flood Task 
Team.  
 
3.1.2. Phase 2 (2012-2013) 
 
The bulk of the data collection was conducted during this phase. This included participant 
observation during weekly visits to Sweet Home and at CCT meetings. In-depth interviews were 
carried out with selected CCT officials, Flood Task Team representatives, and individuals living 
in Sweet Home. Sweet Home was selected during this phase, based on input from DRMC field 
officers and following engagement with the locally-elected community leader of Sweet Home. 
Two transect walks were carried out in Sweet Home (Figure 8) to explore areas where flood 
risk is most challenging and to see examples of residents’ coping strategies. Group discussions 
were carried out with Sweet Home residents to discuss the challenges that they face when 
addressing flood risk.  
 
 
                                                             
7 For details of this workshop and for a list of FliCCR’s workshops, see Appendix 6. 
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Figure 8: GPS points taken during the second transect walk of Sweet Home (14/03/2013) 
(Source: GPS and GoogleEarth, 2013) 
 
 
3.1.3. Phase 3 (2013) 
 
The final phase of the fieldwork aimed to consolidate findings and collect data needed to refine 
the conceptual framework. Follow-up interviews were carried out with selected participants, 
including CCT officials, Flood Task Team representatives, Sweet Home residents, and 
representatives from a few NGOs engaged in flood risk reduction activities. Three final FliCCR 
workshops were held in 20138, with the aim of disseminating findings from the inland flooding 
component of the FliCCR project and bringing multiple actors together into dialogue on issues of 
collaboration as a tool for flood risk reduction in Cape Town’s informal settlements.  
  
                                                             
8 For details of this workshop and for a list of FliCCR’s workshops, see Appendix 6. 
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In order to facilitate an understanding of the overall research process, Figure 9 outlines the 
process and the methods used during the three data collection phases and the data analysis. The 
red arrows highlight the iterative process of collecting, analysing, validating, and refining the 
conceptual framework. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Outline of the research process adopted in this study 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
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3.2. Participant photography and reporting 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the reality and causes of flooding in Sweet Home 
informal settlement, I adopted a method called participant photography, or ‘photo-reporting’. 
Firstly, this method was adopted because I felt that as an outsider, it was difficult to enter 
certain spaces within informal settlements (e.g., people’s homes), at certain times (e.g., at night). 
I also realised that as an ‘outsider’, I could not capture certain activities, perceptions, and 
perspectives of particular causes of flooding. For example, one of the ‘causes’ of flooding and 
contaminated water that CCT officials and (some) residents highlighted, was from residents 
throwing used water, solid waste, and night-soil (toilet buckets) into open stormwater drainage 
systems or onto the roads/communal spaces outside their homes. This was an activity that I 
could not capture myself, through photography or observation, because these activities 
happened when I was not looking, or at times when I was not in the informal settlement (i.e., 
hidden from outsiders). Participant photography was therefore adopted as a method to 
overcome some of these limitations, and to gain an ‘insider’ view of the reality of flooding in 
informal settlements. 
 
The participant photography was carried out by two groups: 
 
1. Two residents from Sweet Home informal settlement were hired to become 
‘community researchers’ over a period of six weeks9. The two community 
researchers were asked to capture, through photography and narrative, 
examples of stormwater channel blockages and how the stormwater drainage 
system was used by residents in Sweet Home10. Over May and June 2013, the 
two community researchers were also asked to capture examples of flooding in 
Sweet Home and examples of how residents are affected by, or deal with, 
flooding11. This period was important because it was during the wet winter 
season, when flooding was a daily reality for people living in Sweet Home. 
Unfortunately, only one of the residents provided feedback from the May-June 
period.  
                                                             
9 This activity was based on a similar activity carried out by Drivdal (a colleague on the FliCCR project) in 
neighbouring informal settlements in Philippi, Cape Town. The results of Drivdal’s activity were presented as reports: 
one on Egoli informal settlement (Drivdal, 2011a) and one on Graveyard Pond informal settlement (Drivdal, 2011b). 
10 See Appendix 1 for the information sheets provided to participants. See Appendix 2 for the question sheet provided 
to participants, and an example of answers they provided. 
11 See Appendix 3 for the question sheet provided to participants, and an example of answers they provided. 
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2. As part of the FLiCCR project, a flood awareness and reporting activity was 
conducted at a local school in Philippi, with Grade 11 students12. This activity 
took place over three weeks and aimed to help students raise their awareness of 
flood risk and flooding impacts in their communities. As part of this activity, 
students were divided into nine groups containing three students (27 students 
in total). Each group was given a disposable camera to capture examples of 
flooding for their final project, which was to design and present a poster on 
flood awareness.  
 
 
3.3. In-depth, semi-structured interviews 
 
In-depth interviews, which Charmaz (2006) refers to as ‘intensive interviewing’, allows the 
researcher to explore in depth a person’s understanding and experiences of the world. Charmaz 
(2006:28) defines intensive semi-structured, in-depth interviewing as an “open-ended but 
directed, shaped yet emergent, and paced yet flexible” method for exploring particular aspects 
of a participant’s life. This type of interview method provides the flexibility for ideas and themes 
to emerge and be pursued during the interview, which would not otherwise be possible under a 
rigid, tightly focused interview approach where the questions are pre-determined and 
stubbornly adhered to (Charmaz, 2006). The semi-structured aspect of this approach meant 
that I did not embark on an interview without a list of themes and guiding questions, but instead 
planned questions and discussion points based on key themes beforehand. I preferred following 
a semi-structured format in my interviews because this allowed me the flexibility to only select 
the most pertinent questions in cases where participants had limited time for the interviews, 
and allowed me to question further a particular line of discussion which I, as the researcher, 
might not have thought of or known of beforehand. 
 
From 2011-2013, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out with 22 CCT officials, 
four local government ward councillors, seven representatives from NGOs, two informal 
settlement leaders (from Sweet Home and a nearby informal settlement called Graveyard 
Pond), and 22 residents from Sweet Home (Table 5)13. Specific names of CCT officials and ward 
councillors, residents, community leaders, and NGOs are omitted throughout this thesis to 
ensure anonymity. 
                                                             
12 See Appendix 4 for the information sheets provided to students. 
13 See Appendix 5 for a detailed table of when interviews, workshops, and group discussions were conducted with 
particular departments, residents, and NGOs. 
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Table 5: Number of interviews and people interviewed during this research 
CCT Officials 
Department/Directorate # Interviews # Interviewees 
Development Services Department 1 1 
Disaster Risk Management Centre 8 7 
Engineering Services Department 1 1 
Environmental Health Department 2 3 
Informal Settlements Management Department 1 2 
MAYCO (Mayoral Committee Members) 2 2 
Roads and Stormwater Department 3 2 
Solid Waste Management Department 014 2 
Water and Sanitation Department 1 2 
Ward Councillors 3 4 
TOTAL 22 26 
Residents living in informal settlements 
Informal Settlement / Role # Interviews # Interviewees 
Graveyard Pond Community Leader 1 1 
Sweet Home Farm Community Leader 3 1 
Sweet Home Farm Residents 23 21 
TOTAL 27 23 
NGOs 
Name # Interviews # Interviewees 
Ikhayalami 1 2 
The Mustadafin Foundation 1 2 
The Jungle Theatre Company 1 1 
The Warehouse 1 2 
TOTAL 4 7 
 
 
Actors from the CCT were selected because of their involvement and knowledge of flooding 
issues in informal settlements. These actors were often representatives of their department on 
the Flood Task Team and participated in ongoing workshops organised as part of the FliCCR 
project. The selection of officials involved an element of snow-ball effect, with officials either 
delegating interviews to their colleagues within the same department, or suggesting other 
officials within the CCT who they thought would provide better insight into the complexities of 
flood management. Actors from NGOs were also selected, based on their involvement with the 
Flood Task Team, their presence in Sweet Home, and/or their participation in FliCCR’s 
workshops. Two groups of residents participated in the focus groups held in Sweet Home, as 
well as ongoing interviews, the transect walk, and FliCCR’s workshops. Each group of residents 
was selected via a gatekeeper; the wife of Sweet Home’s self-elected community leader (in order 
to gain initial access and rapport with the Sweet Home community), and a facilitator of a health-
related civil society organisation (CSO) based in Sweet Home (in order to reach a broader 
audience and overcome potential bias from the wife of the community leader).  
                                                             
14 Representatives from the Solid Waste Management Department did not consent to any interviews, but provided 
responses to some of the interview questions via email communication, on two separate occasions (2012 and 2013). 
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All of the interviews15 were conducted face-to-face and most lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. 
In Sweet Home, 18 of the interviews with residents were carried out during the two transect 
walks, and as a result lasted between 20 and 40 minutes. Although most of the interviews were 
recorded digitally, some were not recorded because interviewees did not consent to them being 
recorded16. In those cases, notes were taken and data was extracted from those written notes. 
All of the recorded interviews were transcribed in full by me, and their content analysed using 
qualitative analysis software (NVIVO 10). All of the interviews with CCT officials and politicians, 
NGO representatives, and informal settlement leaders were carried out in English, whilst 
majority of the interviews with Sweet Home residents required a Xhosa or Afrikaans translator.  
 
Nine interviews with CCT officials, which were carried out by FliCCR colleagues in 2010 as part 
of the broader FliCCR project, were also included in the analysis (Table 6). Five of these 
interviews were provided as digital recordings, and transcribed in full by me, in order to ensure 
their accuracy and strengthen their validity. Three of these were full transcripts provided by my 
FliCCR colleagues to include in my analysis. The issue of ‘research fatigue’ presented a major 
limitation throughout this research; the topic of flooding and flood management has (and 
continues to be) a highly researched field by many national and international students and 
NGOs in Cape Town. The very busy lives of government officials, as well as their past 
experiences of being interviewed relentlessly about flooding, flood management, and informal 
settlement issues, meant that CCT officials were often reluctant to grant initial and follow-up 
interviews. Some CCT departments and NGOs were also reluctant to grant interviews because 
they felt that they could not contribute any information on flood management. Solid Waste 
Management, for example, were adamant that they were not involved in flood governance 
issues and therefore refused any interviews. As a result of this research fatigue and 
unwillingness by some participants to be interviewed, the transcripts and interview recordings 
from FliCCR colleagues provided an important additional resource for this research. 
 
 
Table 6: Number of interviews carried out in 2010 by FliCCR colleagues  
CCT Department/Directorate # Interviews # Interviewees 
Development Services Department 1 1 
Disaster Risk Management Centre 4 7 
Engineering Services Department 1 1 
Informal Settlements Management Department 2 2 
Transport, Roads, and Stormwater Directorate 1 2 
 
                                                             
15 See Appendix 5 for a detailed table of when interviews were conducted with particular participants. 
16 See Appendix 5 for details of which interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed, and which were not. 
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3.4. Workshops and group discussions 
 
As part of the FliCCR project, we carried out five workshops with unique aims and objectives17. 
The first two workshops (November 2011, Jan 2013) were conducted in order to engage 
directly with a group of CCT officials represented on the Flood Task Team; to report back on 
findings from the FliCCR project and validate these findings with input from the participants, 
collect more data relevant to the project and this thesis, and support ongoing flood management 
activities by the Flood Task Team. The workshop in February 2013 was provided for residents 
living in the informal settlements where FliCCR’s research was conducted, to present our 
findings, and to seek feedback from residents on these findings. The March 2013 multi-actor 
workshop, which brought together actors from the CCT, informal settlement residents, and NGO 
representatives, was in response to findings from the FliCCR project and the research in this 
thesis. This workshop aimed to provide the opportunity for actors who would otherwise not 
engage directly, to enter into dialogue on findings from the FliCCR project, and to discuss the 
challenges of multi-actor collaboration. The workshop in May 2013 was aimed specifically at 
residents from Sweet Home, as an opportunity to present findings from this thesis, and to 
address the issue highlighted in interviews of a lack of engagement between CCT officials and 
Sweet Home residents on flood risk management.  
 
Group discussions were held with Sweet Home residents in 2012 and 201318. The group 
discussions drew on two types of methods: focus groups and participatory risk assessments 
(PRAs). A focus group is described by Silverman (2011) as a type of interview where the 
researcher takes on the role of a facilitator of a group discussion, rather than as a questioner. 
Focus groups are different to interviews because they are not “conversations with a purpose” 
(Burgess, 2002:84), but try to “create space for discussion amongst its members to flow more 
freely, with less direction and prompting from the facilitator” (Macun and Posel, 1998). The 
focus groups provided a space for participants to discuss and unpack key issues and explore 
themes collectively.  
 
Participatory risk assessments is a methodology used in disaster practice, which aims to 
empower local communities and groups to define their disaster risk, decide on and implement 
solutions, and evaluate the results of those interventions (Holloway and Roomaney, 2008). In 
this research, the group discussions I conducted were used as a tool to not only capture data on 
                                                             
17 See Appendix 6 for details of FliCCR’s workshops. 
18 See Appendix 5 for a detailed table of when interviews, workshops, and group discussions were conducted with 
particular departments, residents, and NGOs. 
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how residents understand and respond to flood risk (i.e., via a focus group), but to facilitate 
discussions with residents with the aim of helping them to define flood risk in their community, 
identify the factors contributing towards their vulnerability to flooding, and consider the 
options needed to strengthen their resilience to flooding. In 2012, an initial, exploratory group 
discussion was carried out with a mixed group of five men and three women. In this workshop, 
the problem tree method used in PRAs (Holloway and Roomaney, 2008:54) was used to identify 
the relationships between the underlying causes and impacts of flooding in Sweet Home. This 
activity was followed by discussions on coping strategies and a transect walk to identify 
problem areas in Sweet Home.  
 
In 2013, a series of workshops that were facilitated together with two Masters students (Dixon 
(2013) and Desportes (2014)), were conducted with separate women-only and men-only group 
sessions to map flood risk in Sweet Home, identify assets available to residents to cope with and 
prevent flood risk, and identify and rank flood management activities carried out by the CCT 
and residents in Sweet Home. Desportes (2014) presents a detailed description of these group 
sessions and their outcomes in her Master’s thesis. Relevant data from these group sessions on 
the causes and impacts of flood risk in Sweet Home and the types of flood management 
activities implemented in Sweet Home are presented in Chapter Six.  
 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
In analysing and coding the data, insights on coding procedures were drawn on from Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) and Babbie and Mouton (2007). Coding is understood as the process of 
analysing text, questioning segments of the text, labelling these segments according to a 
meaningful category (or ‘code), and comparing the codes within and between texts (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2007). From this process, the researcher is able to generate theory, refine theory, 
and/or critique existing theory. There are three key steps in coding procedures: open coding, 
axial coding, and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Babbie and Mouton, 2007).  
 
Open coding, seen as the first phase of coding, can be approached in three different ways (see 
Babbie and Mouton, 2007:499-501):  
 
1. you identify all possible categories (‘codes’) pertaining to a specific line of text; 
2. you code a paragraph or sentence by noting its central theme (‘code); and 
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3. you code the whole text by summarising what is going on in the text. 
 
In coding the transcribed interviews, workshops, and focus groups, I adopted a combination of 
the first two open coding approaches. The approach depended on the text, with certain lines 
containing lots of important information and therefore requiring the identification of multiple 
codes. Other sections of text, which were often lengthy explanations from participants on 
particular events or activities, required a single code to summarise its core theme. 
 
The second phase of coding is called ‘axial coding’. Axial coding is the process of analysing data 
initially coded under open coding, in order to find new connections between the categories, or 
refining the categories to represent their finer detail (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Babbie and 
Mouton, 2007). In this research, an example of axial coding was making connections within the 
broader category of ‘challenges’, and refining different sets of challenges into different types of 
barriers, as informed by my conceptual framework.  
 
The third and final phase of coding is called ‘selective coding’, whereby categories established 
under the conceptual framework (see Chapter Four) are selectively identified from the text and 
sections of text already coded during phases one and two. An example is taking the existing 
codes of ‘perceptions of different actors’, ‘mandates’, ‘approaches towards problems’, and 
‘definitions of problems’, and re-coding those as ‘mentalities’. 
 
In order to code the data collected in this research, qualitative analysis software called NVIVO 10 
was used. This software allowed me to create codes to categorise sections of text under 
different themes. Although this software allowed me to analyse the coded data quantitatively, 
this process did not provide meaningful results in the context of this thesis. I was more 
interested in finding examples of how different participants responded to different themes in 
the interviews and the details of those answers. The examples provided by the participants only 
make sense, for example, if understood within their particular environment and context (e.g., 
whether they were a CCT official or a resident, the department they worked for, or the role they 
occupied in Sweet Home).  
 
In the analysis chapters of this thesis (Chapters Six to Nine), the richness of the data and 
participants’ responses are captured by presenting excerpts from the interviews. I use 
narration, in the form of direct quotations from case actors, as a mode of presentation. Not only 
does narration best capture the responses from in-depth interviews and workshop discussions, 
but as Duminy et al. (2013) argue, narration is well-suited to describing the complexities and 
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contradictions of real life, such as flood governance in informal settlements. By providing 
quotations of the actors managing and experiencing flood risk in Cape Town, this mode of 
presentation also gives a voice to those actors, who are otherwise silenced by political and 
social agendas.  
 
 
5. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
It is widely accepted that objectivity in qualitative research is a myth. Corbin and Strauss 
(2008:32) recognise the impact that researchers have on the research process; in bringing their 
“perspectives, training, knowledge, and biases, these aspects of self then become woven into all 
aspects of the research process”. One approach to come to terms with this objectivity and still 
maintain validity in the research is for the researcher to be ‘sensitive’ throughout the research 
process. Corbin and Strauss (2008:32) define sensitivity here as “having insight, being tuned in 
to, [and] being able to pick up on relevant issues, events, and happenings in data”. Being a 
sensitive researcher means that the researcher views the data through the eyes of the 
participants, and through that, understands the issues and themes from the participants’ 
perspective; the researcher also recognises and reflects on the bias that impacts on how he/she 
interprets and understands this data. Corbin and Strauss (2008) explain further how being 
‘sensitive’ in research also means that the researcher is aware of how they themselves influence 
interpretations of the data; recognising that their findings are the product of the data as well as 
the knowledge, background, and past experiences that the researcher brings to the data. The 
literature review also plays an important role in enhancing sensitivity, argue Corbin and Strauss 
(2008), because it can help the researcher more objectively interpret the data and compare it to 
findings from similar studies by other researchers.  
 
The use of multiple FliCCR researchers when conducting fieldwork also provided value in 
enhancing confidence of the findings. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that using multiple 
‘investigators’ can be advantageous because it allows each investigator to bring a different 
perspective to the data collection and analysis phases, which can enhance the richness of the 
study, increase the likelihood of finding critical insights from the data, and build confidence in 
the findings if there are conflicting perceptions of the data that are then addressed by the 
multiple investigators.  
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There were several challenges in conducting this research, which are similar to those 
highlighted by Duminy et al. (2013) in the context of conducting research in cities of the global 
South, and in particular in informal settlement contexts. Duminy et al. (2013) reflect on how 
residents can sometimes be suspicious of, or even simply resist researchers collecting 
information about their households because they fear that this might lead to government 
interference. For the most part, households in Sweet Home were receptive of me and my 
questions; although I attribute this to the gate-keepers that I had selected, who were known to 
community members and who introduced me as a researcher wanting to understand their 
‘problems’. Without these gatekeepers, I would not have had easy access to households.  
 
The issue of validity and confidence of findings in terms of the interviews conducted for this 
research were also taken into consideration. Several actors were excluded from the data 
gathering process because they were not available for interviews or did not want to be 
interviewed. In Sweet Home, interviews were conducted from 11 am until 3 pm during the 
week, and therefore excluded the economically-active residents. Both gatekeepers to Sweet 
Home were women; this meant that most of the participants interviewed and invited to 
workshops were women and knew the gatekeepers prior to the fieldwork. These two logistical 
factors created a bias in the findings because the participants selected from Sweet Home 
represent only a small fraction of the community’s experiences. Carrying out interviews in 
Sweet Home during the week and with a gatekeeper was, however, the safest option for me, as a 
female researcher and an outsider to the settlement. On two occasions in 2013, my colleagues19 
and I had to stop fieldwork and leave Sweet Home immediately because of gang-related, deadly 
shooting incidents in Sweet Home. I tried to address participant bias in two ways: 
 
1. My colleagues (i.e., the two Masters students) and I selected a second gate-
keeper and translator and ran a group of workshops in 2013 with residents who 
were selected by that gate-keeper; these workshops were conducted with a 
different group of residents from the PRA-focused workshop I conducted in 
2012. Although the second gate-keeper was also female, she was not from Sweet 
Home itself and had contacts through her community-based public health 
network; this was different to the original gatekeeper who lived in Sweet Home 
and introduced me mainly to her neighbours and close friends. 
2. My colleagues and I invited men to participate in a men’s only group discussion 
in 2013. In FliCCR’s May 2013 workshop, we also asked for equal representation 
                                                             
19 I introduced Isabelle Desportes and Juliette Dixon, two Masters students from Europe, to Sweet Home and its 
residents. In 2013, the three of us conducted group discussions in Sweet Home as a collective effort.    
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from men and women, to counter the gender bias towards women attending our 
other group discussions. 
 
As an outsider, there is always a hidden transcript (Scott, 1991, Cochrane, 1999). A hidden 
transcript is information that is hidden from the public and only accessible to someone who 
knows how to decode the transcript, has privileged access, and/or will know what is really 
going on. In this research, I was the outsider in both the CCT circles and in Sweet Home. It was 
often in the best interest of CCT officials, for example, to keep certain information ‘hidden’ from 
me. In addition, the CCT officials presented only information that was allowed in the public 
domain and could be published in my ‘public’ thesis. Any information that was questionable in 
terms of its public domain access was told to me ‘off the record’ in interviews.  
 
In Sweet Home, residents had their own agenda and their answers were often framed in a way 
that served that agenda. This agenda related closely to the contentious issue of housing and 
service delivery in informal settlements. Using a translator also resulted in some of the 
information being lost in translation; especially when I used the wife of Sweet Home’s local 
leader, who would often answer on behalf of residents or tell them what to say. Williamson et al. 
(2011) argue that cross-language interviews can be challenging not only because of logistics and 
the process itself of generating data, but because of the questionable influences these 
interpretations might have on the validity of the data and the conclusions drawn. One way I 
tried to get a sense of the hidden transcript and make it more visible for the purposes of my 
thesis, was to validate responses from participants with follow-up interviews and with 
interviews with different/multiple participants. In this way, the different or recurrent responses 
helped to build a more ‘accurate’ understanding of the issues.  
 
Finally, the sensitive and highly political nature of flood risk in informal settlements meant that 
I, as the researcher, needed to position myself clearly, yet at the same time gain and maintain 
trust with participants. Silverman (2011) argues that building trust and confidence with 
participants is especially important when asking sensitive questions or dealing with sensitive 
issues. Numerous visits with Sweet Home residents were carried out to form a relationship with 
them. This was particularly important for discussions on CCT-resident conflict and 
misunderstanding and housing/services protests. However, this was problematic because I still 
needed to remain objective, despite the strong ties formed with residents and the reality of the 
situation, which is often quite desperate. It was difficult to remain objective and only collect 
data when many of the discussions with Sweet Home residents and local leadership were about 
people (NGOs, researchers, CCT officials) entering Sweet Home, just taking down 
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information/numbers, and leaving and not coming back or having any real follow-up and 
results. As a result, I tried to keep in contact with residents from Sweet Home, visit without the 
aim of collecting data, and provide feedback20.  
 
It was critical throughout the research process to present myself as a researcher and to not take 
that role for granted (Silverman, 2011). During interviews with CCT officials and NGO 
representatives, I was definitely positioned as the researcher. In Sweet Home, however, because 
I was asking questions about the CCT’s strategies and was knowledgeable of the CCT’s structure 
and policies, residents would often assume I was from the CCT or had influence with CCT 
officials. This was challenging because responses from residents would often be framed in a way 
that ‘requested’ extra help from the CCT (via me). I therefore had to constantly remind residents 
of my role as a researcher. With the May 2013 workshops, this boundary was blurred because I 
was one of the facilitators bringing CCT officials and residents together onto a common 
platform. In this workshop, I had to continuously steer discussions and action plans away from 
becoming ‘my’ responsibility and into the hands of the residents and CCT officials (i.e., what can 
‘they’ do/plan and take forward). This notion of actively encouraging CCT officials and residents 
to take responsibility was especially important at the close of the FliCCR project, during the 
March and May 2013 workshops, because the aim of these workshops was to nurture dialogue 
and action on flood risk between the CCT and residents, in a non-confrontational setting. 
 
 
6. SUMMARY 
 
A single-case embedded case study approach guided this research and several qualitative 
methods were drawn on to collect and analyse the empirical data and theorise about flood 
governance in Cape Town and disaster governance in cities of the global South more broadly. 
This diversity of methods reflects the complexity of understanding multi-actor governance 
processes and acknowledges the need to understand the conditions necessary for strengthening 
collaboration between multiple actors in order to strengthen those governance processes. The 
two embedded units of analysis in this case study (i.e., the Flood Task Team and Sweet Home 
informal settlement) were particularly relevant for providing a detailed analysis of disaster 
governance processes and allowing me to examine the complex realities of governance 
                                                             
20 Feedback was provided via the various FliCCR workshops, as well as via a booklet published by FliCCR on flood risk 
issues in informal settlements. A hardcopy version of this booklet was distributed to residents and CCT officials who 
participated in my research. For a PDF version, see:  
http://static.weadapt.org/knowledge-base/files/1280/52556f59809edacc-fliccr-risingwaters-2013.pdf 
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processes and the complex social interactions between people within their particular socio-
political context.  
 
Throughout the research process (the data collection, analysis, and conceptual framework 
development), the dilemma of how to disseminate and apply the results in a manner that would 
address some of the challenges highlighted in the research and meet the goals of the FliCCR 
project, was increasingly apparent over time. The multi-actor workshops played a key role in 
not only providing opportunities for collecting more data from a wider participant list, but 
became the vehicle for disseminating the results in a way that would facilitate further 
discussion and potentially more tangible outcomes. This research and the workshops that 
disseminated some of the findings from this research were not designed to try and highlight 
examples of what the CCT and its Flood Task Team were doing wrong in terms of managing 
flood risk in the city’s informal settlements, but designed to help these officials evaluate their 
approaches and consider what changes could take place to strengthen their flood management 
strategies.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  
 
FLOOD GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE 
ACTORS, THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND THE 
CHALLENGES 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
South Africa experiences severe floods annually; in 2014 alone, flooding was reported across six 
of the country’s nine provinces (Hill, 2014a,b,c,d,e). In South Africa’s second most populous 
city21, Cape Town, where the case study for this thesis is based, 24 significant flood events were 
reported between 1989 and 2004 (DiMP, 2005). In August and September 2013, severe storms 
and the resultant flooding displaced 158,880 people (Hirsch, 2013a). Similar high-intensity cold 
fronts hit Cape Town in 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009, and 2012, causing extensive flooding, 
displacing thousands of informal settlement residents, and costing the City of Cape Town (CCT) 
municipality millions in direct damages and relief provision (DiMP, 2005, DRMC, 2010, 
Holloway et al., 2010, DRMC, 2012b). 
 
The multiple negative socio-economic impacts on informal settlements from these types of 
extreme floods in Cape Town, as well as the less-publicised chronic, annual flooding, is well 
documented in the literature. Based on research conducted in Cape Town, Bouchard (2007), 
Nestegard (2009), Drivdal (2011a,b), Orangio (2012), Dixon (2013), Machiridza (2013), 
Desportes (2014), and Jozipovic (2015) all highlight the multiple impacts of flooding on low-
income communities: 
 
 residents’ health is at risk because of waterborne diseases, flu and coughs, and 
rashes from contaminated water; 
                                                             
21 According to the 2011 South African census, the City of Johannesburg has the highest population with 4.4 million 
people, while the City of Cape Town has the second highest population with 3.7 million.  
See: http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/ [Accessed: February 2015]. 
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 residents are prevented from going to work or school because of flooded 
communal spaces/paths/roads and heavy rainfall; 
 residents’ belongings and homes are damaged by rising/standing water and 
leaks; 
 psychological impacts; and 
 physical displacement.  
 
Holloway et al.’s (2010) assessment of the impacts on high-value coastal properties and 
developments from the 2004 floods and Pharoah’s (2013) thesis on flood risk in subsidised, 
formal housing22 highlight how informal settlements are not the only areas of Cape Town that 
are at risk from flooding.  
 
Both the high-intensity rainfall events of recent years and the studies on the socio-economic 
impacts of floods on Cape Town’s residents, particularly the urban poor, confirm the need to 
proactively manage flood risk in Cape Town. In this chapter, I begin with an overview of the 
nature of flooding in Cape Town’s informal settlements; this overview captures the reality of 
annual flooding as experienced by majority of the urban poor living on marginalised land in an 
area of Cape Town called the Cape Flats. I then present the key actors governing flood risk in 
Cape Town’s informal settlements: the collaborative efforts of the CCT’s Flood Task Team, the 
coping strategies of residents living in the high flood risk informal settlement of Sweet Home, 
and the activities by some of the NGOs to respond to flood events. I then discuss some of the 
more general challenges of managing flood risk in Cape Town’s informal settlements, as 
identified by the actors engaged with during my research.  
 
 
2. THE NATURE OF FLOODING IN CAPE TOWN’S INFORMAL 
SETTLEMENTS 
 
Located in the south-western corner of South Africa, Cape Town has a Mediterranean-like 
climate: it experiences cool, wet winters (May-September) and warm, dry summers (November-
February). The winter rainfall and dry summers experienced in Cape Town are in contrast to 
much of southern Africa, which experiences dry winters and summer rains (Midgley et al., 
                                                             
22 In South Africa and South African literature on housing, there are different ‘types’ of housing described; these range 
from the shacks (informal housing) in informal settlements, to the more solidly built brick and cement houses (formal 
housing) in state-funded RDP (public) housing, or privately-owned and built houses in more affluent areas. For more 
on housing types in South Africa, see Landman and Napier (2009), Pharoah (2013), and CCT (2013).  
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2005). Cape Town also experiences two significant weather systems: the low pressure systems 
in the form of cold fronts, and the cut-off low pressure systems (see Midgley et al., 2005:19 for 
detailed descriptions of these systems). These two weather systems are responsible for the high 
levels of rainfall and high-intensity storms that often precede heavy flooding across the city. For 
example, the August 2004 floods, which affected 20,000 residents living in Cape Town’s 
informal settlements (Table 7) and cost the CCT ZAR 6.5 million in direct damages (Holloway et 
al., 2010), was the result of two large cold fronts that hit Cape Town successively. The 2008 and 
2013 flooding during Cape Town’s August and September months, which affected about 22,000 
and 40,000 households in Cape Town, respectively, were the result of cut-off lows that followed 
cold fronts. These large-scale, high-intensity storms were accompanied by gale force winds and 
extended periods of precipitation.  
 
 
Table 7: Number of affected households and displaced people  
from flooding in Cape Town (2001-2012) 
Year Affected Households Displaced People 
2001 11,000 44,000 
2004 4,000 16,000 
2007 8,000 – 8,600 32,000 – 34,000 
2008 22,323 75,258 
2009 11,507 29,011 
2010 3,497 9,099 
2011 2,636 6,500 
2012 5,504 14,000 
2013 39,505 158,880 
2014 19,723 69,108 
Source: Flood Task Team reports (DRMC, 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012),  
Hirsch (2013a), and DMAF (2014). 
 
 
In August 2013, Cape Town received 168 mm compared to the average 85.3 mm in other years. 
This heavy rainfall, which happened mostly in the first two weeks of August, affected 65 areas 
across Cape Town (De Lille, 2013). According to the Mayor’s statement following the flooding, 
the CCT spent over ZAR 2.6 million on social relief to residents whose structures were damaged 
by the flooding; majority of whom lived in informal settlements (De Lille, 2013). From January 
until September 2013, the South African Weather Service recorded a total rainfall of 807.6 mm, 
beating 2012’s 715 mm, which was the highest rainfall for the period since 1997 (Hirsch, 
2013b).  
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Extreme rainfall events have increased in frequency in South Africa over recent years (Ziervogel 
et al., 2014a). These changes are likely to continue with climate change, yet it is less certain 
what the precipitation changes will be in terms of direction and magnitude (Ziervogel et al., 
2014a). A report on climate trends and scenarios for South Africa by South Africa’s Department 
of Environmental Affairs (DEA, 2013) claims that there will be an increased rainfall variability 
in Cape Town, with a tendency towards a significant decrease in the number of rain days and an 
increase in the intensity of rainfall events and the duration of dry spells. This all points towards 
an increased frequency in extreme events, in terms of both potential droughts and floods (DEA, 
2013).  
 
Majority of Cape Town’s 378 informal settlements23, which house most of the 21.6 per cent of 
residents living in ‘informal’ housing (StatsSA, 2011), are located on the low-lying, sandy, and 
waterlogged wetlands of the ‘Cape Flats’ (Bouchard et al., 2007, DRMC, 2009, Ziervogel and 
Smit, 2009) (Figure 10). The Cape Flats is a large expanse of inland wetlands and coastal land 
about 30 kilometres from Cape Town’s central business district (CBD). The informal settlements 
on the Cape Flats are hidden from the CBD behind the city’s iconic Table Mountain; a distinct 
spatial and socio-economic polarisation that many authors attribute to the legacy of race-based 
segregation policies during Apartheid (Wilkinson, 1998, Lalloo, 1999, Huchzermeyer, 2002, 
Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006). The segregated location of these informal settlements from 
the CBD also reflects many authors’ arguments about the physical and socio-economic 
marginalisation of the urban poor who are forced to live on the outskirts in many cities of the 
global South (Huchzermeyer, 2002, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Douglas et al., 2008, 
Pelling and Wisner, 2009). These informal settlements in Cape Town are densely populated, 
with an estimated 144,000 households living on the Cape Flats (Housing Development Agency, 
2013).  
 
                                                             
23 The Housing Development Agency (2013) report provides this statistic. The official number of informal settlements 
is constantly changing and many different reports/officials provide different tallies. For example, a report by the 
CCT’s Human Settlements Directorate states that there are 204 informal settlements listed in their database (CCT, 
2014). The number of informal settlements is constantly changing because of new settlements cropping up, smaller 
neighbouring settlements merging, or settlements relocating, dispersing, or dissolving. One CCT official explained 
that for political reasons (i.e., to show that government is addressing the issue of informal settlements), the official 
stated number of informal settlements is lower than in reality. 
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Figure 10: Location of informal settlements on the Cape Flats in Cape Town 
(Source: Google Earth and the CCT, 2013) 
 
 
Every year, the DRMC and the Flood Task Team carry out disaster risk assessments (DRAs) to 
identify the informal settlements that are ‘high risk’ and ‘medium risk’ (in terms of flooding), 
and those informal settlements that ‘need to be relocated’ (Table 8). In 2009, for example, 
DRMC’s (2009) ‘Winter Preparedness Strategy’ stated that 88,000 households on the Cape Flats 
were at risk of flooding, and 51 informal settlements had an ‘above average’ risk of flooding 
should ‘normal’ winter rainfall take place. In more recent DRMC assessments24, however, the 
total number of ‘high risk’ and ‘medium risk’ informal settlements has reduced as a result of: 
 
1. activities by the Flood Task Team, which have successfully addressed flood risk 
in a small number of these informal settlements; and  
2. the Flood Task Team re-classifying the ‘at-risk’ informal settlements from ‘high-
risk’ and ‘medium-risk’ to ‘high-risk’ and ‘need to be relocated’.  
                                                             
24 Because of the confidential nature of the reports and lists, the exact lists are not referenced or copied here. 
Information about these lists needs to be directed to the DRMC. 
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Table 8: Summary of flood risk classification of informal settlements from 2009-2013 
Year 
No. of ‘high 
risk’ informal 
settlements25 
No. of ‘medium (above 
average or average) risk’ 
informal settlements 
No. of informal 
settlements ‘to 
be relocated’ 
No. of informal settlements 
where mitigation measures 
need to be implemented 
2009 12 
44 (above average) 
170 (average) 
- - 
2011 22 - 9 20 
2012 - - 24 9 
2013 9 - 24 - 
2014 7 - 22 7 
 
The ‘need to be relocated’ category acknowledges that some informal settlements are located on 
unsuitable land (e.g., those built on road reserves, detention ponds, wetlands, and private land) 
where the only viable solution, from the CCT’s point of view, is to relocate the residents to 
appropriate ‘flood-safe’ and serviced/serviceable land. The politics and challenges around 
relocation are discussed further in Section 5.1 of this chapter. To illustrate the issue of people 
building their houses in flood-prone areas, Table 9 shows the number of informal settlements 
identified as those built in flood-prone (‘unsuitable’) areas in 2008/9. 
 
Table 9: Numbers of informal settlements and houses built in flood-prone areas in Cape Town  
Flood Hazard Locality 
Estimated Number of 
Informal Settlements 
Estimated Number 
of Dwellings26 
Un-drained, trapped low-lying areas 33 3885 
Designated watercourse floodplains 6 987 
Within 25 m of a watercourse 18 861 
Formal stormwater ponds (e.g., 
retention and detention ponds) 
7 457 
Environmentally-sensitive wetlands 2 927 
(Data from DRMC, 2009) 
 
The nature of flooding on the Cape Flats is not characterised by rivers overflowing their banks, 
but rather by rising water from saturated water tables, localised flooding from blocked 
stormwater systems, and natural or engineered retention ponds, in which informal settlements 
are often illegally located, filling with water during the rainy season (see: Benjamin, 2008, 
Drivdal, 2011a,b): 
 
Five examples of flooding experienced in Cape Town’s informal settlements are provided in 
Table 10, as witnessed and photographed during the fieldwork in Sweet Home and surrounding 
informal settlements. 
                                                             
25 Majority of these informal settlements are located on privately-owned land, stormwater ponds, wetlands, or road 
reserves; this limits the DRR measures that the CCT can implement. 
26 The CCT calculates the total number of people based on an average of four people per house. 
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Table 10: Examples of flooding in Cape Town's informal settlements 
TYPE PHOTOGRAPHED EXAMPLES 
Water ponding in 
communal areas: 
high/saturated water 
tables + informal 
settlements located in 
wetlands = some areas 
of the informal 
settlement are lower 
(in depressions) than 
the rest of the 
settlement/roads  
Rainwater or surface 
runoff entering houses 
through the cracks in 
roofs and walls (of 
badly-constructed 
shacks made from 
recycled materials) or 
through open doors 
 
Stormwater and 
greywater/sewage 
overflowing from 
blocked/unmaintained 
stormwater channels: 
this water ponds in 
communal areas/roads 
and enters houses built 
below the road/ground 
level  
Informal settlements 
built in transient 
wetlands or 
retention/detention 
ponds during the dry 
season, which become 
flooded during wetter 
seasons 
 
Water collecting from 
standpipes that lack 
formal drainage 
systems, or water 
collecting in areas 
where residents dump 
greywater (or toilet 
waste). 
 
 
Taken by Joy Waddell 
Taken by Joy Waddell 
Taken by high school scholar 
Taken by Sweet  
Home resident 
Taken by high school scholar 
Taken by Joy Waddell 
Taken by Sweet  
Home resident 
Taken by high  
school scholar 
Taken by Joy Waddell Taken by Joy Waddell 
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Table 11: Key underlying factors that increase flood risk in Cape Town’s informal settlements 
Biophysical and geographical factors: 
1 High-intensity weather events overwhelm existing stormwater drainage systems 
2 Wetlands and depressions = ponding 
3 Informal settlements built on old solid waste/rubble dumping sites or sand dunes = undulating 
topography = stormwater runoff channelled into depressions or low-lying areas 
4 Sandy soils and high water table = saturation during winter rainfall. Standing water evaporates very 
slowly during cold winters = flooding in winter 
Socio-economic and behavioural factors: 
1 Residents dig their shacks into the ground to secure against strong Cape winds = shack at risk from 
rising water (from high water table) and from stormwater runoff flowing ‘down’ into their homes 
2 Some informal settlements built on private land = CCT unable to legally service that land 
3 High density informal settlements = difficult (often impossible without relocation) for CCT to build 
drainage services (i.e., in-situ upgrade) 
4 Increased hardening of surfaces = increased stormwater runoff flowing into houses and flooding paths  
5 Low-quality housing in informal settlements = shacks leak from rainfall, seepage from the ground (i.e., 
shacks often built directly on muddy ground with only a carpet covering the floor) 
6 Residents build houses in flood-prone areas (e.g., wetlands, retention and detention ponds, low-lying 
areas, and along natural water courses) for a number of reasons: 
 Residents have 
no alternative 
and are forced 
to build their 
shack wherever 
they find open 
space 
People migrating to Cape Town from 
other (drier) provinces or countries 
have no prior knowledge of where it is 
safe to build = they build somewhere 
that looks dry in summer, but floods in 
winter. New migrants lack social ties, so 
neighbours/ communities do not warn 
newcomers of flooding hotspots 
Political motivations: Political parties pay 
residents to build shacks in controversial 
areas close to election time, to gain extra 
votes or to make the ruling party look bad 
(make the province/city ‘ungovernable’).  
Some residents build their shacks in flood-
prone areas so they can be moved up the 
housing or relocation list/queue27 
7 Existing open stormwater channels blocked = localised flooding when channels overwhelmed by 
surface runoff. Reasons for blockages include: 
 Residents fill open channels 
with rubble and sand to 
cover the smell of stagnant, 
contaminated ‘green’ 
water, and to prevent 
children from 
playing/drowning in this 
contaminated water. 
Contaminated water is 
from residents emptying 
‘night-soil’ (toilet buckets) 
into open channels every 
morning because 
communal toilets are 
broken (or non-existent, too 
far away to use at night, or 
unsafe for children/women 
to use at night. Stagnant 
water also from long-term 
blockages and rotting solid 
waste 
Residents 
fill the 
open 
channels 
directly in 
front their 
house to 
allow 
easier 
access by 
foot, to 
park their 
cars right 
in front of 
their front 
door, or to 
expand the 
size of 
their 
house into 
that space 
Residents build 
infrastructure 
over stormwater 
systems: e.g., a 
personal toilet 
over a 
stormwater 
cover, a driveway 
over the 
stormwater 
channel, or 
bridges/ 
walkways. These 
cause blockages, 
especially when 
solid waste enters 
the system or 
collects 
in/around the 
‘informal’ 
infrastructure 
Solid waste = from 
residents throwing solid 
waste into open 
channels, or solid waste 
being blown into open 
channels. These issues 
relate to inconsistent 
solid waste removal or 
central collection points 
(= large green shipment 
containers) being locked 
when residents want to 
dispose of refuse bags. 
Dogs (or scavenging 
children/adults) rip 
open refuse bags left by 
locked containers and 
the winds/rain blow the 
solid waste into open 
stormwater systems 
Stormwater 
systems not 
maintained, 
cleaned, or 
unblocked 
regularly = 
bad 
blockages 
and localised 
flooding 
 
 
                                                             
27 The Housing database, which the CCT developed in the early 2000s (and went live in June 2006), is a centrally-
managed list that the CCT uses to allocate housing (rental and subsidised) (CCT, 2014). This housing database is what 
many residents and officials refer to when talking about ‘being on the waiting/housing list’. As of April 2013, the CCT 
had assisted 57,349 applicants, but 276,920 applicants were still awaiting housing opportunities in Cape Town (CCT, 
2014). The ‘relocation list’ refers to those houses or informal settlements that the Flood Task Team has identified as 
being high flood-risk informal settlements, where the CCT sees the only viable solution as permanently relocating 
those houses/informal settlements to higher ground or areas that are less flood-prone. 
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The multiple factors that cause flooding and increase flood risk in Cape Town’s informal 
settlements are well-documented in the literature28. The key underlying factors (Table 11) were 
identified during interviews with CCT officials and Sweet home residents and observed during 
the transect walks in Sweet Home. From Table 11, it becomes apparent that many of the 
challenges around flood risk are closely linked to housing and deeply embedded in and shaped 
by socio-economic and political realities and factors.  
 
In the following sections, the different actors who are seen as central to addressing flood risk 
will be introduced, as well as the multiple approaches that these actors are taking to address the 
underlying physical, socio-economic, and even political factors that increase/exacerbate flood 
risk.  
 
 
3. IDENTIFYING THE KEY NODES GOVERNING FLOOD RISK IN CAPE 
TOWN’S INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS 
 
During this research, a number of actors (called nodes) were identified as playing a key role in 
managing flood risk in Cape Town29. For the purposes of this thesis, the analysis and discussion 
will focus on the activities of 17 of these nodes, who were available for interviews and actively 
participated in FliCCR’s workshops. Table 12 provides a breakdown of who these 17 nodes are 
and what their function and responsibilities are within the context of flood governance.  
  
                                                             
28 For example, Drivdal (2011a,b), Orangio (2012), Dixon (2013), and Desportes (2014) consider the factors that 
increase vulnerability from a qualitative approach. Musungu (2012) uses community-based GIS to identify and 
analyse the hazard profile of two informal settlements, as well as residents’ coping strategies.  
29 See Appendix 7 for an overview of all these actors. 
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Table 12: The functions and responsibilities of the selected nodes  
Actor / Node 
Number of 
people30 
interviewed 
Responsibility / Nature of the Node 
Development 
Services Dept.# 
1 
Coordinate with other departments to ensure the effective delivery of 
services in Cape Town’s informal settlements. 
Disaster Risk 
Management 
Centre (DRMC) 
8 
Manage and respond to disaster risk across Cape Town and in high 
risk communities. Conduct awareness campaigns and carry out DRAs. 
Coordinate the Flood Task Team and relief provided by NGOs. 
Engineering 
Services Dept.# 1 
Coordinate service delivery of essential/basic services/infrastructure. 
Responsible for incremental upgrade of services/infrastructure and 
identifying settlements for upgrade.  
Environmental 
Health Dept.## 
3 
Preventing outbreak of diseases and monitoring underlying disease 
risk factors. Monitoring/referral of inadequate/damaged services in 
informal settlements to relevant departments. Health and hygiene 
education and safety advice.  
Ikhayalami 
2 
NGO working closely with communities on multiple development 
issues, including re-blocking and de-densifying informal settlements. 
Informal 
Settlements 
Management 
Dept.# 
3 
Management of infrastructure upgrade and service delivery in 
informal settlements. Assess and coordinate relocation to suitable 
areas. Prepare and register flood victims, supply emergency flood kits, 
and carry out annual DRAs of informal settlements. 
Jungle Theatre 
Company### 
1 
Activated by the CCT to run annual fire and flood awareness shows. 
MAYCO 
(Mayoral 
Committee 
Members) 
1 (Utilities) 
1 (Safety and 
Security) 
Comprises 11 councillors appointed by the Mayor. Each member has a 
different portfolio of municipal government. Utilities is responsible for 
ensuring residents have access to basic services. Safety and Security is 
responsible disasters, crime, traffic, and by-law enforcement. 
Mustadafin 
Foundation### 
2 
An Islamic NGO activated by the CCT to provide disaster relief. Also 
involved in community-based activities: i.e., health/hygiene education. 
Roads and 
Stormwater 
Dept. 
4 
Proactive stormwater and river cleaning, and regular maintenance of 
critical formal and informal stormwater systems. Design/implement 
constructed systems to address Cape Town’s drainage needs. 
SA Red 
Cross### 
1 
An international NGO activated by the CCT to provide relief during a 
disaster event. Also involved in community-based DRR activities. 
Solid Waste 
Management 
Dept. 
231 
Coordinating and monitoring community contractors who are 
responsible for the weekly collection of solid waste, area cleaning, and 
the removal of illegal dumping in informal settlements. 
Sweet Home 
Residents 
21 
They live in an informal settlement that experiences annual flooding. 
Small-scale measures taken to prevent/cope with localised flooding. 
Sweet Home 
Street 
Committee 
3 
Informally elected by Sweet Home residents to manage the daily 
issues in the informal settlement. Comprises representatives from 
each ‘section’ of Sweet Home and is chaired by a community leader. 
The 
Warehouse### 
2 
FBO working closely with Sweet Home residents. Projects include a 
seniors’ club, HIV/AIDS support, crèche, and teenage groups.  
Ubuhle Bakha 
Ubuhle### 
1 
Community-based project working closely with Sweet Home residents 
to replace haphazard shacks and build clusters of sandbag houses.  
Ward 
Councillors 
and Subcouncil 
6 
The formal interface between the CCT and communities. Responsible 
for a particular ward (ward councillor) or cluster of wards 
(subcouncil). Mobilise resources to address the needs of their ward. 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Dept. 
2 
Responsible for the general maintenance and housekeeping of water 
and sanitation infrastructure. Unblocking and cleaning of existing 
sanitation and sewerage systems. 
# Located within the Housing Directorate           ## Located within the Health Directorate           ### NGO 
                                                             
30 Tally of interviewees from interviews by Joy Waddell (2011-2013) and FliCCR researchers (2010-2011). 
31 Officials from Solid Waste Management did not consent to any interviews; they communicated by email only. 
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In order to discuss these 18 nodes in the following subsections, they are further categorised into 
three groups (called ‘nodal assemblages’): 
 
1. Departments and directorates that form part of the CCT and are represented on 
the Flood Task Team (eight nodes in total); 
2. Residents and the street committee from Sweet Home informal settlement (21 
residents and three street committee representatives); and 
3. External actors (e.g., NGOs, FBOS, CBOS, CSOs, and ward councillors) who carry 
out flood risk reduction and relief activities at the community level (seven 
nodes in total). 
 
 
3.1. The Flood Task Team: The nodes coordinating flood governance in 
Cape Town 
 
Flood risk management activities in Cape Town are coordinated by the CCT’s Flooding and 
Storms Emergency Planning Task Team. This ‘Flood Task Team’ is chaired by the DRMC, which 
is the CCT department mandated to mitigate and respond to all types of hazards (e.g., 
technological, natural, political) and related disaster events across Cape Town (DRMC, 2012a). 
In accordance with national and municipal DRM legislation (South Africa, 1998, South Africa, 
2002, DRMC, 2012a), and in response to the destructive and costly winter flooding event in 
2008, DRMC and the CCT’s Development Services department were tasked with setting up the 
Flood Task Team. This Task Team was seen as the structure for relevant CCT departments to 
work together to prepare for annual, winter storms and flooding, and reduce the risk of 
vulnerable informal settlements to this flooding.  
 
The rationale for establishing the Flood Task Team was recognition by the CCT departments 
active in informal settlements that the complexity of flood risk and the multiple underlying risk 
factors required a coordinated, holistic approach that brought together different experts and 
knowledge. The Flood Task Team was established as a CCT forum for coordinating activities, 
encouraging information-sharing between departments, and sharing the responsibility of 
managing flood risk internally between different departments. The Flood Task Team comprises 
around 30 CCT municipal departments32 and selected external actors, who meet every two 
                                                             
32 See Appendix 8 for a detailed representation of the nodes on the Flood Task Team. See Appendix 9 for a 
membership list of the Flood Task Team.  
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weeks during the winter season to design and implement their ‘Winter Preparedness Strategy’, 
which is based on the CCT’s ‘Flooding and Storms Plans’ (DRMC, 2009). 
 
The Flood Task Team’s Winter Preparedness Strategy, which is supplementary to the CCT’s 
‘Municipal Disaster Risk Management Plan’ (DRMC, 2011a, DRMC, 2012a), involves 
“coordinating [flood] risk reduction, preparedness and proposed response and relief efforts… in 
accordance with the [CCT]’s Flood and Storms Plan” (DRMC, 2009). Although this Flood Task 
Team discusses issues of flood risk across the whole of Cape Town, their main focus is on the 
city’s informal settlements, where the risk is most severe. The Flood Task Team uses DRAs and 
reports from various CCT departments to identify high-priority informal settlements at risk 
from flooding during the winter months, develop DRR strategies for these high-risk areas, 
provide contingency plans for potential flood events across the city, and monitor risk 
throughout the winter season (DRMC, 2009, DMAF, 2012, DRMC, 2012a). The Winter 
Preparedness Strategy’s objectives include (DMAF, 2012): 
 
1. integrating preparedness and response activities for flooding by the relevant 
CCT services, essential services, and external role-players; 
2. reducing or mitigating the risks and impacts that severe winter storms have on 
communities within the municipal area of Cape Town; and  
3. raise awareness of the risk of flooding with communities, through continuous 
communication.  
 
A number of NGOs are also represented on the Flood Task Team, although they do not attend 
the fortnightly meetings. These NGOs are activated by the Flood Task Team for relief provision 
(e.g., The Mustadafin Foundation, the South African Red Cross Society, the Salvation Army, and 
SANZAF) and community-based education activities (e.g., the Jungle Theatre Company). 
 
The Flood Task Team is seen by many of the CCT departments working in informal settlements 
as a positive step towards managing flood risk holistically and collaboratively. An 
Environmental Health department official (10/04/2013) explained that because of the people 
represented on the Task Team, reports or flood-related issues that are raised in these meetings 
are addressed more quickly: 
 
“…during the flooding season, we complete a weekly flood report that is submitted to 
our representatives at the flood meetings. [Our representative on the Flood Task 
Team] then takes up the issues […] that we have identified. At [the Flood Task 
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Team’s] meeting, they would then request to take the necessary steps to rectify the 
issue, and give a report-back at the following meeting. So that’s why, funnily enough, 
in the winter season, because of having this meeting… this flood committee… […] 
things are addressed because all the directors and management are sitting in this 
meeting.” 
 
Several CCT officials see the Flood Task Team as an ‘integrated’ approach that helps to pool 
critical resources, hold CCT departments more accountable, and overcome otherwise silo-based 
approaches to addressing flood risk in Cape Town: 
 
DRMC (31/01/2013): “The resources are equally spread because you have this 
platform, and your concerns and your area can be addressed. And you can ensure 
equity in the way things are dealt with.” 
 
Flood Task Team chairperson (31/01/2013): “One of the key roles we play […] is 
coordination. In terms of pulling all departments together to make sure we actually 
eliminate all those silo-based management of the flooding. Making sure that we’re all 
working as one, as a city, as CCT departments, and also including the outside 
stakeholders.” 
 
The Flood Task Team is seen in this thesis as a nodal assemblage because it brings together 
multiple nodes (CCT departments and NGOs) onto a common platform in order to collectively 
govern flood risk. Table 13 presents the nodes that form this nodal assemblage, who were 
interviewed during this research and participated in some of FliCCR’s workshops.  
 
 
Table 13: Nodes represented on the Flood Task Team who participated in this research 
Name of the Node Type 
Development Services Department CCT Department 
Disaster Risk Management Centre CCT Department 
Engineering Services Department CCT Department 
Environmental Health Department CCT Department 
Health CCT Directorate 
Informal Settlements Management Department CCT Department 
Roads and Stormwater Department CCT Department 
Solid Waste Management Department CCT Department 
The Jungle Theatre Company NGO 
The Mustadafin Foundation NGO / FBO 
Water and Sanitation Department CCT Department 
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3.2. Sweet Home informal settlement: Grounding the flood governance 
question 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Location of Sweet Home (outlined in yellow) in Cape Town 
(Source: GoogleEarth and Joy Waddell) 
 
 
Sweet Home (Figure 11) was selected as an embedded unit of analysis in the case study of flood 
governance in Cape Town because it represents indicative dynamics of informality, 
marginalisation, and some of the predominant socio-political developmental challenges and 
vulnerability to flood risk faced by majority of residents living in informal settlements on the 
Cape Flats, in Cape Town. The characteristics unique to Sweet Home are summarised in Table 
14.  
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Table 14: Demographics and characteristics of Sweet Home 
Type of Data 
Data Source: CCT survey of Sweet Home in 
2004 (CCT, 2005) 
Data Source: CCT’s overview of Ward 
80, based on data from the 2011 census 
(CCT, 2013b) 
Household 
Demographics 
Average of 3.2 members per household Average of 2.9 members per household 
Demographic 
Profile 
90.5% of residents originally migrated from 
the Eastern Cape Province (i.e., majority 
Black African) 
79.8% of the population are Black 
African; 17.3% are Coloured33 
Age Profile 
Age profile skewed towards job-seekers aged 
16-34 and children under 5 years 
49.3% are aged 25-64, and 28.7% are 
aged under 14 
Education 
Level 
8% of adults have matric34 73% have not completed matric 
39.1% of adults have not completed primary 
school, of which 4.1% do not have any formal 
schooling35 
13.6% of adults have not completed 
primary school, of which 3% do not 
have any formal schooling 
Employment 
36% of adults are unemployed36 38% of residents are unemployed 
Majority of residents who work are in the 
construction industry, street trading, manual 
labour, farm work, and security (in 
descending order from the most common) 
 
Household 
Income 
Average income per month is ZAR 1,272 
78% have an income of ZAR 3,200 or 
less 
Other Income 
Sources 
61.5% receive no state grants37 or other 
financial support: 28.9% receive child 
support, 6.9% receive disability, and 5.3% 
receive a state pension 
 
 
 
Sweet Home is located in the suburb of Philippi38. Falling under Ward 8039 within Subcouncil 18, 
with an African National Congress (ANC) ward councillor, Sweet Home has a complex history 
that has had an impact on the expansion of the settlement, its service delivery status, and the 
vulnerability of its residents to flooding. Sweet Home was originally farmland, but became an 
illegal rubble dump for Philippi’s farmers, industries, and builders (Sacks, 2012). In 1992, 
people already living in Cape Town’s other informal settlements and backyard shacks, as well as 
immigrants from the poorer Eastern Cape Province, began moving into the area and building 
shacks on available parcels of land (Sacks, 2012). The settlement grew from 52 dwellings in 
                                                             
33 ‘Coloured’ in South Africa refers to anyone who is of mixed Caucasian (‘white’) and ‘black’ African or Asian 
ancestry. See http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/126829/Coloured for a more detailed explanation. 
34 Matric is the term used in South Africa to describe the final year of high school (i.e., Grade 12) and the qualification 
received on graduating. 
35 To be considered ‘functionally literate’ (CCT, 2005), adults need to have at least completed their primary education; 
these figures here highlight the percentage of ‘functionally illiterate’ people in Sweet Home. 
36 Unemployment rates are difficult to calculate accurately because some of the ‘working’ residents are under the age 
of 18 (thus not considered ‘adults’) and/or those who indicated that they were unemployed/employed were either 
casual workers who work occasionally, or worked part-time instead of full-time. 
37In 2014, a child support state grant was ZAR 310 a month per child; a disability state grant was ZAR 1,350 a month; 
and a state pension was ZAR 1,350 a month or ZAR 1,370 a month if you are over the age of 75 (Source: South Africa, 
2014). 
38 See Appendix 10 for a map of Philippi. 
39 See Appendix 10 for a map of Ward 80. 
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January 1993, to 2,217 dwellings in 2003 (DiMP, 2009). In 2012, there were an estimated 
17,000 residents crammed into 4,000 dwellings (Sacks, 2012) (Table 15). 
 
 
Table 15: Number of informal dwelling units in Sweet Home (2002-2005) 
Year 1992 1993 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2011 2014 
Number of 
dwellings 
0 52 886 1480 2217 1785 1706 1974 2005 270040 4000 
(Source: CCT, 2005, CCT, 2006, Arthern, 2011, Sacks, 2014) 
 
 
Sweet Home is divided into three sections (Figure 12): 
 
1. one section is owned by the CCT and was serviced with water, sanitation, electricity, 
gravel roads, and stormwater drainage in 2006; 
2. one section was privately owned until 2011 and is un-serviced (DiMP, 2009, Sacks, 
2012); and 
3. a thin section running along the railway track is owned by Transnet (railway company) 
as a ‘road/rail reserve’, and the shacks located on this land are un-serviced.  
 
 
Figure 12: Map of Sweet Home, showing the three 'sections' 
(Source: Google Earth and Joy Waddell) 
                                                             
40 This figure was given during an interview (24/04/2013) with a Water and Sanitation department official. 
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The privately owned, un-serviced sections of Sweet Home are un-serviced because the owner of 
this land prevented the CCT from providing services, besides a few water standpipes and a few 
container (chemical) toilets. This large, un-serviced area has a considerable amount of illegal 
and dangerous electricity connections to the houses in the serviced section. This private land 
was finally bought by the CCT in December 2011, for ZAR 750,000 (Sacks, 2014). Sacks (2014) 
describes how this was a bargain for the company who sold that land to the CCT because their 
land was worthless: not only was the company losing money from the land because they were 
paying the compulsory monthly municipal rates, but they could not develop the land because of 
the thousands of people living there illegally. In 2013, the CCT started the lengthy process of de-
densifying the closely-packed shacks in the un-serviced area, in order to provide the necessary 
basic services.  
 
There are no formal houses in Sweet home and all of the shacks are made from recycled 
material. The only concrete building in Sweet Home is the local community hall, which is also 
used as a shelter during flood events, or for storage of flood relief supplied by local NGOs (e.g., 
blankets and food). Figure 13 illustrates the open stormwater drainage channels (called ‘hyson 
cells’) and the sanitation drainage services that exist in Sweet Home. Service delivery in Sweet 
Home and across the Cape Flats remains a contentious issue, as reflected in local news stories 
and voiced in frequent protests by residents (Nombembe, 2012, Masiko-Kambala, 2013, 
Waddell et al., 2013).  
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Figure 13: Map of Sweet Home showing the hotspots for flooding (as indicated by the residents) in 
relation to the un-serviced areas, the stormwater system, and the roads41 
(Source: Google Earth and Joy Waddell) 
 
 
Flood risk in Sweet Home, particularly during the winter rainfall period, is concentrated along 
the south-easterly corner of Sweet Home and in the middle-north-easterly section of Sweet 
Home (Figure 13). Although the south-easterly corner is in the serviced area of Sweet Home, 
flooding here is a result of the stormwater drainage system, which diverts runoff from the 
settlement to this low-lying area. The stormwater drainage system crosses through a private 
property (‘chicken farm’42 in Figure 13), which was blocked by the private landowner because 
the stormwater flowing through open channels in that person’s yard is often mixed with foul-
smelling sewerage and solid waste. This ‘blocked’ system causes the stormwater to back up 
                                                             
41 This map is based on findings from transect walks in Sweet Home and information from the Roads and Stormwater 
Department (i.e., for the various channels and systems). The flooding hotspots are based on observation, responses 
from interviews with participants, and from residents indicating on a map where the flooding hotspots are located.  
42 Sweet Home residents and CCT officials refer to this private property as ‘the chicken farm’ because it was a chicken 
farm in the past. In more recent years (date unclear), the chicken farm was converted to a car workshop (panel 
beater). 
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during heavy rainfall, flooding the streets and surrounding shacks. CCT officials explained (in 
2013) that the CCT was in negotiations with the owner of this private land to buy the land; this 
was seen as the only viable solution for overcoming the long-standing battle with this 
landowner to divert stormwater from Sweet Home into the drainage system located on his land. 
From conversations with Sweet Home residents and CCT officials in 2014, it seems that the CCT 
was finally able to purchase this private ‘chicken farm’ and could begin to install proper 
stormwater drainage to reduce the flood risk in that corner of Sweet Home. 
 
The middle of the top-left un-serviced area in Figure 13 is a high flood risk zone because there is 
a substantial depression in this area that fills with water during the rainy season. Since this 
pond-like area is in the un-serviced area of Sweet Home, the runoff is not diverted from the 
houses. As a ‘high risk’ informal settlement (identified as ‘high risk’ from 2009 until 2014), 
Sweet Home is prioritised in the Flood Task Team’s annual Winter Preparedness Strategy. 
Despite the Flood Task Team’s proactive interventions in informal settlements prior to the 
winter rains (e.g., educational campaigns on how to ‘waterproof’ shacks by raising floor levels, 
building roofs at an angle, and digging trenches to divert water to formal stormwater drainage 
channels), every winter the DRMC has to provide relief to affected households in Sweet Home 
and relocate them to nearby shelters (e.g., the community hall in Sweet Home). 
 
Residents living in Sweet Home and their street committee (which was elected by the residents) 
are seen as a nodal assemblage in this research. Although considered as a nodal assemblage, this 
research recognises that this community is not homogeneous. As identified by Smit (2006), 
urban informal settlements are not internally heterogeneous; residents’ perceptions vary 
depending on their socio-political and cultural background, their gender, religion and 
ideologies, and even their status within the community. Input from and analysis of Sweet Home 
residents are based on the outcomes from the various focus groups and interviews conducted 
with selected groups of residents and individuals. Although these findings cannot be applied to 
all the residents living in Sweet Home or all residents across all informal settlements, they do 
shed light on some of the key issues surrounding flood risk management that other actors (e.g., 
CCT officials and NGOs) have highlighted during their respective interviews. It is these broader 
themes that I unpack and discuss in the analytical chapters that follow.  
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3.3. External nodes: NGOs, ward councillors, and community leaders 
 
There are a number of external actors who were identified as key to the flood governance 
discussions in Cape Town. Since these actors vary in the roles that they play in terms of flood 
governance itself and because of their varying relationship with the Flood Task Team and 
residents living in Sweet Home, the external actors have been grouped into three categories.  
 
3.3.1. Actors activated by the Flood Task Team 
 
There are seven NGOs that are officially recognised by the Flood Task Team and the CCT as 
playing a role in responding to flood risk and educating residents about flood risk (DRMC, 
2009): HDI Support, the Jungle Theatre Company, the Mustadafin Foundation, the Salvation 
Army, the South African Red Cross Society, the South African Zakah Fund (SANZAF), and the 
Trauma Centre. These NGOs are activated by the Flood Task Team to provide relief and 
humanitarian assistance (except for the Jungle Theatre Company) and help to run their 
education programmes on fire and floods (only the Jungle Theatre Company). Mfupi’s (2013) 
thesis highlights the very reactive role that five of these NGOs play in governing flood risk. In 
contrast to Mfupi’s (2013) findings, interviews with representatives from the South African Red 
Cross Society and the Mustadafin Foundation highlighted the active role that these 
organisations play in educating residents about flood risks and indirectly strengthening these 
communities’ resilience to flood risk through their various poverty eradication and community 
development activities, and the various risk assessments that they carry out. However, since 
these activities are not conducted in partnership with the DRMC, the DRMC does not formally 
recognise or present this side of these NGOs’ activities in the context of flood management.  
 
The perception by the CCT that these NGOs only play a ‘reactive’ role to flood risk (i.e., they only 
respond to a flood crisis by providing relief) ignores the other proactive activities carried out by 
these NGOs, such as awareness-raising and education on flooding, community-based DRAs, and 
so on. This perception is a direct result of the CCT and the Flood Task Team only highlighting 
the formalised partnership that the CCT has with these NGOs; this partnership only extends to 
the NGOs handing out relief and humanitarian assistance during disaster events, thus ignoring 
the ‘private’, but proactive activities of the NGOs. This very narrow perspective of what NGOs 
do/can and do not/cannot do in the context of flood governance, which is dominated by the 
CCT, is an issue that will be discussed further in Chapters Seven and Eight. The Jungle Theatre 
Company is excluded from this perception because their task is to support DRMC in their 
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education campaign (i.e., a proactive activity), through their community/street theatre shows 
on flood and fire awareness. 
 
Out of the seven NGOs mentioned above, only three43 were interviewed during this research and 
participated in FliCCR’s March 2013 workshop. These three NGOs are described below. 
 
1. The Jungle Theatre Company 
The Jungle Theatre Company uses theatrical shows and workshops with organisations, children 
and youth, and families to raise awareness on social and environmental issues44. The Jungle 
Theatre Company helps the DRMC with their annual flood and fire awareness programmes 
(Figure 14), which are held in winter and summer respectively. The shows explain how 
residents can protect themselves from flooding/fires and what they should do during 
flooding/fires.  
 
 
 
Figure 14: The Jungle Theatre Company's annual flood awareness production held at a junior 
school in Philippi in May (left), and their fire awareness production held in Sweet Home in 
February (right) 
(Source: Joy Waddell, 2013) 
  
                                                             
43 The other NGOs were invited to FliCCR’s workshops and were contacted for interviews, but were either busy or not 
interested.  
44 See http://jungletheatre.co.za/about-us/mission/ [Accessed: 04/11/2014]. 
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2. The Mustadafin Foundation 
The Mustadafin Foundation is an Islamic NGO that has five core functions: education, poverty 
eradication, health, community development, and disaster relief45. This NGO runs education 
programmes at the beginning and throughout winter for people who are affected by flooding. 
They run these education programmes in conjunction with their feeding schemes: when people 
are standing in the queues for food, or when people come to the Mustadafin Foundation’s 
centre(s). When activated by the CCT to respond to a disaster-affected area, the Mustadafin 
Foundation provides relief in the form of blankets, warm clothing, hot meals, food parcels, 
sanitary packs (for women), and baby packs, for about three days, depending on the situation.  
 
3. The South African Red Cross Society (SA Red Cross) 
The SA Red Cross provides communities with a number of services: disaster relief and 
preparedness, health and care, psychological support, home-based care, and peer education46. 
The SA Red Cross has established local committees that conduct flood awareness programmes 
in the informal settlement communities where they work. The SA Red Cross also carry out DRAs 
within the various informal settlements where they work; these assessments identify the main 
hazards in those areas and the areas that are prone to flooding. 
 
 
3.3.2. External actors not affiliated with the Flood Task Team 
 
Other external actors include those who are not formally affiliated with the Flood Task Team, 
but are involved in community-based work and who are conducting development-related work 
that overlaps with and impacts positively on flood risk reduction activities. Some of these NGOs 
partner with the CCT on other activities/projects, but most of them work with informal 
settlements in their own capacity, with separate/external funding sources. These other actors 
include local churches and mosques, academic institutions (e.g., the University of Cape Town), 
retail outlets and businesses (e.g., hardware stores that provide building material after flood 
events and grocery stores that provide food parcels, etc.), service providers and contractors 
who work for the CCT (e.g., Aurecon engineering consultancy, Eskom, contractors, and EPWP 
workers47), and other local civic organisations involved in poverty alleviation activities, food 
distribution, education, etc. There were three external NGOs that this research engaged with: 
                                                             
45 See http://www.mustadafin.org.za/ [Accessed: 30/10/2014]. 
46 See http://www.redcross.org.za/?page_id=25 [Accessed: 30/10/2014]. 
47 The national Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) provides labour and income to poor households in the 
short-to-medium-term; EPWP projects employ workers on a temporary or on-going basis. In Sweet Home, EPWP 
workers are employed by CCT departments (e.g., Roads and Stormwater and Water and Sanitation) to help clean the 
informal settlement and unblock drains. For more information, see www.epwp.gov.za [Accessed: 01/01/2016]. 
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the Warehouse and UBU is active in Sweet Home and were identified by the residents as critical 
external actors, while Ikhayalami was not active in Sweet Home during the research period 
(2011-2014), but participated in FliCCR’s workshops because of their involvement in other 
communities where FliCCR’s researchers were based. These two NGOs are described below. 
 
1. The Warehouse 
The Warehouse is an FBO that was established in 2003 through the Anglican church in Cape 
Town48. The Warehouse has many projects that aim to alleviate poverty and address injustice in 
informal settlements. The Warehouse carried out several activities in Sweet Home, such as a 
senior citizens’ club, a teenage discipleship group, soccer teams for boys, HIV/AIDS support 
groups, and soup kitchens. Many of the residents highlight how the Warehouse has built a 
strong relationship with Sweet Home, as exemplified through their ongoing activities in Sweet 
Home and not the once-off, once-a-year, or ‘only when disaster strikes’ approaches that other 
NGOs (e.g., those activated by the CCT) have.  
 
2. Ubuhle Bakha Ubuhle (UBU) 
UBU is a CBO that was formed in 2014 in Sweet Home with the aim of providing Sweet Home 
residents with the design and know-how to build their own houses in a relatively short time49. 
UBU’s approach is to build clusters of homes; the design concept of the houses, which were 
drawn and finalised by the residents themselves, is based on the idea of using sandbags as the 
main material for building the houses. In 2014, UBU began a partnership with the CCT’s housing 
department to implement this design concept and ensure that the clusters of homes are 
serviced properly.  
 
3. Ikhayalami 
Ikhayalami50 is a non-profit NGO that designs and implements affordable solutions for 
incremental and in-situ upgrades of informal settlements. Ikhayalami seeks to embed their 
projects within the community, so that they are driven by the community, with support from 
local government. A key aspect of their work is their re-blocking/blocking-out projects. Re-
blocking involves the reconfiguration of settlements in terms of the settlement’s whole layout 
(clustered houses around a communal area) and the design and dimensions of the shacks 
(better quality shacks with more internal space, which are less susceptible to fires, flooding, and 
break-ins). The idea of re-blocking caught the attention of the different actors who participated 
                                                             
48 See http://www.warehouse.org.za/ [Accessed: 30/10/2014]. 
49 See http://ubu.bz/ [Accessed: 30/10/2014]. 
50 See http://www.ikhayalami.org/about/ [Accessed: 04/11/2014]. 
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in FliCCR’s workshops because of its potential for in-situ upgrades and service delivery and 
flood/fire risk reduction.  
 
 
3.3.3. Ward councillors and community leaders 
 
Ward councillors are the formally (legally) recognised and democratically elected local 
government representatives of the CCT who form part of the formally recognised interface 
between the municipality and the residents living in their allocated wards. These ward 
councillors are considered to be ‘external actors’ because although DRMC officials explained 
that ward councillors are invited to the Flood Task Team meetings, interviews with Flood Task 
Team representatives and ward councillors themselves highlighted that the ward councillors do 
not ever attend these meetings. The ward councillors play a crucial and central role in allocating 
and channelling resources (mainly financial) to their wards (and communities in their wards) 
for various activities and priorities, including flood relief and flood risk reduction activities. 
Each ward has a ward committee that is made up of selected residents representing specific 
sectors: senior citizens, youth, children and women, safety and security, community police 
forum, education, etc. The ward councillor chairs this committee, and the residents on the 
committee are not allowed to work for the CCT or be a politician themselves (i.e., no competing 
agendas). Ward committees, which are established in all municipalities in South Africa, are a 
form of public participation; they are supposed to be non-partisan, but Piper and Deacon (2008) 
find that most ward committees are partisan. DRMC officials also argue that these ward 
councillors and their offices are the official channel through which communities are expected to 
lodge complaints and/or report flood-related problems and issues. 
 
A community leader, on the other hand, is a representative of a particular community, who was 
elected by the local community, and is not legally (formally) recognised by local government or 
any statutory body (e.g., the Independent Electoral Commission). A community leader often 
chairs a street committee, which is made up of representatives from each section of a particular 
informal settlement51. One ward councillor (03/02/2012) described how community leaders 
can be regarded as activists within a community. It is important to note here that each informal 
settlement is unique in how/whether they select a community leader and/or street committee. 
In Sweet Home, there is a street committee that is made up of locally elected ‘section 
                                                             
51 In Sweet Home informal settlement, the residents had divided the informal settlement into various sections; one or 
two residents from each section were voted as the ‘street representative’. These street representatives formed the 
street committee, with the community leader as the overall leader/head of this committee. 
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representatives’ who are responsible for one of the smaller sections of Sweet Home, and who 
collectively ‘run’ the informal settlement (e.g., make decisions, lodge complaints/reports to the 
CCT and their ward councillor, distribute relief, etc.) and report to the community leader. The 
issue of community leaders and street committees is a contentious one, in both informal 
settlements and amongst CCT officials and ward councillors (discussed further in Chapter 
Eight). Many of the CCT officials interviewed expressed very negative perceptions of community 
leaders in general, highlighting in particular issues of corruption and nepotism, non-
transparency of who the leaders actually are, and the short-lived and highly transient nature of 
community leaders:  
 
DRMC (10/04/2013): “It’s happened on numerous occasions: you come here, and this 
section has a street committee. And a month later, you find it’s somebody else. And you 
ask: ‘what happened to the other guy?’ And they say, ‘he wasn’t ethical enough’. So 
they kicked him out and put in a new person. So now the negotiations have to start all 
over because there’s a new guy involved.” 
 
MAYCO member (06/12/2012): “You have [street] committee [members] 
purporting to be the leaders. You often get leaders coming and saying they’re the 
leaders [but they’re not]. [These leaders] often place strict demands [on the CCT 
officials].” 
 
Informal Settlements Management (03/12/2012): “I find that in the few informal 
settlements where there is no committee, it’s a more peaceful environment. It depends 
how strong the committee leaders are [… If] there’s no community structures in place 
[…] that also causes a lot of [problems]. Because you get community leaders that can 
really lead their people and support us. But sometimes they also there for their own 
agendas.” 
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4. CURRENT APPROACHES TO MANAGING FLOOD RISK IN CAPE 
TOWN’S INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS 
 
This section presents some of the current responses to managing flood risk that are carried out 
by the Flood Task Team and residents living in Sweet Home. Since examples of flood risk 
reduction interventions by the CCT and residents in Cape Town are extensively captured in the 
literature (see Pharoah, 2006, Anderson, 2010, Desportes, 2014, Ziervogel et al., 2014b), this 
section will not provide an exhaustive list of the flood risk management interventions carried 
out across Cape Town, but highlight instead some of the key activities that are carried out in 
collaboration with other actors, or as silo-based, individual activities (e.g., coping activities by 
residents).  
 
Table 16 (on page 121) illustrates a range of flood management activities that were identified 
during interviews in 2013 with CCT officials, residents, and external actors52. During the 
interviews, respondents were asked to identify different flood management interventions that 
they carried out (as individuals and/or as a department), as well as interventions that they 
knew that other actors were currently doing to reduce flood risk. The respondents were then 
asked to identify which of these interventions had a very positive impact on reducing flood risk 
(“big change”), had a moderately positive impact (“good change”), had no impact (“no change”), 
and had a negative impact on reducing flood risk (“bad change”).  
 
From Table 16, it is apparent that there are many interventions that are carried out by 
individual departments, there are very few collaborative efforts (yellow boxes), and the limited 
number of interventions by residents (red boxes) are skewed towards ‘no change’ and ‘negative 
change’ in terms of their perceived level of effectiveness. Table 16 also highlights how there are 
more proactive interventions than reactive interventions that are currently being implemented 
in Cape Town, which is contrary to the widely-held perception of residents. Also interesting to 
note is that the majority of the reactive interventions currently implemented by the CCT and 
residents are seen as providing ‘no change’ or having a negative impact. 
 
 
                                                             
52 This process was conducted in 2013 with Desportes (a colleague on the FliCCR project), with 7 CCT officials from 4 
CCT departments (DRMC, Environmental Health, Roads and Stormwater, and Water and Sanitation), 1 ward 
councillor, 1 representative from the Mustadafin Foundation, a group of women from Sweet Home, and the 
community leader of Sweet Home. For more information on this process, refer to Desportes (2014:74). 
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Table 16: Perceptions of the impact of current flood risk reduction activities in Cape Town 
Acronyms for actors:  
 
CCT (City of Cape Town); DRMC (Disaster Risk Management Centre); DS (Development Services);  
EH (Environmental Health); EPWP (Expanded Public Works Programme); FTT (Flood Task Team); 
R&S (Roads and Stormwater); SH (Sweet Home); SWM (Solid Waste Management);  
W&S (Water and Sanitation); WC (Ward Councillor); UBU (Ubuhle Bakha Ubuhle) 
 
 
 
 
Activity 
 
 
* BOLD TEXT = Proactive activities 
Actor Responsible 
Identified By 
 * Red box = activities 
by residents only 
* Yellow box = 
collaborative,  
multi-actor activities 
V
e
ry
 p
o
si
ti
v
e
 i
m
p
a
ct
 
** CCT depts. working together in Task Teams and 
interdepartmental workshops 
CCT; FTT; W&S WC; W&S 
** Concrete slabs to raise toilets above flood level Residents W&S 
** Continuous cleaning of drains; Working with 
residents and contractors to keep channels clear of 
solid waste; Cleaning ablution blocks 3x a week 
Contractors; EPWP; 
R&S; W&S; Residents 
EH; Mustadafin; 
R&S; SH 
Residents; W&S 
** Education and awareness activities on relevant 
issues (e.g., health, floods, sanitation, dumping) 
DRMC; EH; Jungle 
Theatre; The Media; 
W&S; WC 
DRMC; 
Mustadafin; 
W&S; WC 
** Engage with ward councillors, community leaders, 
and communities 
W&S W&S 
** Lobbying for a ward-level DRMC plan DRMC; WC WC 
** Maintenance of sewerage infrastructure W&S R&S 
** Pushing if complaints are not being taken care of; 
Directing resources where needed; Public 
participation channels to decide budget and increase 
awareness 
WC; Subcouncil WC 
** Raise floor level of houses Residents DRMC; SH 
Community 
leader 
** Reporting and funding DS DRMC 
** Sandbag houses Residents; UBU; CCT SH Community 
leader 
** School Artscape Project DRMC and the 
Artscape Theatre 
DRMC 
** Service delivery DS; R&S; W&S EH 
** Service maintenance (e.g., fix taps and toilets) EPWP; R&S; W&S EH; DRMC; W&S 
** Solid waste removal SWM DRMC 
** Use loudspeakers to call residents to community 
hall; Check that people do not extend their shacks or 
build in flood-prone areas, and that they leave spaces 
between their shacks 
Street Committee; 
Residents 
SH Community 
leader 
Contacting the CCT when there is a flooding problem DRMC; R&S R&S 
Electrical repairs (despite delays) Eskom SH Residents 
Food and groceries donations Retail Sector WC 
Handing out relief (e.g., food parcels, blankets, plastic) DRMC; NGOs 
activated by CCT 
WC; DRMC; SH 
Residents 
Moving people to churches and halls CCT WC 
Platforms for collaboration between multiple actors FliCCR Mustadafin 
Soup all the time from the support group Support group SH Residents 
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M
o
d
e
ra
te
ly
 p
o
si
ti
v
e
 i
m
p
a
ct
 
** Count households to determine demand (for 
services and relief) 
CCT depts. W&S 
** Educational drives and awareness raising (e.g., 
theatre and distributing pamphlets) 
DRMC; EH EH 
** EPWP workers cleaning/servicing areas; Drains 
emptied quarterly by R&S 
EPWP; R&S; W&S WC; R&S 
** Fieldtrips to identify high risk areas FTT W&S 
** Good savings for emergency (i.e., not buying on 
account) - end of year savings 
Residents SH Residents 
** Informal settlement plans Engineering Services W&S 
** Monitor and report on defects and flooding in the 
area (e.g., weekly flood reports, using the CCT's 
notification system) 
EH; EPWP; W&S EH; W&S 
** Neighbours helping each other; 'Fight' with people 
when they do their washing or dump waste in the 
open stormwater channels; Put stones and crates in 
alley-ways and entrances 
Residents SH Community 
leader 
** Ongoing, long-term help by NGOs and not just 
once-off donations when there is a ‘disaster’ 
The Warehouse SH Community 
leader 
** Provide and clear solid waste containers and skips 
on a weekly basis 
Contractors; SWM R&S; SH 
Residents; W&S 
** Raise floor levels of shacks Residents; Street 
Committee 
R&S; SH 
Community 
leader 
Call CCT officials to request help (e.g., during floods and 
when drains are blocked) (despite delays); Emergency 
phone number 
DRMC; SWM; Street 
Committee 
SH Community 
leader; DRMC 
Dig trenches around shacks to divert surface runoff Residents Mustadafin 
Flood kits; Food and shelter Human Settlements; 
Mosque; WC 
WC; SH 
Residents 
Pump out water; Use gullies to get greywater out; Use 
people in the field to repair, clean, and unblock 'light' 
equipment/infrastructure 
W&S W&S 
Relocate people to temporary relocation areas (TRAs) Human Settlements W&S 
N
o
 i
m
p
a
ct
 o
r 
ch
a
n
g
e
 
** Door-to-door pamphlets on flood risk/issues DRMC DRMC; SH 
Residents 
** Elevate floor with sand, bricks, tyres Residents EH; Mustadafin 
** Initiatives by residents to waterproof their houses Residents Mustadafin; WC 
** Relocate affected people/households (permanent 
& temporary) 
Human Settlements WC 
Bring sand for residents to use R&S W&S 
Give flood relief kits DRMC W&S 
Mosques and churches dropping off things in informal 
settlements 
Mosques; Churches Mustadafin 
People clean inlets/drainage channels when there is a 
problem 
Residents; R&S EH 
Pump out stormwater channel with vacuum trucks; 
Repair pumps (used by R&S to remove water in flooded 
channels/areas 
R&S EH; SH 
Community 
leader 
Put furniture on bricks inside houses Residents Mustadafin 
Residents inform the community leader that there is 
water in their shacks 
Residents SH Community 
leader 
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 Bad savings (e.g., buying on account and/or with credit) Residents SH Residents 
Bringing food parcels &blankets (once-off donations 
during floods) 
NGOs; FBOs; 
Churches; Mosques; 
DRMC 
SH Community 
leader; W&S 
People relocated temporarily to community halls and fed 
there 
DRMC W&S 
 
 
Activity 
 
 
* BOLD TEXT = Proactive activities 
Actor Responsible 
Identified By 
 * Red box = activities 
by residents only 
* Yellow box = 
collaborative,  
multi-actor activities 
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Nodes explained how certain measures, which were not currently (or always) happening, would 
have a very positive impact if they were carried out. These included: 
 
1. If conflicts and disputes between actors were resolved (e.g., between residents 
and the ward councillor, and between residents and CCT officials) (identified by 
Sweet Home’s community leader and Water and Sanitation); 
2. Human settlements directorate and engineers coming up with long-term 
engineering plans and interventions, rather than piecemeal, ‘quick-fix’, short-
term interventions (identified by Roads and Stormwater); 
3. Social entrepreneurship-related activities that improve residents’ livelihoods 
(e.g., residents sell second-hand clothes to raise funds to invest in flood risk 
reduction initiatives) (identified by the Mustadafin Foundation); and 
4. If Roads and Stormwater replaced damaged infrastructure more frequently and 
put in more drains (identified by a ward councillor). 
 
There are also contested views between actors of whether some activities are positive or 
negative. For example, the provision of relief to affected residents is seen by Water and 
Sanitation has having ‘no impact’, whereas the ward councillor, residents, and the DRMC (who 
activate the relief) see this relief provision as ‘very positive’. However, Sweet Home’s 
community leader explained how once-off donations (i.e., relief activated by DRMC only after a 
flood/fire event) made ‘no change’ because residents still returned to flooded/burnt houses and 
were no better off than before. Sweet Home’s community leader went on to argue that NGOs 
who provided long-term support and relief (i.e., the Warehouse and its ongoing activities in 
Sweet Home, as well as UBU’s partnership with residents), did in fact make a very positive 
impact. This argument highlights the need for ongoing support to and partnership with 
residents and communities, with external actors who get to know the people and their needs, as 
opposed to once-off donations from external actors who only enter the scene following a 
crisis/emergency. The Mustadafin Foundation (25/03/2013) argued that once-off donations, 
such as blankets, food parcels, and soup, had a negative impact because it made people 
complacent. 
 
In terms of education/awareness activities, majority of the CCT actors argued that these 
activities have a very positive impact. However, some actors, especially Environmental Health, 
argued that distributing pamphlets about flooding53 has a slightly lower impact than others 
perceive, while Sweet Home residents said that the pamphlets made no impact at all. In 
                                                             
53 See Appendix 11 for examples of these pamphlets. 
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interviews with various actors, the impact of these pamphlets was more contested, with most 
actors highlighting that although education/awareness is a critical component of flood risk 
management, pamphlets are not the way forward. One field-based DRMC official (29/11/2011) 
and several Sweet Home residents argued that distributing pamphlets door-to-door made no 
change because residents simply throw the pamphlets away without reading them. Another 
DRMC official (08/04/2013) argued that the effectiveness of the pamphlets would be increased 
if they were combined with other activities, such as the community theatre production (by the 
Jungle Theatre Company) in communities and at surrounding schools. A Ward councillor 
(07/06/2013) argued similarly that since people often cannot read or interpret pamphlets 
correctly, CCT officials need to sit with residents and explain the information on those 
pamphlets.  
 
Important to note here is that although there are more proactive interventions listed in Table 
16, they do not necessarily have the positive impact that people perceive, either because the 
intervention is not monitored properly and/or its beneficial outcome is undermined by other 
activities. For example, providing and servicing stormwater systems is not always successful 
because residents see these open drainage channels are negatively impacting on their health 
and safety (of children especially), and thus fill them in with rubble, which increases their risk 
to flooding during winter. The answers provided by respondents in Table 16 are also 
perceptions, and the actual impact (positive or negative) has not been quantified in the context 
of Cape Town. 
 
The rhetoric and perception in Cape Town is that the activities carried out under the capacity of 
the Flood Task Team are the formal, accepted, and ‘most beneficial’ activities. This is in line with 
a technocratic, state-centred approach to DRM, whereby the experts, engineers, and 
government (essentially the actors making up the Flood Task Team) are seen as the central 
actors who are best equipped to govern risk. When Flood Task Team representatives were 
asked during FliCCR’s January 2013 workshop to list the interventions implemented across 
Cape Town to reduce flood risk, the only interventions listed were those carried out and run 
solely by the CCT (Table 17). Many of the proactive interventions that the Flood Task Team plan 
and implement before winter, for example, are structural and involve minimum engagement 
with communities: constructing and unblocking stormwater systems, raising shack and toilet 
levels, mapping of informal settlements, updating the CCT’s GIS data/maps, etc.  
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Table 17: Examples of current proactive and reactive flood interventions by the CCT in Cape Town 
Proactive Interventions 
Description Dept./Actor54 Involved 
Sending out Early Warnings and Media Releases DRMC 
Implementation of a formal Early Warning System in Diep River (area in Cape 
Town) 
R&S: modelling 
DRMC: message 
Monitor river systems; Recommend interventions to CCT departments, 
private sector, and Property owners 
DRMC 
Outreach programs to the public: education and awareness on flooding and 
health (e.g., community theatre, pamphlets) 
EH, DRMC, Health 
directorate 
Increased media communication and proactive briefing of press  DRMC 
Project to assess the capacity of the bulk stormwater system R&S 
Proactive stormwater cleaning program: increased frequency of cleaning and 
cleaning of stormwater river systems 
R&S, EPWP 
Requests for the cleaning of stormwater channels and unblocking of drains EH to R&S 
Removal of solid waste from settlements before and during winter SWM 
Establishment of an Illegal Dumping Law 
SWM, Law Enforcement 
Unit 
Coordination of all activities regarding flooding (i.e., Flood Task Team) DRMC 
Update GIS layer of Informal Settlements – mapping DS 
Flood risk assessment and site visits to identify locations/settlements most at 
risk – identify hotspots and priority issues 
DRMC, ISM, EH, DS 
Identify issues that can be addressed before the event (e.g., roof/wall leaks, 
shacks built below ground level, etc.) 
ISM 
Task teams address issues in high risk settlements; link with ward councillors 
Multi-departmental, 
Housing Directorate 
Stockpile and identify resources needed flood relief (e.g., blankets, food, etc.) DRMC 
Improve operational work plans for solid waste and stormwater systems R&S with SWM 
Increase the inspection of underground infrastructure in order to identify 
system functionality 
R&S 
Increased mechanical cleaning methods – especially in informal settlements R&S 
Identify basic short-term interventions and refer to relevant line departments DRMC 
Stopping people from settling in flood prone areas  
Housing Directorate, 
Land Invasion Unit 
Recommendations for re-blocking of informal settlements Housing Directorate 
Sandbagging of river channels (e.g., Diep River) DRMC 
Rescue exercises (e.g., Lourens River Rescue Exercise in 2012) DRMC and EMS 
Clarify the definition of flooding All depts. 
Provide sand to at-risk settlements/residents (‘Sand Protocol’) ISM, R&S 
Reactive Interventions 
Unblock stormwater systems R&S 
Area staff responds to community calls and activates relief measures DRMC 
Assessment and referral of affected flooded households to DRMC 
DRMC, EH, Housing 
Directorate, R&S 
Provide sand bags and water pumps R&S 
Request of starter kits (to ISM), sand (to R&S), plastic sheets to cover roofs (to 
DRMC, ISM) 
DRMC and EH to ISM, 
R&S, and DRMC 
Area-staff monitor relief (e.g., supply of sand/bags, food, blankets, etc.) DRMC 
Monitor greywater and solid waste going to stormwater channels SWM, R&S, EH 
Low-lying/flooded people relocated to higher ground and community shelters ISM, DRMC 
Prioritising the most affected informal settlements EH, DRMC 
                                                             
54 Acronyms: DRMC (Disaster Risk Management Centre); DS (Development Services); EH (Environmental Health); 
EMS (Emergency Management Services); EPWP (Extended Public Works Programme); R&S (Roads and Stormwater 
Department); and SWM (Solid Waste Management Department).  
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DRMC coordinates the Flood Task Team to carry out flood risk assessments that help to identify 
the high risk informal settlements for flooding prior to winter. Short- and medium-term flood 
risk reduction and prevention measures are then identified for the particular areas, including 
short-term proactive interventions that could mitigate flood risk, such as infrastructure 
improvement and maintenance, or relocation of settlements (in full or in part) (DMAF, 2012). 
The Flood Task Team meets every two weeks, where the multiple departments represented on 
this Task Team report on their progress in terms of the interventions that each department is 
mandated to carry out. Each department also raises issues that their department has flagged 
(e.g., blocked drainage system, broken taps, etc.), and the relevant department is then expected 
to address that issue (e.g., Roads and Stormwater are responsible for unblocking blocked 
stormwater systems that are flagged).  
 
The monitoring and evaluation of the Flood Task Team’s annual progress is based on individual 
assessments for each department with regard to the interventions that they were mandated to 
carry out. This silo-based approach to monitoring and reporting reflects the institutional 
framework that the CCT departments have to work within; although the Flood Task Team 
portrays itself as a collaborative, multi-actor platform, the institutional framework of the CCT 
means that CCT departments still have to function within their own portfolios and mechanisms. 
The Flood Task Team is therefore a mechanism more for departments to share their activities 
and hold each other accountable for their progress, than as a collaborative, inter-departmental 
platform. The Flood Task Team is therefore collaborative in the sense of each department 
having the same end goal in mind (reduce flood risk), but not in the activities themselves 
(separate portfolios, mandates, resources, and reporting structures). These issues and the 
challenges that they bring are discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
 
Residents from Sweet Home indicated various flood risk reduction and coping strategies that 
they adopted before and during the winter season. Although some CCT officials and external 
actors perceive residents’ strategies informal, short-term, and ineffective (i.e., made no impact, 
as shown in Table 16), the literature on coping strategies and community-based DRR activities 
often contradicts these perceptions. Akter and Mallick (2013) found in Bangladesh, for example, 
that although poor households a coastal community were more exposed to tropical cyclones 
and related risks, they were better able to respond to and recover from the shocks than their 
‘richer’ neighbours. The poorer communities had better access to post-disaster relief and 
rehabilitation aid, as well as exhibiting signs of being able to learn from the experiences and 
take preventative measures against future losses (Akter and Mallick, 2013).  
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Residents in Sweet Home have developed what Parkinson and Mark (2005) refer to as a 
‘hazards culture’; residents see their short-term coping strategies as part of their usual 
activities. When it rains, for example, residents perceive the following activities as a normal part 
of the winter season in Cape Town: using buckets to empty water from their houses, raising 
their furniture onto bricks, relocating temporarily to friends or relatives in drier, neighbouring 
areas/houses, sending their children to relatives/friends in drier settlements, or temporarily 
moving into local community halls if their houses are too flooded to live in. Residents indicated 
that the activities they do before winter to reduce their flood risk is limited because they lack 
the resources and knowledge to reduce risk. Some of the precautionary measures that residents 
take include putting plastic on their roofs, raising their shack’s floor levels, clearing solid waste 
from existing drainage infrastructure, putting a slope on their roof so that water drains away 
from their house, building concrete steps in front of their doors, and/or putting concrete/bricks 
around their house to raise its level compared to the surrounding street/communal areas 
(Figure 15). During flood events, residents try to dig trenches, use sandbags around their house, 
dump sand/rubble/bricks in flooded pathways, or relocate temporarily to neighbours or 
relatives who live in dryer areas. 
 
 
Figure 15: Examples of flood risk reduction initiatives carried out by residents  
(e.g., covering their roof with plastic, using bricks to raise the level of communal spaces, building 
steps/barrier in front of their house to prevent water from entering). 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
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5. THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING FLOOD RISK IN CAPE TOWN’S 
INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS 
 
There are many challenges to managing and addressing flood risk in Cape Town; this section 
provides a brief overview of some of the broader challenges identified through the various 
interviews and workshops with multiple actors. A more detailed discussion on the barriers that 
emerged from the analysis of flood governance in Cape Town, from a nodal governance 
perspective, is presented in Chapter Nine.  
 
In South Africa, as with many cities of the global South, it is recognised that there are a wide 
variety of external factors that impact on local government’s ability to manage informal 
settlements and address development issues such as service delivery backlogs, rapidly-
expanding informal settlements, capacity constraints, and international and social dynamics 
(Holloway, 2003, Graham, 2006, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Ziervogel and Smit, 2009, 
Satterthwaite, 2011). CCT officials are aware of some of these external factors that hinder their 
progress; in particular, issues around rapid in-migration and urbanisation, service and housing 
backlogs, a lack of available land for development, and high levels of poverty and 
unemployment. In the context of flood governance, the challenges that the Flood Task Team 
reported during their feedback session at the Disaster Management Advisory Forum (DMAF) in 
2012 (DMAF, 2012) included: 
 
1. Continuous need and high demand for service delivery; 
2. Lack of progress reporting of proposed interventions by line departments; 
3. Lack of capacity, funding, and dedicated resources; 
4. Lack of land for relocation; 
5. Communities building houses on existing infrastructure, which damages/blocks 
infrastructure (i.e., stormwater, sanitation, electricity, water, etc.); 
6. Reluctance of affected communities to move to identified sites because those 
sites are too far away; and 
7. Impossibility of preparing for every possible eventuality, despite a wide range 
of contingency and preventative measures already being in place before the 
winter season. 
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In Anderson’s (2010) research on the Flood Task Team55, she found four main challenges to 
flood management in Cape Town: 
 
1. Residents settling in flood-prone land; 
2. Lack of available, suitable land to provide serviced housing to at-risk people; 
3. Gap in what is outlined in policy and what happens in practice; and 
4. Lack of public participation. 
 
Although my research corroborated Anderson’s (2010) findings, two key challenges emerged, 
which highlight in particular the complexities of managing flood risk because of its 
embeddedness in broader socio-political and economic issues: 
 
1. Issues around upgrading housing, the lack of available land for relocating at-risk 
communities, and the politics of relocation and in-situ upgrades; and 
2. Individual (i.e., not collective), piecemeal, and once-off/short-term ‘flood 
management’ strategies that increase or shift risk, instead of reducing risk. 
 
These two challenges are described in more detail below.  
 
 
5.1. Issues around land, space, and relocation 
 
The lack of land in Cape Town is a major challenge that was highlighted by the CCT officials and 
the Flood Task Team. The lack of land not only increases the risk of flooding for many 
inhabitants (because they are forced to live and settle on marginal, flood-prone land), but 
provides a challenge for the CCT to relocate at-risk informal settlements, either temporarily (i.e., 
during in-situ upgrades or during flood events) or permanently. With regard to the issue of 
residents settling on flood-prone land, a DRMC official (26/03/2012) and Informal Settlements 
Management official (2012/03/12) explained how an ‘anti land-invasion unit’ does exist, but 
legally and politically there are many constraints for this unit to act and stop people from 
building shacks on any available land, whether public or private land. Examples of court cases 
and politically charged situations in South Africa can be found in the literature (Huchzermeyer, 
2003, Miraftab and Wills, 2005) and in the media: the Marikana settlement in Cape Town is a 
                                                             
55 Anderson (2010) only looked at four departments represented on the Flood Task Team: Development Services, 
DRMC, Informal Settlements Management, and Roads and Stormwater. 
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perfect example of the political and legal battle that followed the evictions of land occupiers on 
private land, at the beginning of 2014 (LRC, no date, Daily Maverick, 2014, Knoetze, 2014) 
 
The CCT owns pieces of land in Cape Town, whether for future industrial, commercial, 
residential, public services, road reserves, or macro-infrastructure (e.g., stormwater 
infrastructure such as retention/detention ponds). The problem that CCT officials identified was 
new migrants, backyard shack dwellers, or people who need to move from their current 
shack/informal settlement seeing this ‘open’ land and building their houses there. This land 
could be ‘open’ for development reasons, as mentioned before, or simply because it is a wetland 
or detention pond that is dry in summer, but floods naturally in winter. Informal settlements 
built on private property cannot be serviced or upgraded legally by the CCT, as experienced in 
the one section of Sweet Home.  
 
MAYCO member (06/12/2012): “When it comes to informal settlements, people 
invade land and choose to locate there. Residents don’t ask questions of suitability of 
the land. […] Cape Town people [are] able to recognise which land is flood-prone, but 
people coming outside Cape Town [e.g., the Eastern Cape] aren’t able to recognise 
which land is flood prone.” 
 
There are many perceptions, by CCT officials, as to why residents ‘invade’ open land. One 
perception is that it is a move of desperation; migrants and inhabitants have no other options 
and settle wherever they can find land, an issue that is often attributed to housing shortages in 
South Africa. Another perception is that it is related to economics; some people own multiple 
shacks in informal settlements and rent them out to others (called ‘shack farming’), or people 
rent out their formal state-provided houses and live in a shack in an informal settlement 
because rent/rates are cheaper/free. Another perception, which is the most pervasive amongst 
CCT officials, is that it is purely political: 
 
MAYCO member (19/06/2012) responding to the evictions in Marikana, Cape 
Town56: “There has been a concerted effort to invade both private and public land 
across the city of Cape Town as a means to promote lawlessness and in an attempt to 
make the city ungovernable. We believe that the situation playing out in Philippi East 
is an example of these determined efforts to promote the illegal occupation of land for 
political objectives.” 
 
                                                             
56 See Knoetze (2014) for a newspaper article on the Marikana evictions. 
CHAPTER 6: OVERVIEW OF FLOOD GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN 
 
131 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN                                                                      JOY WADDELL  -  WDDJOY001 
CCT officials also highlighted how the process of de-densifying highly dense informal 
settlements, in order to upgrade the settlement (i.e., to provide services such as stormwater 
drainage), results in people having to move out of the informal settlement because the number 
of houses the area can accommodate is greatly reduced. On the one hand, this process can be 
blocked and politicised because alternative land is not available for those residents who need to 
move. On the other hand, some residents do not want to move, either permanently or 
temporarily while the upgrades are happening, because residents fear that the government will 
not return their houses, or that it is just a ploy to remove them from the area. Some CCT officials 
highlighted how the alternative land provided to residents, especially for temporary relocation, 
often lacks adequate services, which exacerbates the existing problems instead of addressing 
them.  
 
Another issue raised by CCT officials is that if people are relocated permanently from a flood-
risk area (e.g., retention pond) to safer, higher ground, then new people simply replace them in 
those unserviceable, flood-prone areas. Officials highlight how this results in the issue 
remaining and never being properly resolved. Another related issue is that of who should be 
relocated first; the normal process involved a ‘last in, first out’ approach because those 
residents were usually the ones living the most marginal of the marginalised land (e.g., right in 
the wetland itself or in the lowest, most flood-prone area), and were therefore seen as the most 
‘desperate’ and in need of relocation more urgently. This approach created conflict and raised 
issues of social justice because those people who were relocated might be the most ‘desperate’, 
but they were not living in the settlement the longest. Officials are therefore concerned that 
people might consider relocating to very flood-prone areas in order to jump the queue on the 
relocation and/or housing list. This has resulted in the approach whereby those who live 
furthest in (i.e., built their shacks in the area first, or less recently) would be relocated first and 
then people on the edges (i.e., the last to move to the area, who are often in the more flood-
prone areas) could slowly move inwards to replace those who had been relocated.  
 
 
5.2. Risk reduction strategies that shift risk instead of reduce risk 
 
A major challenge to flood risk reduction in Cape Town that CCT officials highlighted was the 
contradictory approaches of residents and CCT officials, which often exacerbate the problem of 
flooding instead of solving it. CCT officials argued that residents often try to implement their 
own ideas and DRR strategies that sometimes work against what the CCT has tried to 
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implement to address the problem. An example is that of the open stormwater drainage 
channels that CCT officials choose to construct in informal settlements, and which residents see 
as posing a health risk (e.g., children fall into the open channels, contaminated water collects in 
the open channels) and therefore close up or cover. When there is heavy rainfall, this means 
that the covered or filled in channels are therefore compromised and increase the risk of 
flooding instead of reducing it. Residents also put bricks or pallets inside or over the open 
channels to allow them to walk across the channels when they are filled with water (Figure 16); 
this also decreases the ability of the stormwater channels to drain high volumes of water away 
and often results in the channels becoming blocked.  
 
 
 
Figure 16: Examples of residents filling the open stormwater channels with bricks and covering 
them with pallets or ‘bridges’. 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
 
 
In other cases, residents often work individually to protect themselves from flood risk, instead 
of collectively as a community; this results in activities that shift risk from one resident to 
another. One example of this is where one household digs a trench to divert water away from 
their house, but because they have not worked with their neighbours, this water often gets 
diverted directly into their neighbours’ houses. DRMC officials explain that this situation is often 
a result of communities not being advised properly on how to channel water effectively into 
existing stormwater drainage infrastructure instead of just ‘away’ from their houses. Another 
example of residents ‘shifting’ the risk to their neighbours is where they build sloping roofs that 
divert the rainwater away from their houses; these sloping roofs are often constructed without 
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regard for their neighbours, in very densely-packed settlements, which means that the rainfall 
flows off their roofs and directly into their neighbours’ property or houses. 
 
Another problem with some of the initiatives that residents take is that the initiatives increase 
their risk instead of actually reducing/addressing it, or the initiatives have no impact at all. For 
example, residents sometimes build their houses below the road or surrounding ground, in 
order to stabilise their house during floods and protect them from the very high velocity winds 
that Cape Town often experiences. This means that when there is a high rainfall event, surface 
runoff either flows down into the person’s house (i.e., if they are built below the road 
level/surrounding area), or the high water table means that their house fills up with water (i.e., 
if they have built their house down into the ground, to stabilise it).  
 
Water and Sanitation (31/01/2013): “People in general would also think that [it is] a 
good idea to dig their whole house deeper into the ground. Then they will call us [the 
CCT] and say, ‘look, my house is flooded’. Whereas they’re actually creating a flood 
situation because they’re below the water level, and this causes the whole house to be 
flooded. […] In general, people will also try and implement their own ideas, which 
sometimes works against what we’re trying to implement in order to address the 
problem.” 
 
Another issue relates to residents getting bricks and building rubble from contractors and/or 
local contacts (e.g., friends, neighbours, family in the construction business). Residents pay a 
small amount of money to the contractors so that they will dump their building rubble in the 
informal settlement, instead of a CCT/company-approved dump. Residents use this rubble to 
raise the level of the surrounding areas, pathways, or even their houses (Figure 17). The CCT 
officials find this problematic, however, because this rubble is sometimes used to fill in open 
drainage systems, or is simply washed away into the surrounding infrastructure during heavy 
rainfall events; this results in critical infrastructure (e.g., stormwater and sanitation drainage, 
water pipes, etc.) becoming damaged, which would then increase the risk of residents to 
flooding and other environmental/health risks.  
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Figure 17: Examples of pathways and communal areas covered with rubble to raise their levels 
and provide access to residents during winter. 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
 
 
CCT officials also explain how the lack of monitoring of their Sand Protocol results in residents 
using the sand improperly and then blaming the CCT for its failure or ineffectiveness. The Sand 
Protocol is carried out in response to residents requesting sand from their ward councillor 
and/or the CCT, in order to raise the levels of their houses. Residents who receive this sand 
would instead use the sand to raise the ground level outsider their homes, or to fill flooded 
pathways and communal areas. This is problematic because when it rains, the sand outside 
washes away. The sand is also sometimes used to raise the level of the pathways, which creates 
a gradient that results in surface water flowing ‘downhill’ from the raised outside path and into 
the insides of the ‘lower’ houses; this results in houses filling up with water and possessions 
being destroyed, which residents then claim from the CCT because it was the CCT who provided 
the sand in the first place.  
 
 
6. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the flood governance landscape in Cape Town, 
with respect to the nature of flooding in Cape Town, the key actors governing flood risk, and the 
current approaches adopted by the various nodes. Although the Flood Task Team is seen by the 
CCT as the key, central platform for coordinating flood risk management activities, this chapter 
has highlighted the key role that other actors, including residents, play in managing flood risk. 
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The current challenges to flood management, especially in terms of a lack of resources (e.g., 
land) and a lack of know-how (e.g., residents’ initiatives that exacerbate or shift risk), highlight 
the complex nature of flood risk management in Cape Town and how the multiple actors need to 
work together in order to strengthen flood governance processes. Despite this recognition that 
multiple actors bring with them multiple capacities and resources, the reality of the different 
mentalities, perceptions, and approaches of the various actors impacts on the ability of actors to 
collaborate effectively. In Chapters Seven and Eight, I unpack some of these issues from a nodal 
governance approach, highlighting how multiple actors bring with them very different 
mentalities and priorities, and tools and resources that enable them to govern risk. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
 
THE REALITY OF FLOOD GOVERNANCE IN CAPE 
TOWN FROM A NODAL GOVERNANCE 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Using a nodal governance approach, I explore in this chapter the unique characteristics of the 
actors (called ‘nodes’) governing flood risk in Cape Town and the factors that impact on their 
ability to govern. A nodal governance approach helps to map the unique mentalities, 
technologies, resources, and institutions that the various nodes governing flood risk in Cape 
Town possess. Recognising the unique characteristics that define each node’s actions and 
decisions is a critical first step to understanding the potential barriers that impact on their 
ability to make decisions57.  
 
In this chapter, I discuss how bringing multiple nodes together to reach consensus and carry out 
collaborative disaster-related activities is a complex and messy process because multiple nodes 
bring multiple capacities, technologies, and ideologies to these multi-actor platforms. I argue 
that this inherent 'strength' (bringing multiple capacities together) is also a challenge for 
collaborative disaster governance because multiple types of knowledge (e.g., indigenous, 
scientific, engineering, etc.) and capacities often result in clashing and contrasting ideologies. 
These clashing ideologies can impact negatively on the outcomes of the activities and decisions 
and become a barrier to effective disaster governance. This also makes it challenging, in 
practice, to adopt a collaborative disaster governance approach, especially in a highly 
politicised, informalised context such as Cape Town's informal settlements. By identifying the 
often conflicting mentalities and how these impact on the types of approaches that nodes 
                                                             
57 A very short summary of some of the key issues discussed in this chapter was presented in a paper at the 5 th 
Resilient Cities Global Forum on Urban Resilience and Adaptation, in Bonn, Germany, 2014. See: Waddell and 
Ziervogel (2014). 
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choose to govern, one can start to critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each actor 
in terms of their capacities to manage disaster risk. 
 
 
2. MULTIPLE MENTALITIES AND UNDERSTANDINGS OF FLOOD 
RISK AND ITS SOLUTIONS 
 
According to nodal governance theory, mentalities, which refers to the way that nodes think 
about the issue that they are governing, determine how a node translates these perceptions into 
action (Burris et al., 2005, Tefre, 2010). By analysing the actions (or lack of actions) of a 
particular node, one can infer what mentalities are ultimately guiding their actions. Upham et al. 
(2009) argue that perceptions can be biased by pre-existing beliefs and views, and that these 
perceptions can in turn guide behaviour. Arguing from a cultural theory perspective, Tansey 
and O'Riordan (1999) state that people’s perceptions are not independent of social context; 
perceptions are shaped by the nature of the social groups to which they belong, and the degree 
to which they feel bonded to that social group. Accepted in the literature on perceptions of risk 
is how nodes’ perceptions of disasters and risk influence how (and whether) they choose to 
respond to and manage disasters (Whitmarsh, 2008, Upham et al., 2009); this results in nodes 
handling DRM and protection issues very differently (Messner and Meyer, 2005). In previous 
years of flood risk management, for example, civil engineers dominated this field and therefore 
prioritised technical and financial aspects of flood management, often neglecting socio-
economic factors and other social science-related methods (Messner and Meyer, 2005). Adger et 
al. (2009) highlight how these differences in perceptions often create barriers because it makes 
it very difficult and often impossible for nodes to agree on how to address particular issues.  
 
Fatti and Patel (2013) found in their research on local government and residents’ perceptions to 
urban flood risk in Johannesburg, South Africa, that the perceptions of different actors often did 
not overlap; this impacted on which solutions were sought and how the solutions were 
implemented. Ziervogel and Taylor (2008) found similarly in their research on perceptions of 
climate change in a rural part of South Africa, that local government and residents have 
different points of entry for understanding various issues. As a result, rural communities and 
local authorities differed in the types of issues that they prioritised, and thus the actions that 
they chose for addressing the identified issues.  
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In Cape Town, nodes governing flood risk are embedded within different disciplines and are 
guided by different mandates and experiences. These diverse backgrounds in turn shape the 
way that a particular node defines the problem (of flood risk) and how they approach the 
solutions and decisions. Roads and Stormwater, for example, is a node that is mostly made up of 
civil engineers who are trained to see the world in terms of the infrastructure that is needed to 
divert surface runoff and minimise flooding in inhabited areas. Environmental Health is mostly 
made up of experts in environmental and public health who see flooding in terms of the hazards 
and risks that can impact negatively on people’s health. DRMC, which is made up of officials 
trained in disaster and emergency management, often consider the underlying causes of 
disasters, as well as the impacts that these have on people’s wellbeing and livelihoods. Informal 
Settlements Management, Development Services, and many of the NGOs, on the other hand, 
have representatives from across multiple disciplines and therefore have a variety of 
viewpoints and knowledge that inform their mandates and how they approach decisions; 
whether it is from the perspective of housing, health, environmental, livelihoods, and/or service 
delivery.  
 
Since each node draws on the disciplinary backgrounds of their officials to inform their 
decisions, flood risk management approaches by the various nodes are not necessarily 
conceptualised in the same way across all the nodes. Bringing multiple nodes together, who 
each draw on a diversity of knowledge, skills, and disciplinary backgrounds, can be both a 
strength and weakness when governing disaster risk. Multiple nodes with multiple sources of 
knowledge can result in a variety of solutions for complex problems, but this diversity of 
experience and knowledge can also result in conflicting ideas and a lack of agreement on the 
appropriate solutions. In this chapter, I therefore highlight some of the diversity in terms of 
mentalities, knowledge, capacities, and technologies that different nodes in Cape Town possess, 
in the context of flooding and flood management. 
 
 
2.1. Multiple definitions of ‘flooding’ 
 
Nodes governing flood risk in Cape Town were found to have different definitions of flooding 
(Table 18) and understandings of the nature of flooding and the actual needs of residents 
affected by flooding. Nodes saw this mismatch in definitions and understanding as impacting 
negatively on their ability to reach agreement on how to respond to flooding and which 
solutions would be more effective. Engineers from Roads and Stormwater, for example, defined 
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flooding by the level of water (above knee level) and duration of the flood (more than three 
days). On the other hand, social and health workers from particular NGOs or Environmental 
Health defined flooding as any amount of water that impacts on and disrupts the livelihoods, 
activities, and health of individuals. Although residents do not define flooding in technical terms 
(e.g., height or duration of the water), they often described their experiences of previous ‘bad’ 
flooding as the water being “up to their ankles, or midway between their ankles and knees” 
(29/11/2012), and impacting directly on their livelihoods and well-being.  
 
 
Table 18: Multiple definitions of flooding by selected nodes 
Node Flooding definitions 
Development 
Services 
If the water stays for more than 6-12 hours. 
DRMC 
A temporary rise in water level or the overflow of water onto land not normally 
covered by water: results in socio-economic disruption, property damage, or 
threatens the health and safety of the public. Informal structures are considered to be 
flooded when they are situated in areas of extensive ponding of water, which has 
resulted in a substantial amount of water covering floors and areas around dwellings, 
for an extended period of time (more than 48 hours) (DRMC, 2009).  
Mustadafin 
Foundation 
Water seeping from the ground up, not from the top down. If a roof leaks, it is not a 
flood. If you are shin deep or ankle deep in water.  
Roads and 
Stormwater 
Based on a catchment definition: when stormwater runoff exceeds the capacity of 
drainage systems (natural and constructed) or when ground water flows into 
structures or when water accumulates in depressions (ponding) (DRMC, 2009). A 
temporary rise in water level, including groundwater or overflow of water onto land 
not normally covered by water (CCT, 2002b). Measure flood risk in terms of 
probability and risk, as given by hydrology and storm models (e.g., 1 in 10 year flood 
is low risk and high probability, but 1 in 100 year flood is high risk and low 
probability). 
Sweet Home 
Residents 
When the floor is wet; water comes in the door and into the house; blocked channels 
that overflow and are contaminated with ‘green’ water; and when there is water 
outside your house.  
Ward Councillor 
Anything water-wise that will inconvenience a family/person/community. It doesn’t 
need to be a big flood or be standing water for three days; if the water inconveniences 
you in your house, then immediately, it is a flood, you must report it, something needs 
to be done, and the CCT must become involved.  
 
 
Several nodes were critical of the different definitions and understandings of flooding and the 
responses by nodes that were based on these definitions: 
 
Development Services (12/06/2012): “They call it flooding, but give it a couple of 
hours and it will drain away. […] The [CCT] has to provide relief, even if the ‘flooding’ 
is not what I would define as flooding.” 
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Ward councillor (03/02/2012): “Sometimes people will say that they are flooding 
when there is water that can’t even fill a ruler [of] 30 mm. There has been a lot of 
definitions [of flooding] used, even by the [CCT…]. Our understanding, given by 
[DRMC] is that when the water is above your knees, then you can regard that as 
flooding. But you can’t say you are flooding just because water is protruding from 
below and doesn’t even reach your ankle. People [residents in informal settlements] 
will say, ‘no, we are flooding’.” 
 
The Mustadafin Foundation (25/03/2013): “If a roof is gonna leak, it’s not gonna be 
constituted as a flood [by the CCT]; only if the water reaches your shin height, then it 
will be constituted a flood. Which I think is very unfair.” 
 
As shown by the three statements above, several nodes indicated that the definitions of flooding 
used by the CCT nodes are different from the definitions used by residents living in informal 
settlements. This disparity can be attributed to the community’s lived experiences of flooding, 
versus certain CCT nodes’ more theoretical and technical understanding of flooding. A 
community defines flooding by whether it damages their belongings (i.e., water damage on their 
furniture, clothes, and/or floor) or impacts on their health (i.e., prolonged damp conditions 
causes coughs/rashes). The Flood Task Team, on the other hand, has adopted Roads and 
Stormwater’s definition of flooding, which is based on more technical terms (e.g., water is above 
two metres for an extended period of time). When a community member contacts the CCT to 
lodge a ‘flooding’ complaint, the CCT would sometimes identify the reported ‘flood’ as just a 
‘wet’ situation, or a problem of ‘leakages’. DRMC explained how the definition of flooding is 
often context specific; in one informal settlement, a flood situation is reported immediately if 
the river floods and residents cannot walk around, whereas in another informal settlement, a 
flood situation is reported only once water sits around (ponds) for more than a few days. 
 
The lack of a standardised definition of flooding causes frustration when CCT nodes try to 
evaluate situations, decide on whether resources (e.g., relief, financial, human) need to be 
activated (or to what extent), and in responding to flood-related ‘emergency’ calls. Residents 
also expressed their frustrations at reporting a ‘flood’ situation to the CCT’s call centre, only to 
be told that it is not a ‘flood’ (or severe enough). Different definitions of flooding reflect a lack of 
education/training of nodes, a lack in understanding of the specific and divergent priorities of 
different nodes, and a lack of communication between nodes. The very different definitions of 
flooding can also be attributed to the different disciplinary backgrounds of nodes and multiple 
understandings of the nature of flooding (essentially, their ‘mentalities’). Figure 18 illustrates 
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some of the nodes’ perceptions of the nature of flooding; whether they see it as the result of 
excess water, people living in the wrong place, or both. Most of the nodes felt that flooding was 
attributable equally to excess water and people constructing their houses in flood-prone areas, 
although the Health Directorate felt more strongly that it was a problem of excess water, and 
Roads and Stormwater felt that it was the opposite. Although Development Services indicated 
that they see flooding as equally a problem of excess water and people living in the wrong 
places, they explained that they are more inclined towards seeing it as a problem of excess 
water; this is in line with their directorate’s view that informal settlements are part of the 
current urban landscape, and that water should be moved/diverted to allow people to live 
where they are.  
 
 
 
Figure 18: The nature of the problem (flooding) as perceived by the various nodes58 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
 
 
 
2.2. Multiple understandings of the ‘nature of flood risk’ 
 
Nodes’ understanding of the nature of flood risk is shaped by their mentality, which is 
understood in this thesis to be a combination of their conception and perception of the world, as 
well as their disciplinary and knowledge background. For example, DRMC see the city in terms 
of the multiple hazards and risks posed to residents, infrastructure, service delivery, and events. 
This much broader view of disasters (i.e., disasters are the result of multiple underlying factors) 
and the city (i.e., the city is shaped by and embedded in socio-political, historical, environmental, 
etc., factors) in turn shapes their approach to managing risk across Cape Town. DRMC have a 
five-pronged approach59 to DRM that recognises that there are multiple underlying factors that 
contribute to risk and disasters, and therefore these need to be addressed holistically. This 
                                                             
58 See Appendix 12 for the original list of questions and responses by nodes represented on the Flood Task Team. 
59 DRMC’s five-pronged approach is based on what they call the five ‘Es’: (1) Engineering and technological 
interventions; (2) Education and awareness training; (3) Enforcement; (4) Emergency preparedness and response; 
and (5) Economic incentives. 
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approach takes into consideration the whole cycle of disasters (from preparedness to response 
and recovery), and attempts to also address issues that cause vulnerability or strengthen 
resilience: socio-economic factors, infrastructure, and illegal activities (i.e., law enforcement and 
issues around illegal dumping of solid waste and/or construction in land not zoned for 
development/housing). DRMC also recognises the interconnectedness of urban risks and the 
need to therefore rely on expertise from multiple nodes; this mentality is illustrated through 
their coordination of the Flood Task Team’s activities and the reliance that the DRMC has on 
multiple nodes’ contributions towards the DRAs carried out in their ‘high risk’ informal 
settlements.  
 
DRMC (10/04/2013): “The underlying causes really need to be addressed, and failure 
to effectively make inroads into those underlying causes is what is leading to this 
situation… [where] we’re [just] addressing the effects […]. We adding a band-aid […]. 
We [are only] managing the effects.” 
 
Roads and Stormwater see the world in terms of the physical interventions (infrastructure) that 
can be used to improve access, reduce flood risk, and divert stormwater runoff from one area to 
another. They see the world in terms of the geography, topography, and layout of settlements: 
high risk areas are therefore identified as those that are located in low-lying areas and 
depressions, or where there is no stormwater infrastructure that can protect citizens up to a 
certain level (understood in terms of a 20-, 50-, 100-year flood return period60). The challenges 
to flood governance, as perceived by Roads and Stormwater, lie in residents/society interacting 
with and disrupting watercourses and stormwater infrastructure. Roads and Stormwater also 
see the city in terms of the floodplains and catchment areas, rather than as individual 
settlements (formal or informal); they argue that flood risk can be found across the whole city, 
and flood risk in informal settlements is only one small component of a much broader issue.  
  
                                                             
60 A storm/flood return period (also called recurrence intervals) is defined by the CCT (2002b:xii) as “the average 
interval between [storm/flood] events”. A return period gives the probability of an event of a similar size/intensity 
occurring in any given year. For a 100-year return period, the probability of that type of event occurring in a given 
year is therefore 1% (i.e., very low). In Cape Town, the major stormwater systems are designed to cope with large 
infrequent events (e.g., 20-year and 50-year return periods), while minor systems are designed to cope with more 
frequent events (e.g., 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year return periods). New developments in Cape Town should be 
designed to safely contain floods with a 50-year return period, and conditions should be checked for the 100-year 
return period (although most development types are permissible with limited requirements/conditions within the 
‘flood fringe’ zone, which comprises the area between the 50-year and 100-year flood return period – see CCT 
2002a,b). The CCT’s guidelines in terms of recurrence intervals (return periods) and where new developments 
(including residential and critical infrastructure) should be constructed (and protected) are provided in the Roads 
and Stormwater Department’s various policies on stormwater management planning (CCT 2002a,b). 
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Roads and Stormwater (08/09/2010): “Flooding is not only confined to informal 
settlements, but because of press coverage, that is the perception that is created. There 
is significant flood risk elsewhere, but the probability of occurrence in a particular 
year is low so people don’t see that often.” 
 
Informal Settlements Management sees the flooding of informal settlements as more of a 
problem of people being in the wrong place, than of water being in the wrong place. This 
mentality reflects the main challenges that this node faces, which relate directly to the spread 
and high-densification of informal settlements and trying to manage people who occupy low-
lying, poor-draining areas that are not suitable for residential use (in their present state).  
 
A theme that emerged from interviews and workshops was the perception of flooding being a 
completely overwhelming problem; CCT nodes highlighted how the lack of finances, resources 
(e.g., land), and political support made it almost impossible to solve the issue of flooding, while 
residents often explained how their lack of know-how and resources made it almost impossible 
for them to reduce their vulnerability to flooding. This mentality of flooding being 
‘overwhelming’ can lead to inaction by CCT nodes, who feel that they lack the human resources, 
skills, and finances to address the problem. This mentality can also lead to inaction by residents, 
who feel that they lack the capacity, knowledge, and resources to protect themselves. Flooding 
is perceived by residents to be a recurrent phenomenon that is beyond their capacity to 
prevent, which often creates a mental obstacle to addressing risk. 
 
Informal settlement community leader61 (21/02/2013): “When it’s raining a lot… 
the water… it’s like a dam outside. Like a river. […] The things I am trying to do about 
flooding, to help my community, is to just go report to the councillor… to bring us some 
sand so that we can throw outside the house. That’s the only thing I can do.” 
 
Graveyard Pond62 resident (21/02/2013): “I really doubt that there’s that much that 
[the CCT] can do, except for relocating the people; because really, that place is meant 
for the water, not for the people to live. […] Unfortunately for us, we are living in a 
detention pond. There’s not much [the CCT can do] because the area we’re living in is 
in a lower place and it’s meant for the water.” 
 
                                                             
61 A resident (and community leader) living in a re-blocked informal settlement called Sheffield Rd, located 5 km 
away from Sweet Home in Philippi, Cape Town. 
62 Graveyard Pond is an informal settlement built in a detention pond in Philippi, Cape Town. Drivdal (2011a,b) and 
Organio (2012) conducted some research in this informal settlement and some of Graveyard Pond’s residents 
attended FliCCR’s workshops. 
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Residents feel that they are incapable of doing anything to reduce their individual or 
community’s flood risk; they therefore rely completely on the government because the 
government (CCT in the Cape Town case) is seen as having the financial resources and technical 
expertise to solve the issues.  
 
Sweet Home resident (21/05/2013): “We wish there is a lot we could do ourselves, 
but we do not have the resources to do things on our own. All we can do is to cry out to 
the government and tell them about the problems affecting us.” 
 
This fatalistic perception and residents’ complete reliance on the CCT and external nodes to 
manage flooding makes it challenging for CCT nodes to encourage residents to proactively 
address their individual and community-wide flood risk. CCT nodes’ mentality of flood 
governance in Cape Town as a completely overwhelming and complex problem is based on their 
experiences of having to manage flood risk in the face of the following issues: 
 
1. the massive scale of problems: e.g., growing informal settlements, service 
delivery backlogs; 
2. the limited resources to address the problems: e.g., uneven ratio of CCT officials 
to residents/need, limited land for relocation, limited tax base that limits 
available finances; 
3. and political interference or the lack of political backing: e.g., residents 
damaging critical infrastructure when demanding services and housing; and 
South African political parties using residents in informal settlements to either 
gain votes or make the majority political party look bad.  
 
Many of these issues are related to two major challenges when it comes to flood governance:  
 
1. the often unclear and blurred understanding of the real needs and capacities of 
residents and the perceptions of each node with regards to residents’ behaviour 
and the types of solutions that residents implement; and  
2. the lack of communication between nodes and the CCT, which often excludes 
residents from decision-making and planning (e.g., very non-transparent, state-
centric planning processes).  
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3. NODES’ DIVERGENT NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 
 
There is a mentality by CCT nodes that they know what is best, as the professionals and experts 
in the field of DRM, service delivery, stormwater maintenance, environmental health, etc. This 
mentality often translates into plans and actions where CCT nodes make the decisions and 
implement designs that do not necessarily align with those of residents and other nodes. An 
example of this in the Cape Town is the open stormwater channels that Roads and Stormwater 
has designed and built in many of Cape Town’s informal settlements. These open drainage 
systems (called hyson cells) are seen by Roads and Stormwater engineers as the best design for 
highly dense and topographically challenging informal settlements; hyson cells are cheap to 
construct, flexible (i.e., easy to build in small, tight spaces), and easy to clean and unblock when 
filled with solid waste, rubble, and sediment. Residents, on the other hand, argue that open 
drainage systems are a bad solution for flooding because they create a range of risks: they are 
unsafe for children (i.e., children play in the open channels and can drown or get infections from 
contaminated water), they easily fill with solid waste and become blocked, they are often filled 
with contaminated, foul-smelling ‘green’ water, and they block residents’ access to their 
homes/driveways (Figure 19).  
 
 
 
Figure 19: Examples of open stormwater channels in Sweet Home, which are blocked by solid 
waste, filled with contaminated water, and where residents have placed concrete pipes, sandbags, 
and/or rubble and sand to bridge open channels. 
 
 
 
Taken by Sweet Home resident 
Taken by Joy Waddell 
Taken by Joy Waddell 
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With the aim of mitigating the risk of these stormwater channels becoming blocked and 
collecting contaminated water, as well as providing access to their driveways/shacks, residents 
often fill in these open channels with rubble and sand, or lay concrete pipes, sandbags, or 
wooden pallets across the open channels. CCT nodes, especially Roads and Stormwater, 
perceive these actions by residents as ‘bad behaviour’ because it exacerbates the risk of 
localised flooding and makes it challenging for Roads and Stormwater to maintain and unblock 
the channels.  
 
Environmental Health (10/04/2013): “Unfortunately the channels are quite deep. 
People had to access their driveways, had to access their homes. So what they 
[residents] used to do, they used to fill up the channel to pull the vehicles into the 
yards, or whatever.” 
 
Water and Sanitation (24/04/2013): “People in general will put rubble in there [the 
stormwater channels], so they can get into their yards. They would also dump solid 
waste in there. […] If this [resident] now wants to get to a [solid waste] container on 
this side of the road where they can dump their solid waste, he’s not going to walk 
through all this water. So they dump it [the solid waste] next to the road. And that 
obviously blocks everything.” 
 
Informal Settlements Management (03/12/2012): “People have built on top of the 
main water supply pipes of the […] area. And last year we had an incident where some 
of the pipes were so damaged by the people building there… they [residents] knock it 
[the water supply infrastructure]. […] The water then came through the areas where 
it was damaged. […] they [residents] had to sweep the water out [of their houses].” 
 
Findings from Mozambique and Nepal on community risk perceptions show that risks 
highlighted by local authorities (e.g., disaster risk managers) are not necessarily the same as 
those prioritised by communities: for example, residents ranked issues such as cholera, 
earthquakes, and hunger lower than issues of governance and poverty (IFRC, 2009). Ziervogel 
and Taylor (2008) found similarly that actors at different scales (e.g., village level versus local 
municipality) had very different priorities and needs, which influenced how they chose to 
address those issues and which types of responses they prioritised. Ziervogel and Taylor 
(2008:37) attribute these differences in priorities and actions to the different levels and types of 
actors and their “access to resources (including funding), decision-making power, and [the] 
extent of influence and responsibility” that these actors have.  
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In Cape Town, because the priorities of residents and local government often do not align, there 
is this perception by residents that the local government is doing nothing for them. For example, 
residents prioritise housing and services in the face of ongoing flooding, and not the clearing of 
drainage systems or the provision of disaster relief. One resident in Graveyard Pond informal 
settlement63 started saying in the interview that the CCT was doing nothing for them, but as he 
started remembering some of the activities that the DRMC did carry out in his informal 
settlement, he concluded that the CCT was actually helping them: 
 
Graveyard Pond resident (21/02/2013): “They [the CCT] are doing nothing! For 
instance when there are rains, or floods, they… provide us with a blankets. And helping 
people with maybe… soups when they have no places to go. And they [the CCT] provide 
us with walls in the community. And they also provide us with the teaching before 
floods; [for example] how to handle floods, what must we do when there are floods, 
and all that stuff… So I wouldn’t say they [the CCT] are not helping...” 
 
In this example, because the government is not providing houses and services, which are high 
priority needs for residents, the government is seen as doing nothing; this is in spite of the long 
list of flood risk reduction activities that are implemented currently by the CCT (see Tables 16 
and 17 in Chapter Six). Residents tend to also de-value the responses provided by the CCT 
because these responses are not aligned with their immediate priorities: the blankets are seen 
as causing more problems, the sour milk does not keep them warm during the wet/cold winters, 
the soup only helps them for a very short time, and being relocated temporarily to a community 
hall does not make the problem go away. The overall mentality of residents is thus very negative 
towards short-term, reactive responses by the CCT.  
 
The Isandla Institute (2011) sees contestation in South Africa’ service delivery as a result of 
differences in priorities within government structures and in different local communities. CCT 
officials, residents, and external actors often have very different priorities (and needs); for 
example, local municipality is concerned with macro issues, whereas local communities are 
more concerned with the micro issues. CCT nodes highlighted how they also often had very 
different priorities amongst themselves, which are challenging to align. CCT nodes highlighted 
how they lack the resources and time to address all the priorities and needs that exist in Cape 
Town. Residents in informal settlements, for example, have an urgent need for services, but 
assessing the risk is a lengthy process and the backlogs for services are already so high. This 
                                                             
63 An informal settlement built inside a retention pond in Philippi, about 5 km east of Sweet Home. See Drivdal’s 
(2011b) report on the flooding situation in Graveyard Pond. 
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notion of authorities being responsive to the priorities and needs of residents is termed by 
Satterthwaite and Dodman (2013) as the ‘political dimension’ of resilience. In order for cities to 
be more resilient to disasters and climate change, local authorities, who have the power to 
provide services and address the needs of citizens, need to be genuinely responsive to those 
needs. As seen in the Cape Town case study, and as echoed by Welsh (2014), this political 
dimension is often overlooked. 
 
Environmental Health (10/04/2013): “Everybody’s got their own priorities, and 
what might be a priority to us is not a priority to somebody else, or for another 
department. […] The case in point: we sent through an issue about solid waste. 
Compared to what they [Solid Waste Management] were dealing with, that little solid 
waste that we were complaining about was nothing comparing to what they had to 
deal with. So they [Solid Waste Management] have ten tons of the stuff lying 
somewhere else and we were complaining about 500 kilos. So what is more a priority? 
Everyone else got their own priorities and unfortunately, we just have to wait until 
such time as they [other CCT departments] can come and deal with our problem. And 
we also have to be understanding… in our case, the resources are stretched to the 
limit.” 
 
 
4. THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF NODES: A WAY TO 
GOVERN THAT IS SHAPED BY THEIR MENTALITIES 
 
From a nodal governance approach, I argue that the roles and responsibilities of nodes are both 
a mentality and a technology. The various roles that nodes play (i.e., a method for exerting 
influence and thus a technology) are shaped by the various responsibilities that nodes have. 
These roles and responsibilities, which refer to the mandates and activities that nodes have, are 
also shaped by and reflect each node’s disciplinary background and how they think about the 
world (i.e., their mentalities).  
 
Emerging from the data are four key roles that nodes are seen as having in the context of flood 
governance: coordinating, monitoring and reporting, operational, and response and relief 
provision (Table 19). Roads and Stormwater explain how there are operational boundaries that 
the CCT has to work within; for example, Roads and Stormwater are responsible for anything 
that impacts on their roads and stormwater infrastructure, while Solid Waste Management or 
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Water and Sanitation are responsible for issues relating to solid waste and water and sanitation, 
respectively. Despite these clear operational boundaries (i.e., roles and responsibilities), the 
activities, or lack of activities, of one node might impact on another node. For example, residents 
dumping solid waste might cause blockages in stormwater systems, or solid waste failing to 
remove solid waste one week due to strikes/protests might result in solid waste blocking the 
stormwater systems. As explained by Roads and Stormwater (09/11/2011), any non-
performance by one department might reflect badly on other departments.  
 
 
Table 19: The multiple roles/responsibilities of selected nodes, with regard to flood governance 
Node Roles and Responsibilities 
Development Services 
Coordinating service providers and other CCT nodes responsible for 
providing/maintaining services in informal settlements.  
DRMC 
Coordinate other nodes on the Flood Task Team to holistically identify and 
address flood risk. Activate external nodes to provide relief during flood events.  
Environmental Health 
Monitoring of health- and environment-related risk factors in informal 
settlements. Reporting of issues (e.g., faults, leaks, broken/disrupted services) 
to relevant nodes. 
Informal Settlements 
Management 
Monitoring and reporting issues that arise in informal settlements. Assessing 
and coordinating the upgrading of informal settlements – coordinating nodes in 
this respect. 
Jungle Theatre 
Company 
Implementing the DRMC’s education and awareness campaign (operational). 
Mustadafin Foundation Provision of relief during and after a flood event. 
Roads and Stormwater 
Providing and implementing roads- and stormwater-related services in 
informal settlements. Maintenance of related services where necessary 
(operational). 
Solid Waste 
Management 
Providing and implementing solid waste-related services in informal 
settlements. Maintenance of related services where necessary (operational). 
Sweet Home Residents 
Reporting and monitoring issues in their informal settlement, which might 
increase their risk and/or impact on their well-being, to the street committee 
and/or community leader. Receive relief/resources during/before flood events. 
Sweet Home Street 
Committee 
Reporting and monitoring issues in their informal settlement to the CCT 
and/or ward councillor. Distributing and coordinating relief/resources 
during/before flood events (operational). 
Ward Councillor 
Channel resources to their ward (operational). Coordinate other nodes to 
respond to calls/complaints from residents. Play and oversight role.  
Water and Sanitation 
Providing and implementing water- and sanitation-related services in informal 
settlements. Maintenance of related services where necessary (operational). 
 
 
During FliCCR’s workshop in November 2011 with Flood Task Team representatives, each 
department was asked to discuss where their core flood management activities (flood 
responses/strategies) lay. Each department was asked to place themselves on a spider matrix; 
the final outcome is presented in Figure 20. If a particular flood management response was seen 
as core to their current operation, the department was asked to place themselves near the 
centre of the spider matrix. If they were not centrally involved, then they were asked to place 
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themselves at the edge, or along the line depending on the extent of their activities. Roads and 
Stormwater felt that they play an advisory role in terms of relocation. DRMC argued that they 
play a central role in terms of temporary relocation for flood-affected households, but sit on the 
periphery in terms of permanent relocation activities (which is the mandate of Human 
Settlements). The Health department saw their central role as making recommendations for 
infrastructure upgrades, spatial planning and regulation, and proactively supplying materials to 
at-risk household. The Health department argued that they play a central role when it comes to 
temporary relocation. 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Spider matrix showing where CCT nodes position themselves in terms of central versus 
peripheral roles that they perceive themselves as playing 
(Source: FliCCR’s workshop, November 2011) 
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There is often a mismatch in how other nodes see a particular node’s role, which can cause 
frustration or an overlap in activities that nodes carry out. For example, Environmental Health 
identifies their role as monitoring and reporting, yet residents perceive Environmental Health 
as playing an operational role (i.e., delivering services and repairing/maintaining 
infrastructure). When issues are identified by Environmental Health field officers in an informal 
settlement (e.g., a leaking toilet), residents expect those officers to fix the problem immediately. 
However, Environmental Health’s role is to report these issues to the right CCT node (i.e., Water 
and Sanitation in this case) because they are not equipped (financially, and expertise- and 
mandate-wise) to fix these issues. Residents do not see this, as it is a very non-transparent 
process, and instead the residents get frustrated with (and often abusive towards) any 
Environmental Health officials who are seen, by the residents, as not doing their perceived 
‘operational’ job.  
 
Water and Sanitation also identified how their ‘operational’ role is misunderstood by other CCT 
nodes that often rely on Water and Sanitation to ‘coordinate’ activities or respond to issues that 
are beyond their mandate and for which they lack the resources (financial and human). 
Referring to the call centre that they run, called the Technical Operations Centre (TOC), Water 
and Sanitation explained how other CCT nodes often use this call centre for any issue, even 
when it is obviously not Water and Sanitation’s responsibility, expecting Water and Sanitation 
to address the issue.  
 
Water and Sanitation (24/04/2013) referring to an issue that was sent to their TOC: 
“Like that thing that came through this morning [issue related to unpaved roads in 
an informal settlement]. It’s obvious that is a transport department […] public 
transport has to see to it. They send it to us. We send it to the [CCT’s centralised] TOC 
saying ‘Guys, there’s a public transport problem, send it to them!’ They send it back to 
us.” 
 
This issue causes frustration for Water and Sanitation because although they send the call to the 
CCT’s centralised TOC, the issue is still noted as a Water and Sanitation call on the CCT’s internal 
notification system, called the C364 system. Water and Sanitation argued that other CCT nodes 
relying on them to carry out activities beyond their mandate is also an issue that causes 
frustrations; this is related to a lack of clarity of nodes’ roles and responsibilities, as well as an 
                                                             
64 This system allows CCT nodes to log and track issues. Any calls made through the various CCT’s call centres are 
recorded and logged on the C3 system. Any other CCT departments and ward councillors can see the log to track its 
progress. The notification will only be closed once the issue has been addressed. Through this system, the CCT can 
track progress, hold departments accountable, and measure how long it took departments to resolve notifications 
(thus an indicator of delivery success and improvement). For more info, see CCT (2010).  
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issue of nodes not wanting to take extra responsibility. Although issues are diverted towards 
Water and Sanitation, the necessary resources (human and financial) are not made available: 
 
Water and Sanitation (24/04/2013) reflecting on an example of Informal 
Settlements Management organising a fieldtrip to an informal settlement, which 
multiple nodes were expected to attend: “Since yesterday, I received a call from a guy 
from Roads and Stormwater that we must send out our surveyors to level the areas 
[…] and our internal guys asked us to pay for the graders that the Roads [and 
Stormwater] guys will send out. And I think that they [Roads and Stormwater] must 
go to Human Settlements. It’s nothing to do with us! […] You see, everybody comes to 
us because it’s water and sanitation, so we must pay for it. […] The whole attitude [in 
the CCT] is that […] if there’s a door broken, it doesn’t matter, it must come to us. […] 
Everyone agrees that it’s not our function. But no-one says, ‘hey, I’ll take it’. Keep it 
[they say, but] we’ll complain about [when something goes wrong]. […] Now, if they 
said, ‘Alright, we’ll send you all the people. We’ll all send you so much admin, so much 
more managers to handle the situation.’ It’s fine! But they said, ‘No, no, no, we haven’t 
got money for that… but take responsibility!” 
 
A lack of resources and capacity to take on certain responsibilities or to address flood risk 
properly is also an issue that nodes highlighted. Although the issue of resources and their 
impact on nodes’ ability to govern is the central focus of Chapter Eight in this thesis, an 
important point to note here is how a lack of resources can exacerbate the perception of flood 
risk being an overwhelming problem, as well as cause additional frustration with regard to 
nodes’ actual (and perceived) roles and responsibilities. During interviews with senior DRMC 
officials, they identified housing delivery as one of the key solutions for addressing flood risk. 
The delivery of proper housing in planned/serviced areas that are not flood-prone is argued by 
many CCT nodes to be the ideal (and often only) alternative to residents living in flood-prone 
informal settlements. Although DRMC see the need for housing delivery, their hands are tied in 
this regard because it is not their mandated role to provide housing65, and they lack the 
resources (e.g., land, housing material, and human resources) for housing delivery. DRMC 
therefore recognise that their responses to flood risk will always be insufficient in the current 
                                                             
65 At the time of the interviews with DRMC officials in 2012 and 2013, housing delivery was constitutionally a 
national government competency, through the national Department of Human Settlements. Local government (i.e., 
the local municipal department of Human Settlements) was only mandated to provide the services for housing (e.g., 
roads, electricity, and stormwater). In 2013, the CCT was in the process of applying to national government to 
become a housing provider; if this was successful, which it was (2013/2014), the CCT could then provide housing on 
local government land. However, a lot of the land in Cape Town is owned by different levels of government, which 
complicates any process of identifying/procuring land to build houses on. 
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context because for them, the underlying causes of flooding are low-quality housing (i.e., shacks) 
on inappropriate land (i.e., flood zones, wetlands, and retention/detention ponds).  
 
CCT nodes often explained how residents had the ‘wrong’ perception of what the CCT nodes’ 
individual roles were. When residents were asked who should be responsible for responding to 
flooding, for example, their responses were either ‘the ward councillor’ or ‘the CCT’. This widely 
held perception that the CCT is responsible for flood mitigation/risk reduction reflects not only 
a lack of communication/awareness from the CCT to residents about the structure of the CCT 
and each department’s specific roles/responsibilities, but also reflects the CCT’s very opaque 
planning and implementation processes. Although information about the CCT’s structure and 
specific departments are available on the internet (e.g., the CCT’s official website) and in 
policies/documents made publicly available at local libraries, most of the residents living in 
flood-prone informal settlements are unable to access this information: they are far away from a 
local library, they cannot read (or read English or another ‘official’ South African language), 
and/or they do not have access to electricity and/or the internet. The ‘opaqueness’ of local 
government processes is also an issue that results in field officers from different CCT nodes, 
who have very specific functions and roles in informal settlements, being seen as the ‘face’ of the 
CCT, and therefore in the firing line of any discontent, misunderstandings, or conflict that 
residents bring (i.e., as discussed earlier with regard to Environmental Health).  
 
The matrix in Figure 21 on page 154 illustrates how nodes in Cape Town position themselves in 
terms of whether they see flood risk as the responsibility of local government or civil society, 
and the degree to which civil society should be involved in developing flood risk reduction 
strategies. From this matrix, it is clear that none of the nodes see flood risk as civil society’s 
responsibility to address, with the Mustadafin Foundation and Environmental Health 
department as the only two nodes who perceive the responsibility of flood risk as needing to be 
shared, to some degree, with residents. Nodes disagreed on the extent to which residents (civil 
society) should be involved in decision-making and the implementation of flood risk reduction 
activities. Although Roads and Stormwater lean more towards seeing flood risk as the state’s 
responsibility, the need for residents to ‘share the responsibility of flood risk’ was articulated in 
interviews with one of the senior officials from the department:  
 
Roads and Stormwater (08/09/2010): “How do we convey the information and then 
how do we engage the communities in a way that they will [know how to….] share 
risk with us… there’s some things that [residents] can do [to share risk]. […] We 
recognise that the [CCT] can only protect and only offers to protect up to a certain 
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storm event. And beyond that, it is generally accepted that the communities are on 
their own and we [the CCT] have to manage the consequences through the disaster 
management processes. […] How do we share this risk? And how do we [the CCT and 
residents] work together on minimising it?” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Matrix highlighting how nodes position themselves with regard to who should be 
responsible for managing flood risk and developing flood risk reduction strategies66 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
 
 
DRMC indicated that although it is the state that is currently responsible for tackling food risks 
according to legislation, residents are also seen to help on the ground. The DRMC valued, for 
example, the input and advice from residents living in flood-prone areas because residents 
                                                             
66 This matrix was made using feedback from Flood Task Team representatives during FliCCR’s workshop in 
November 2011 (see Appendix 6 and 12) and from responses during interviews with these actors. 
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know the local context best. This is in contrast to evidence from the interviews with various 
DRMC officials that highlighted how the DRAs were not informed by residents and communities, 
but driven only by input from other CCT departments and external experts (e.g., Aurecon, an 
engineering-focused consultancy company). The Health Directorate expressed how, although it 
is the responsibility of the state to manage flooding, it is the residents who manage (and often 
fail to manage, in their view) the flood risks currently; this node is referring here to the reactive 
‘coping’ activities that residents carry out before/during flooding. Development Services felt 
strongly that it was the state’s responsibility, both at the policy and the implementation level. 
This disagreement between nodes in terms of their understandings and perception of who 
currently manages risk and who should manage what level of risk, impacts on the extent to 
which residents are allowed (or encouraged) to actively participate in current flood risk 
reduction activities. There is still a very state-centric, top-down approach to disaster 
governance in Cape Town, despite what some CCT nodes say in terms of the extent to which 
they engage with residents.  
 
There are many contradictions in the responsibilities that nodes perceive each other as having 
in terms of managing different issues and types (and levels) of flood risk. Public discourse and 
statements from most of the nodes interviewed indicate that flood management is the CCT’s 
problem and that residents do not take responsibility for protecting themselves from flooding. 
Many residents see flooding as the CCT’s problem and expect the CCT to manage all types (and 
levels) of flood risk: localised flooding in a communal space or directly in front of an individual’s 
house are both seen as the CCT’s responsibility to address. Residents seeing DRM as the 
‘government’s’ responsibility is not uncommon in other case studies; for example, Taş et al. 
(2013) find this same perception in Turkey. This perception by residents often results in 
residents not taking the initiative to protect their houses from flooding; although some 
residents expressed how this ‘lack of proactive action’ is the result of not having the right 
resources (financial and physical) and/or lacking the know-how to protect themselves. Roads 
and Stormwater (08/09/2010) argue that residents do not ‘share’ the risk with them (i.e., do 
not take some responsibility for reducing their flood risk) partly because they lack the 
knowledge on flooding and on how to ‘share’ this risk. 
 
Roads and Stormwater (08/09/2010): “People [residents] don’t want to take their 
own responsibility for their own drainage issues and they try and pass problems to 
neighbours. […] And even the basic preparation [for floods]… […] the basics like ‘clean 
your roof gutters. Make sure your roofs are sealed.’ […] ‘Dig channels around your 
houses’ […]. Those messages go out [from the CCT], but I wonder who actually does 
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anything? […] How do we share this risk [flooding]? And how do we work together on 
minimising it?” 
 
Roads and Stormwater (08/09/2010): “I think that the whole communities’ 
understanding of [flood] risk is a huge gap. […] How do we [the CCT] convey the 
information and then how do we engage the communities in a way that they will […] 
share risk with us.” 
 
CCT nodes argued that residents should ‘change their behaviour’ and take responsibility for 
localised, minor flooding that is a direct result of their perceived inaction (e.g., houses leaking 
because they were not waterproofed before winter). CCT nodes expressed how they would like 
communities to share the management of flood risk, by undertaking their own interventions at a 
household level; for example, ensuring water can drain away from buildings, not dumping solid 
waste in drainage systems, reporting any blockages/broken taps, and ‘waterproofing’ their 
shacks. A Health department official (09/11/2011) explained how this idea of making residents 
‘responsible’ for certain risks is very difficult to explain and implement; residents living in 
formalised areas own their house and are therefore responsible for any flooding that happens in 
the house (e.g., blocked drains and leaking roofs are repaired at their expense), but residents in 
informal settlements do not own the land that they live on (i.e., it is often the public or private 
land), and they cannot afford or do not have the incentive (e.g., tenure) to ‘fix’ issues.  
 
The Mustadafin Foundation (01/03/2013): “We must get community involvement [in 
flood risk management]. That they [residents] should take responsibility for their 
own areas. They [residents] should take responsibility of keeping the catchment areas 
of the rivers […] clean. They [residents] shouldn’t dump […] their waste in drainage. 
[…] The CCT also plays a big role in collecting this [waste dumped in drainage]. But as 
an NGO, we need to educate these people how to take care of their areas […].” 
 
The Mustadafin Foundation (01/03/2013): “People [residents in informal 
settlements] will come and say, ‘I need relief because my roof is leaking’. But that is 
not the problem of the CCT. Because they [residents] need to fix their roof before the 
rain comes.” 
 
DRMC described a situation where a blocked stormwater drainage channel (in an informal 
settlement) had flooded the surrounding area, including a resident’s house. When the DRMC 
official asked the resident why they had not dug a trench to divert the water away from their 
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house and into another unblocked channel, the resident said that the CCT should dig the trench 
for them, or pay them to dig the trench. The often fatalistic mentality that residents have, in 
combination with an entitlement attitude (whether real or perceived by other nodes), makes it 
challenging for CCT nodes to engage with and invite residents to participate in decision-making 
and implementation. On the other hand, there is recognition by some CCT nodes that once 
residents are included in decision-making and are actively participating in risk reduction 
activities, their fatalistic and entitlement mentality might change. In response to the question 
“how have you or your neighbours tried to stop flooding”, one Sweet Home resident 
(04/12/2012) said:  
 
“How!? To stop flooding!? Eish… it’s not easy to stop flooding. As I mentioned, concrete 
[as a way to raise your floor level]: not everyone is able to afford to buy concrete. […] 
First, you must be a very clever man. […] Not everyone can do it. […] Sometimes you 
can just protect your house around [with concrete], but when it’s raining… you just 
get some holes in your house and water comes in. So there’s no way whereby you can 
stop to flooding. There’s nobody knows how to stop the flooding. Because when it 
happens, it happens. […] You can walk around and […] you see that person was trying 
to control… to stop flooding. But it doesn’t.”  
 
The contested roles and responsibilities of nodes impacts on their capacity to carry out their 
tasks and ultimately impacts on the ability of nodes to reduce flood risk. An example of this is 
the very contested, unclear, and overlapping responsibility related to the cleaning of solid waste 
from stormwater channels. CCT nodes and residents are unclear as to who is responsible for 
unblocking stormwater channels that are blocked with solid waste. Solid Waste Management 
argue that the responsibility belongs to Roads and Stormwater because the blockage is in their 
stormwater systems, while Roads and Stormwater argue that the responsibility is Solid Waste 
Management’s because it is an issue of their solid waste not being cleared properly from 
surrounding areas and thus falling into their drainage systems. Related to these contested 
responsibilities is the issue of who is responsible for clearing the waste that is removed from 
the stormwater drainage channels and dumped on the roads, alongside the channels. Again, 
nodes are unclear as to who should take responsibility for this, which results in nothing being 
done: 
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Discussion between four DRMC officials (31/01/2013): 
DRMC #1: “In some instances, there’s a lot of grey area. Typical example is solid waste. 
What’s the story where the roads [department]… they put the debris outside? And 
then someone else must come and pick it up and collect it? […] There’s always the 
big question about why Solid Waste Management can’t just take it away? “ 
DRMC #2: “The guy who removes it from the river, he can’t cart it away.” 
DRMC #3: “He just leaves it there. Someone else can come fetch it.” 
DRMC #4: [Departments are] “working in silos […] each department just does what 
he thinks is his portfolio.”  
 
Complaints related to this issue are difficult to log on the CCT’s C3 system because residents and 
CCT nodes are unclear about which department to call. This often results in prolonged, 
unnecessary delays in addressing the issue, no assistance at all, or more often than not, nodes 
being blamed for the failures. Roads and Stormwater blame Solid Waste Management, for 
example, for not providing sufficient blue refuse bags to residents, thus resulting in residents 
dumping waste rather than sending the blue refuse bags to the appropriate collection points. 
Solid Waste Management blame residents for not disposing of their waste appropriately in the 
waste collection skips or containers, and also blame their EPWP workers for failing to unlock 
the waste containers or cleaning the communal areas properly. These examples of ‘finger-
pointing’ and blame complicate the issue and create a mentality of distrust and fatalism, instead 
of constructively trying to address the underlying issues. 
 
Stoker (1998) summarises ‘governance’ as being the new set of managerial tools and techniques 
that actors use for collective decision-making and action. Since an essential part of governance 
is to blur the boundaries (and thus responsibilities) between state and non-state actors, Stoker 
(1998) argues that governance can often create ambiguity and uncertainty; particularly in the 
minds of policy-makers and the public, with regard to who is responsible. This blurring is also 
seen by policy-makers and the public as creating the space for government actors to “[pass] off 
responsibility to privatised providers when things go wrong” (Stoker, 1998:22] and for ‘scape-
goating’ and ‘blame avoidance’ to take place. Stoker (1998:22) argues that although blame 
avoidance and scape-goating are “not new political phenomena”, governance structures can 
“extend the capacity” for this to take place, with actors blaming others for failures and 
challenges. As shown in this previous section, this type of scape-goating and blame avoidance is 
very evident in Cape Town, with city officials and residents pointing fingers at ‘the other’ for 
various reasons. This scape-goating is arguably the result of unclear roles and responsibilities of 
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each node, as well as a lack of accountability and transparency in service delivery and DRM 
planning and decision-making.  
 
 
5. THE TECHNOLOGIES ADOPTED BY NODES TO GOVERN 
 
Technologies refer not only to the structural and non-structural interventions that nodes use to 
reduce flood risk, but also to the set of methods and tools that nodes rely on to exert influence 
over and manage the world and events that they govern. Figure 22 places the nodes along a 
spectrum in terms of the flood risk reduction measures that they prioritise currently. The 
preferred measures by nodes are a reflection of their mentalities, in terms of their 
understanding of the nature of flooding, their disciplinary background, and the types of 
technologies and resources that they possess.  
 
 
 
Figure 22: Types of measures currently prioritised by nodes67 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
*Falls under the Human Settlements Directorate 
 
 
                                                             
67 See Appendix 12 for the original list of questions and responses by nodes represented on the Flood Task Team. 
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Roads and Stormwater, Informal Settlements Management, and Water and Sanitation are all 
involved in the delivery of key services and infrastructure, which is why they indicated that 
their current prioritisation was with technical, engineered, structural measures. Residents in 
Sweet Home value and prioritise technical measures because they are tangible solutions. 
Despite the recurrent failures of many technical measures in Sweet Home (i.e., the blocked open 
stormwater channels, broken pumps to divert water, and water entering shacks despite plastic 
covers and sloping roofs), residents still demanded that the CCT provide them with technical 
solutions to flood risk (i.e., better housing, raised ground levels, etc.). Residents argued that non-
structural measures, such as awareness-raising, temporary relocation, and media releases about 
potential flooding, did not help their situation at all because despite these efforts, they were still 
flooded or at risk of flooding every year. Several nodes argue that structural interventions are 
necessary in informal settlements because  
 
1. they are something tangible that CCT nodes can implement (i.e., politicians can 
be photographed next to the ‘successful’ project); and  
2. residents can see the difference that these solutions make in terms of physically 
diverting runoff and reducing the levels of floodwaters:  
 
DRMC (08/04/2013) referring to tangible, structural flood risk solutions: “That’s 
what people can see. They [Residents] say, ‘Yeah! The CCT’s coming and they’re doing! 
...especially if it’s a big engineering intervention where they can see the difference in 
terms of flood.” 
 
When asked where on the spectrum nodes would like to prioritise their future actions (in the 
next 10-15 years), DRMC and the Health Directorate felt that they would stay where they are 
currently, whereas Development Services and Informal Settlements Management felt that they 
needed to move towards more socio-institutional measures. Roads and Stormwater was the 
only department that felt that more investment was needed in developing more innovative 
technical measures, although some mid-level officials recognised that the lack of community 
engagement (a non-structural measure) was also impacting negatively on the success of their 
current technical measures. One senior Roads and Stormwater official (2010) also argued that 
implementing by-laws and tariffs (a non-structural measure) related to stormwater runoff, 
would help to ensure that businesses and residents would take measures to reduce the amount 
of runoff into existing water systems. The two viewpoints by Roads and Stormwater officials 
(i.e., we need more technical versus more non-structural measures) reflects the divergence in 
opinion by higher-level officials and field-based officials: officials based in the field argued that 
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technical measures are sufficient for reducing flood risk, while more senior officials recognised 
that these technical measures need to be supported by non-structural measures.  
 
Implementing technical measures without the support of non-structural measures is an issue 
that Taing et al. (2011) explore in their case study of the innovative vacuum sewer system built 
in informal settlements in Cape Town. These authors found that this innovative technical 
solution failed because it was not supported by non-structural measures such as community 
engagement, education and information-sharing, monitoring of installation processes and the 
system afterwards, and adequate maintenance schedules.  
 
All of the nodes tended to cite structural interventions rather than non-structural interventions 
when asked which interventions allowed nodes to address flood risk. Although structural 
interventions seemed to be cited first by nodes, they did not identify any major preference for 
either structural or non-structural initiatives when asked which ‘type’ was more effective in 
reducing flood risk. However, it is interesting to note that nodes with engineering backgrounds 
(e.g., Water and Sanitation, and Roads and Stormwater) tended to argue that their structural 
interventions were more effective than non-structural interventions. This reflects the often 
biased perception that nodes have of their own abilities and technologies, as well as a bias 
towards tangible solutions such as engineered structures. Most of the senior 
officials/representatives of the various nodes recognised the need for better policies and by-
laws that dealt with the issue of informal settlements being built in unsuitable, flood-prone land, 
as well as the need for education and awareness programmes that educated residents on issues 
related to flood risk and the underlying causes of flood risk. Although Holloway (2003) and IFRC 
(2012) argue that DRR interventions in South Africa tend to be largely relief and response-
oriented, the number of proactive flood risk reduction interventions that the Flood Task Team 
implements currently were seen to outweigh the number of reactive interventions68.  
 
Several nodes argued that there is still the need for more proactive and innovative 
interventions. These nodes argued that despite the current proactive interventions that the 
Flood Task Team and various CCT nodes implement, there is still a great demand for relief and 
response activities every year. These relief activities cost the CCT millions of South African 
rands69 each year and are not seen as ‘solving’ the problem or meeting the actual needs of 
residents living in informal settlements. Residents similarly expressed their frustration at the 
                                                             
68 This conclusion is based on the number of proactive interventions recorded in Tables 15 and 16, which were 
presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
69 For example, according to a statement released by Cape Town’s mayor, De Lille, in 2013, the CCT spent over ZAR 
2.6 million on social relief in response to flooding during that year’s winter rains/storms.  
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reactive responses by the CCT and how this does not solve the problem. Perceptions of what 
would solve the problem do vary from node to node, as discussed earlier; this is another 
reflection of nodes’ differing mentalities and understandings of the nature of the problem. 
Residents and the Mustadafin Foundation, for example, see the only viable solutions as the 
provision of housing from the CCT. Informal Settlements Management and Roads and 
Stormwater see relocation (permanent) and in-situ upgrade (where possible) as the only viable 
solutions, whereas DRMC argue that an urbanisation policy that controls in-migration and 
urban growth would be the best (and only) solution to a much deeper and highly political 
problem. Many residents have explained how the CCT’s relief responses after a flood do not 
solve the problem (of flooding); a view that was shared by some CCT nodes and NGOs. Some 
residents have expressed instead their desire for the CCT to work with them to show them how 
to protect themselves against flooding.  
 
Sweet Home resident (21/05/2013): “You [The CCT] give me blankets because you 
said I’m affected by the floods. But again, after you give me those blankets… where I 
am going to sleep? I am going back to that shack that is flooded. So it’s not a… a 
problem solved. It’s not solved!” 
 
The Mustadafin Foundation (01/03/2013): “The problem of the people is not having 
relief. They don’t want relief. Obviously there is a need for the relief. But their main 
concern is proper housing. […] The [CCT] spends billions of rands [South African 
currency] every year [on relief]. That [money] could have bought how many houses!? 
So if it’s going to be ongoing that they have to supply relief every year instead of 
having a budget, building them proper housing… and they not going to have that 
problem [of flooding].” 
 
Nodes also highlighted the importance of relocation, both temporary and permanent. Although 
relocation is the responsibility of Human Settlements, all the CCT nodes indicated that they 
provide assistance in assessing potential areas and earmarking informal settlements or 
residents who need to be relocated. As mentioned in Chapter Six, some informal settlements are 
identified as areas where relocation is the only long-term, flood risk reduction solution. Since 
finding suitable land is often challenging, the following approaches are undertaken by CCT 
nodes in the interim (DMAF, 2012): 
 
1. Conduct awareness campaigns; 
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2. Provide relief such as emergency shelter, blankets, meals, and emergency flood 
kits; and 
3. Relocate structures (i.e., shacks) where possible. 
 
Development Services argue that there is land available for relocation, but because it has 
become a very political issue, this land is not available for relocating at-risk informal 
settlements. This official went on to say that although relocation is the wish-list, it is not always 
practical because of financial reasons and the CCT having to negotiate to buy land. For the CCT 
to buy private land, which people have built informal settlements on, for example, (i.e., in order 
to service the land, as in Sweet Home’s case), private land owners try to sell the land to the CCT 
at a very inflated price: they “want to sell bronze for gold price” (Development Services, 
12/06/2012); this results in the process becoming very time-consuming and drawn out, and 
sometimes even landowners block the whole process for political reasons.  
 
Education and awareness campaigns were cited by many CCT nodes and NGOs as an effective 
technology for communicating with and informing residents of how to protect themselves from 
floods and how to respond during flood events. However, the perception of the effectiveness of 
current awareness campaigns varied greatly between nodes. Many of the CCT nodes distribute 
pamphlets and posters on relevant issues70, in the various official languages; several nodes 
explained that these pamphlets were ineffective for a number of reasons: residents cannot read, 
residents are not interested and just throw the pamphlets/posters away, and some of these 
posters are kept in storage somewhere and not distributed properly.  
 
In response to this, DRMC approached the Jungle Theatre Company in 2010 to develop a play 
that is based on their “Protect yourself against floods” pamphlet71. The public theatre shows, 
which the Jungle Theatre Company is sponsored by DRMC to conduct in 20 at-risk informal 
settlements, are also seen by some residents as ineffective. These shows, which are supposed to 
take place right at the start of the flood/fire seasons, but are sometimes delayed for various 
reasons (i.e., often political), are seen by various nodes (except DRMC) as a technology that is 
ineffective because they are implemented too late. The Jungle Theatre Company explained how 
often the DRMC come to them very late and ask them to put on the fire or flood performances. In 
2012, for example, the flood performances were done as late as June, when the informal 
settlements were already flooded. Feedback from residents about the performance indicated 
                                                             
70 See Appendix 11 for examples of these educational pamphlets. 
71 See Appendix 11 for examples of these educational pamphlets. 
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that the residents only wanted blankets and relief from DRMC because they were already 
flooded. 
 
A ward councillor argued that although the pamphlets are an effective tool for educating people 
(“a big change”, 07/06/2013), the distribution of these pamphlets needs to be accompanied by 
people who are able to help them understand and interpret the information on the pamphlets. 
Nodes also argued that even though people are made aware of particular activities or issues 
(e.g., do not throw solid waste on the ground, but use the blue refuse bags and take those bags to 
the containers), the resources required for residents to carry out the activities are missing; the 
solid waste contractor does not provide enough blue refuse bags, or does not unlock the 
container on the correct day (or at the correct times), so residents lack the resources (and 
incentives) to dispose of their solid waste properly.  
 
 
6. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I unpacked how bringing multiple nodes together, who each draw on diverse 
knowledge and skills, can be both a strength and weakness when governing disaster risk. I 
explored how different nodes, who are either central to or impacted by disaster governance 
processes, have multiple and often contested perceptions of the nature of the problem and its 
solutions (mentalities). I also argued that these multiple perceptions impact on the types of 
decisions made and activities conducted and can translate into different types of tools and 
methods that are chosen by nodes to address those issues (technologies). In this chapter, I 
explored the contested roles and responsibility by different nodes in Cape Town and how there 
is often a mismatch in perceptions from other nodes of what these roles/responsibilities entail. 
For flood governance to be more comprehensive, integrated, and holistic, nodes need to be on 
the same page in terms of definitions, especially in this case where nodes come from very 
different disciplinary backgrounds and therefore have very different understandings of the 
nature of the problem. Standardised definitions would allow nodes to decide how best to use 
the diverse expertise and resources that they bring to flood governance, and provide nodes with 
a more unified, collaborative platform to tackle flood issues from. This issue is also reflected in 
the diverse roles and responsibilities of nodes; without transparent and clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities for each node, there is unlikely to be clear expectations, priorities, and 
tasks, which will ultimately strengthen the collaborative flood governance decisions and actions 
of the various nodes.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  
 
NODES (ILL)EQUIPPED TO GOVERN: THE 
RESOURCES AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
THAT ENABLE NODES TO GOVERN  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As identified in Chapter Seven, a salient theme that emerged from the discussions with actors 
governing flood risk in Cape Town was that of ‘who’ should be responsible for responding to 
and addressing flood risk across the city. Residents from Sweet Home informal settlement and 
some representatives from NGOs (e.g., the Mustadafin Foundation) argued that this 
responsibility lies with the CCT and its elected ward councillors, while CCT officials and ward 
councillors emphasised the need for residents to share in this responsibility. This disagreement 
and divergence of opinion is also reflected in the literature on whether government (national 
and/or local) or civil society should be the ones taking responsibility for and driving DRM. 
While some authors see DRM as the government’s responsibility (Roberts, 2008, Satterthwaite, 
2011, Van Riet and Van Niekerk, 2012, Roberts and O'Donoghue, 2013), many highlight how 
local government, especially in cities of the global South, lack the capacity and governance 
structures to manage disasters in these cities (Ziervogel and Smit, 2009, Satterthwaite, 2011, 
IFRC, 2012, Ziervogel et al., 2014b).  
 
In response, the disaster community has advocated for the empowerment and capacity-building 
of local communities so that they can build their resilience to disasters and climate change, and 
drive local DRR and CCA projects (e.g., Allen, 2006, Uitto and Shaw, 2006, CBDRR, 2007, Reid et 
al., 2009, Shaw, 2012, Van Niekerk and Coetzee, 2012). Community-based DRM and CCA 
approaches have been heavily critiqued, however, with authors arguing that community-based 
approaches cannot have long-term, sustainable benefits without adequate support from and 
partnerships with local government (i.e., receive top-down guidance) and other actors (e.g., top-
down and bottom-up support from CBOs and NGOs), both in terms of resources, policy, and 
institutional mechanisms (Allen, 2006, Uitto and Shaw, 2006, Reid et al., 2009, Dodman and 
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Mitlin, 2013, Twigg, 2015). Authors speaking from governance literature argue that no single 
node has enough resources to govern (Stoker, 1998, Tierney, 2012); instead, governing complex 
events needs to be an interactive process with multiple nodes, including both state and non-
state actors, negotiating for and mobilising resources (Stoker, 1998, Tierney, 2012).  
 
In this chapter, I present some of the arguments from the literature that highlight this 
disagreement on whether local government or local communities are best equipped to drive the 
planning and implementation of DRR activities. I explore what these arguments mean from a 
nodal governance approach, for the case study in Cape Town; in terms of the resources that 
nodes have (and need) to address flood risk (i.e., to govern), and the institutional structures that 
create barriers or enable nodes to access and mobilise critical resources. I highlight in this 
chapter how the process of identifying the available resources and those that are lacking can 
help to strengthen disaster governance because it allows one to take a critical look at what 
resources each actor has and needs to govern, and thus which actors need to be included in 
disaster governance processes to provide and mobilise any critical but lacking resources. Based 
on these findings, I argue that a networked, disaster governance approach is necessary to better 
mobilise diverse resources and strengthen the resilience of communities. 
 
In this chapter, I take the discussion about resources further by highlighting how disaster 
governance is not just about the availability of diverse resources, but also about the institutional 
structures that enable nodes to access, mobilise, and channel these resources. Using a nodal 
governance approach, I identify examples of problematic institutional structures in the Cape 
Town case study that act as barriers in collaborative disaster governance processes. I argue that 
in order to strengthen collaborative disaster governance and ensure that sets of actors are able 
to access, channel, and mobilise the necessary resources to govern, these institutional 
structures need to also be strengthened. 
 
 
2. RESILIENCE TO DISASTERS: LOOKING BEYOND A SINGLE ACTOR 
 
Arguments on whether a single entity (state vs. civil society) or multiple actors should govern 
complex events (i.e., disasters) are usually based on whether different actors have the 
resources, expertise, and/or institutional structures to manage events effectively. From a nodal 
governance approach, nodes are understood to use certain resources to support their activities 
and influence the events that they govern (Burris et al., 2005, Tefre, 2010). I argue that in order 
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to evaluate whether local government or another set of actors is better ‘equipped’ to manage 
disaster risk, the types of resources that particular actors or sets of actors have access to and 
can mobilise need to be identified. This process can provide an understanding of where the gaps 
and overlaps in resources might be and which actors need to be included in the governance 
network (i.e., because they have resources that other actors need/lack). When describing some 
of the sets resources that nodes need and/or have access to, I refer to them as capitals (Table 
20), which various authors have conceptualised within a sustainable livelihoods framework 
(Chambers and Conway, 1991, Scoones, 1998, DFID, 1999, Rakodi, 2002) and more recently 
within an adaptive capacity framework (Jones et al., 2010a,b).  
 
 
Table 20: Description of the five types of capitals 
Type of 
Asset/Capital 
Description 
Economic 
capital 
Available stocks (e.g., savings, cash, bank deposits, liquid assets, credit) and regular 
inflows of money (e.g., pensions, remittances – excludes income). 
Human capital 
 Can be quantitative (e.g., number of family members in a household and time 
available to engage in income-earning activities) and qualitative (e.g., skills, 
knowledge, ability to labour, food, health, physical capability, level of education). 
Natural 
capital 
Natural resources stocks (e.g., soil, water, air, genetic, trees, land) and environmental 
services (hydrological cycle, pollution sinks). Includes intangible public goods (e.g., 
atmosphere and biodiversity), especially common-pool resources. 
Physical 
capital 
Basic infrastructure (e.g., transport, shelter, water and sanitation supply, stormwater 
drainage, energy, communications) and producer goods (e.g., the tools and 
equipment people use). 
Social and 
political 
capital 
Networks and connectedness (either vertical, i.e., between state and resident; or 
horizontal, i.e., between individuals with shared interests), memberships of groups, 
and relationships of trust, reciprocity, and exchanges. Includes social claims, social 
relations, affiliations, and associations, access to wider institutions. 
 
 
In the sub-sections that follow, I unpack some of the literature that relates to arguments on 
whether local government or communities should take responsibility for and drive DRM and 
resilience-building processes. I explore what these arguments mean from a nodal governance 
approach, with a focus on the resources available to and accessed by local government and 
communities. First, I explore what these arguments mean for local government (Section 2.1.), 
and then I explore what these arguments mean for community resilience (Section 2.2.). Finally, I 
present my conceptualisation of community resilience from a disaster governance approach 
(Section 2.3.), where I argue that community resilience does not take place in a vacuum from 
broader socio-political and economic processes, but requires networks with and resources from 
multiple actors, from multiple levels of governance. 
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2.1. DRM as local government’s responsibility 
 
DRM, climate change, development, and urban sustainability issues are often argued to be the 
responsibility of local government because local government: 
 
1.  has access to external resources (e.g., funding and technology); 
2. already has the mandates and legislative requirements for service delivery and 
development-related priorities in place; and  
3. has the political/legislative authority to implement related policies and activities at the 
city level (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003, Roberts, 2008, Bulkeley et al., 2011, Van Riet and 
Van Niekerk, 2012, Roberts and O'Donoghue, 2013).  
 
In South Africa, Roberts (2008) and Roberts and O'Donoghue (2013) argue that because local 
government is responsible, legislatively, for the delivery of utilities and other development-
related agendas, any priority issues (e.g., climate change and DRM) need to be linked with and 
driven by local government’s agendas if cities want to ensure that these issues are adopted and 
addressed. Van Riet and Van Niekerk (2012) argue similarly that since DRM and DRAs are 
supported by South African DRM legislation, the local government needs to play a central role 
and ‘drive’ those processes. For Van Riet and Van Niekerk (2012), the outsourcing of DRAs to 
external, non-state actors, for example, is viewed as counterproductive to building resilient 
municipal DRM centres because they argue that municipalities need to develop their own 
capacities and expertise in this area.  
 
In the case study on flood governance in Cape Town, most nodes argue that local government 
should be responsible for the management of flood risk because they are better equipped than 
residents to do so. From interviews with the various nodes in Cape Town, CCT nodes (including 
NGOs ‘activated’ by the CCT during disaster events) were argued to have access to a diversity of 
resources (as summarised in Table 21 on page 169). CCT nodes recognised that the multiple 
CCT departments represented on the Flood Task Team bring, for example, unique human capital 
and expertise to the team. The diverse expertise and knowledge of multiple nodes on the Task 
Team helps them to address flood risk holistically. For example, engineers from Water and 
Sanitation, Roads and Stormwater, and the Engineering Services department of the Human 
Settlements directorate, are professionals in the field of civil engineering. Without their unique 
knowledge, the technical side of reducing flood risk and diverting surface runoff would be 
missing. In addition, nodes from other sectors and disciplines also have critical human capital to 
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contribute; this can be in the form of conflict management and facilitation skills, DRM and DRA 
skills and expertise, an understanding of the complex social issues that underpin life in informal 
settlements, an understanding of the interconnected causal factors of risk and vulnerability, or 
simply the available staff (and time) who can physically implement DRR activities and/or 
respond to disaster events.  
 
 
Table 21: The resources that CCT nodes use to govern flood risk in Cape Town’s informal 
settlements 
Node  Available Resources 
DRMC 
During emergency response, coordinate and manage equipment provided by other CCT 
nodes. Provide some equipment (e.g., large lights to temporarily light up communal 
areas) when other nodes cannot cope. State-of-the-art disaster control centre and 
training facility. Pamphlets/posters for education/awareness. Strong social capital with 
affiliated NGOs to provide relief and support their education campaign. 
Environment
al Health 
Dept. 
Strong social capital in Sweet Home between residents and field officers who are 
regularly in Sweet Home. Pamphlets/posters for education/awareness. Low social capital 
with NGOs/CBOs/CSOs also working in informal settlements. 
Informal 
Settlements 
Management 
Dept. 
Sandbags provided to residents who request them. Emergency Flood Kits72 issued to 
residents affected by flooding. Partnerships with some NGOs/CBOs/CSOs to carry out re-
blocking and/or housing upgrades (e.g., Ikhayalami, UBU73).  
Jungle 
Theatre 
Company 
Fire/flood awareness programmes are run in informal settlement and sponsored by the 
CCT.  
The 
Mustadafin 
Foundation 
Relief (e.g., clothes, food parcels, sanitary packs, baby packs, and blankets) provided from 
donations and CCT funding is distributed to communities after a flood/fire event. 
Pamphlets/posters for education/awareness. 
Roads and 
Stormwater 
Dept. 
High levels of expertise and technical know-how with regard to engineering designs and 
infrastructure. Data from various hydrology and storm models. Pumps and pump trucks 
to remove localised flooding/ponding. EPWP workers to unblock and clean open 
stormwater channels. Sand for the Sand Protocol. Pamphlets/posters for 
education/awareness. 
SA Red Cross 
Very strong social capital with residents in their selected communities (i.e., Sweet Home 
was not one at the time of this research). Community-based volunteers. Settlement-
specific DRAs. Relief (e.g., clothes, food parcels, sanitary packs, baby packs, and blankets) 
provided from donations and CCT funding is distributed to communities after a flood/fire 
event. Pamphlets/posters for education/awareness. 
Solid Waste 
Management 
Dept. 
Blue refuse bags; skips and containers to collect solid waste; EPWP workers to clean 
communal areas and skips/containers in informal settlements. Pamphlets/posters for 
education/awareness. 
Ward 
Councillor 
Social capital with residents dependent on ward councillor and the informal settlement. 
Sweet Home’s ward councillor has no social capital in Sweet Home, but other ward 
councillors have stronger social capital in their informal settlements. Call centre managed 
by local ward council offices. Ability to channel finances to their ward. 
 
                                                             
72 These kits contain some materials that enable residents in informal settlements to fix their shacks during/after a 
flood event. The kits contain mostly nails and plastic sheeting. Similar kits are distributed to households affected by 
fires. 
73 UBU is a community-based project based in Sweet Home, which is run by a former employee of the Warehouse (an 
NGO/FBO) who has a strong relationship with residents in Sweet Home. This project is run in collaboration with 
Sweet Home residents, with the aim of re-blocking sections of Sweet Home into clustered housing that is built from 
sand-bags. See http://ubu.bz/ [Accessed: 30/10/2014). 
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As seen from Table 21, some of the CCT nodes have access to and mobilise very similar sets of 
resources:  
 
 Flood relief items: NGOs activated by the DRMC to provide relief such as food, 
blankets, sanitary kits, and mattresses; Informal Settlements Management who 
provide the Emergency Flood Kits; 
 Educational pamphlets, posters, and other materials on flood awareness: DRMC 
and the Jungle Theatre Company, the Mustadafin Foundation and SA Red Cross 
Society; Environmental Health, etc. all produce educational materials related to 
flooding; despite overlaps in the content74, these materials are produced 
separately by each department/NGO;  
 Social capital: all of the nodes have social capital with other nodes, to a certain 
degree, although it is recognised here that NGOs tend to have a much stronger 
social capital with residents than the CCT and its officials. Some CCT officials 
have social capital with residents, in particular Environmental Health officials 
and field officers (not senior officials) from a few CCT departments (e.g., DRMC, 
Water and Sanitation), who have regular contact with residents, and some ward 
councillors who are responsive to residents and their needs (i.e., this excludes 
the ward councillor for Sweet Home who has a very problematic relationship 
with these residents).  
 
Despite some similarities in the types of resources available to nodes, there is very little 
‘sharing’ of these resources across nodes and the method for channelling these resources is very 
node-specific and guided by individual legal and financial frameworks. Nodes on the Flood Task 
Team highlighted during one of FliCCR’s workshops (31/01/2013) how there is often an 
overlap and duplication of services, and thus a wastage of resources because nodes do not 
interact, communicate, or define (and agree on) roles and responsibilities. For example, nodes 
argued that educational resources, which are produced and channelled in silos by the various 
nodes, are wasted because there is a large amount of very similar materials being produced 
separately and then distributed to a very small section of the population (i.e., many actors work 
in the same communities and with the same families).  
  
                                                             
74 See Appendix 11 for examples of the various materials that CCT nodes distribute on flood/health awareness. 
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Environmental Health (10/04/2013): “I have requested that [DRMC] provide us with 
some education material… because they are doing education [on flooding/flood 
risks], we are doing education [on flooding/flood risks], so why couldn’t we… do it 
together… [so we can] spread the message further.” 
 
Solid Waste Management, Water and Sanitation, and Roads and Stormwater produce their own 
pamphlets and run separate education campaigns about the dangers of throwing waste into 
stormwater drainage systems75. Similarly, the Mustadafin Foundation, the SA Red Cross, 
Environmental Health, Roads and Stormwater, DRMC, the National Disaster Management 
Centre, and Informal Settlements Management produce their own education materials on the 
health risks of flooding, the factors that cause flooding, and how residents can protect 
themselves from flooding. The lack of consolidation between actors carrying out very similar 
activities results not only in wastage of critical resources, but limits the potential for reaching 
more residents with limited resources. DRMC, for example, showed no willingness to recognise 
other nodes who also produce educational materials on flood risk reduction (e.g., the 
Mustadafin Foundation); DRMC only partner with the Jungle Theatre Company, who are paid by 
DRMC to run DRMC-approved plays about flooding/fire awareness in communities and schools 
selected by DRMC76. Other nodes (i.e., the Jungle Theatre Company, the Mustadafin Foundation, 
and Environmental Health) recognised that this type of resource (education) could be mobilised 
better, for example, if the multiple actors producing these materials partnered to produce a 
more comprehensive set of information that could then be distributed systematically across a 
wider audience. 
 
Reflecting on the capacity of local governments in high-income countries, Satterthwaite (2011) 
argues that these local governments play an integral role in providing the framework for 
planning, providing, and financing key services (e.g., infrastructure, risk reduction measures, 
etc.). In high-income countries, external actors (e.g., private companies and non-profit 
institutions) also provide some of the key services needed by cities to run efficiently, and 
citizens engage very little in the overall management of these services; although it is recognised 
that citizens are less engaged only because their expectations are met to a higher degree and 
there are adequate channels for complaints (e.g., local politicians, lawyers, ombudsmen, 
consumer groups, and watchdogs) (Satterthwaite, 2011). In contrast, Satterthwaite (2011) 
argues that local governments in low-income and some middle-income countries lack the 
                                                             
75 See Appendix 11 for examples of these educational pamphlets. 
76 In this case, The Jungle Theatre Company is a tool used by DRMC to educate communities that DRMC select and 
prioritise, using material approved/requested by DRMC; DRMC make sure that they are prominent during these 
shows, as a PR strategy.  
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institutional capacity to take on the same degree of responsibility (and present the same level of 
‘success’) as in high-income nations. Reflecting on why this is the case, Satterthwaite (2011) 
argues that cities of global South lack, for example, the institutional capacity to even fulfil their 
responsibility in terms of infrastructure and service provision, land-use management, etc. 
Ziervogel and Smit’s (2009) analysis of flood governance in Cape Town and the IFRC’s (2012) 
report on DRR legislation in South Africa support Satterthwaite’s (2011) view; they highlight 
how South Africa lacks critical governance structures and key resources to effectively govern 
and manage urban risk (Ziervogel and Smit, 2009, Satterthwaite, 2011).  
 
In light of Satterthwaite’s (2011) arguments, it is therefore critical to question whether local 
governments in cities of the global South are equipped to drive and be responsible for disaster 
governance processes. From their research in the Ekurhuleni municipality in the Gauteng 
Province of South Africa, Fatti and Patel (2013) describe how a lack of financial resources and 
information often resulted in municipal managers feeling disempowered when trying to address 
flood risk. Nodes in Cape Town felt similar disempowerment because of a lack of financial and 
human resources, insufficient staff capacity and skills to manage conflicts and carry out 
participatory DRAs, and the lack of (suitable) land in situations where relocation is the only 
viable solution for communities living in risk-prone areas.  
 
CCT nodes describe how their departments are under-staffed and under-resourced, resulting in 
nodes spreading themselves too thin and/or not being able to address all the relevant issues. A 
DRMC official (10/04/2013) explained that as the disaster manager of one designated 
geographical area (out of four), he is responsible for carrying out DRR activities in 118 informal 
settlements. Both Environmental Health officials and DRMC officials highlighted how this lack of 
human resources means that certain officials have to take on additional portfolios and roles that 
they are not equipped (e.g., not enough hours in a day, stretched finances, and lack of 
experience) to handle. Informal Settlements Management (03/12/2012) described how they 
lack the human resources to address effectively all the issues that their node is required to 
address. DRMC officials (26/03/2012, 31/01/2013, 08/04/2013) and Informal Settlements 
Management officials (03/12/2012) explained how they would often start their working day on 
one side of Cape Town and end up on the other side of the city (often more than 50 kms away 
and several hours drive in traffic). These comments reflect a lack of capacity in terms of human 
resources, and thus the need for limited numbers of staff to spread themselves very thin each 
day. This lack of human capacity impacts on the CCT’s ability to collect accurate data on flood 
risk, to conduct DRAs in all areas of Cape Town, and to understand the priorities and needs of all 
communities, especially those living in high-risk informal settlements. 
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Roads and Stormwater (08/09/2010): “[There are] high and growing numbers of 
informal settlements and people living in informal settlements, and the CCT does not 
have enough staff to collect accurate data.” 
 
DRMC officials recognise that CCT departments on the Flood Task Team also lack the human 
capital (skills and staff numbers) to carry out detailed community-based DRAs in all high-risk 
communities (10/04/2013). CCT nodes are well aware of the negative impact that this has on 
their ability to understand and respond to disaster risk in Cape Town’s informal settlements. 
One DRMC official (26/03/2012) stated that if there is no participation or contributions from 
communities when planning DRR (or other) activities, then these activities are likely to fail 
because they are not decided upon with the community and are not owned by the community. 
Taing et al. (2011) illustrate similarly from their case study on sanitation drainage systems in 
Cape Town how engineered solutions implemented in an informal settlement context often fail 
because these solutions are planned and implemented without input from local communities. 
Nodes also expressed how they are ill-equipped to engage with residents and manage many of 
the conflicts and problems that arise in informal settlements; they lacked facilitation skills, 
conflict management skills, leadership skills, and even language skills. 
 
Engineering Services (2010): “You can be the best project manager in the world, but 
if you don’t have experience of working in informal settlements… it counts for nothing. 
Because you cannot use the same methods that you use to build a stadium […] to go 
and provide services in the informal settlement. […] [To work in an informal 
settlement] you need someone who can listen to the community. […] It’s this view that 
project managers have got qualifications. Yes, but [it’s also about] people skills and 
how to get people to work with you.” 
 
The issue of a lack of capacity was highlighted by Development Services as a key concern, 
especially in terms of experience, professionals, expertise, and know-how with regard to how to 
manage disasters effectively. A Development Services official (12/06/2012) argued that as a 
department, DRMC is still very small and young, and therefore lacked the capacity and expertise 
to address disasters (such as flooding) properly. The official explained further that there is a 
lack of professionals in DRMC (i.e., researchers or staff with more than 10-15 years of 
experience in DRM) because DRMC had only officially been around for six years (in 2012), and 
that the Flood Task Team had only been around for about four years (in 2012); therefore the 
department and Task Team are still needing to grow and develop their capacity. 
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Most CCT nodes argued that the CCT lacked the funding to address flood risk across the city 
effectively. In contrast, another DRMC official (26/03/2012) argued that the CCT has enough 
financial resources, but it is “spending too much money on the wrong things”. A more senior 
DRMC official stated in response that because the CCT lacks sufficient financial resources, the 
DRAs are critical for identifying priority areas: 
 
DRMC (19/11/2010): “That’s why we have commissioned this comprehensive, 
scientific-based disaster risk assessment […] [This DRA] has highlighted what the 
major hazards are facing the city of Cape Town […] We can bring this to the attention 
of decision-makers […] to get them to make decisions on resource […] We’ve got 
limited resources, and the needs always outstrip the resources. So one of our key roles 
[as DRMC] is to bring to the fore what the major hazards are facing the city of Cape 
Town so that funding can be sourced.” 
 
Roads and Stormwater (17/04/2013) argued that they lack the resources (human, physical, and 
social) to conduct education programmes in informal settlements. This node argues that Health 
and Environmental Health are better equipped to conduct education programmes; they have 
the social capital, and are already conducting educational programmes in informal settlements 
(therefore they have the physical, financial, and human resources already). In this case, Roads 
and Stormwater argue that Environmental Health should be completely responsible for 
conducting educational programmes, rather than seeing the opportunity for both nodes to 
collaborate and develop an educational programme that meets both their needs. 
 
Environmental Health explained that because they fall under the Health directorate, they have 
to share their resources with the other departments under this directorate (e.g., Primary 
Health). They find that they have limited resources (human and financial resources, and 
authority) to address issues in informal settlements, but if they draw on their social capital with 
other officials in other CCT nodes, they can make sure that their priority issues are addressed.  
 
Environmental Health (10/04/2013): “It is sometimes quite amazing what we get 
out of the limited resources we have… [official laughs] and sometimes we have to be 
very creative. […] It is how you work with the departments and who you know […] 
We’ve got a good relationship with Water and Sanitation and they could see that 
health [is an important issue]. They’ve come for whatever we’ve reported… so… they 
give priority to address the problems.” 
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In summary, the following resources were identified from interviews as key resources that CCT 
nodes lack in the context of flood governance: 
 
 Economic capital 
o sufficient funding. 
 Human capital 
o staff (e.g., not enough staff to collect accurate data from informal 
settlements and address issues (i.e., large geographical area and high 
number of informal settlements to cover)); 
o staff training in conflict management, facilitation, and community 
engagement; 
o lack of a toolkit for conducting participatory flood risk management and 
lack of training in how to conduct participatory assessments; and 
o lack of accurate statistics on number of houses and services (and 
backlogs), and lack of actual numbers of people living in informal 
settlements (and numbers of at-risk and affected people). 
 Physical capital 
o limited land for permanent/temporary relocation. 
 Social capital 
o CCT nodes lack social capital with residents. 
 
From the findings in Cape Town, it is clear that although local government have a range of 
resources at their disposal, the high numbers of informal settlements and communities at risk 
from flooding, amongst other more pressing needs and development priorities, is stretching 
these resources to the point that they become insufficient. Stretched resources, especially in 
terms of human capital, has meant that local government officials are not sufficiently equipped 
to address all areas of disaster risk; from risk assessments, to community engagement, and 
implementing long-term, ongoing DRR plans and activities.  
 
 
2.2. Communities as central to building community resilience 
 
As shown in Section 2.1., nodes in Cape Town recognise that local government does not have all 
the necessary resources (human and physical) to address flood risk and assume responsibility 
for all levels of risk, particularly in the context of growing informal settlements and high 
CHAPTER 8: THE RESOURCES AND INSTITUTIONS ENABLING NODES TO GOVERN 
 
176 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN                                                                      JOY WADDELL  -  WDDJOY001 
numbers of at-risk communities and informal settlements. DRMC therefore wants residents to 
be more involved in DRR activities; this was exemplified in the Flood Task Team’s priority 
activities for 2013 with ‘increased engagement with residents’ highlighted as one of their top 
priorities. In the literature on community resilience, Edwards (2009) argues that in order for 
communities to build resilience, they should not rely on the government or government 
institutions. Edwards (2009) states in his UK-based report that community resilience starts 
with individuals and communities and thus the specific plans/activities that can build and/or 
strengthen community resilience should be developed and driven by these individuals and 
communities. In this understanding of community resilience, Edwards (2009:80) argues that 
governments, institutions, and organisations need to ‘let go’; they should play a very limited, 
‘behind the scenes’ role, and be invisible. However, this understanding of community resilience, 
which comes from and is aimed at the global North, assumes that communities have the 
capacities to build their own resilience and not rely on external help.  
 
In Cape Town, all nodes recognised that residents, as well as CBOs that support residents, have 
access to certain resources that they rely on to cope with and reduce flood risk (presented in 
Table 22). DRMC officials also recognise the valuable local knowledge that residents living in at-
risk informal settlements have of localised risks and issues (26/03/2012 and 10/04/2013). 
This local insight is seen by some DRMC officials as critical for understanding local priorities 
and needs, as well as developing more context-specific and informative DRAs.  
 
 
Table 22: The resources that residents and CBOs rely on to govern flood risk in Cape Town’s 
informal settlements 
Node 
Name 
Node 
Type 
Available Resources 
Sweet 
Home 
Residents 
Residents Plastic sheets to waterproof roofs, Sand, and sandbags: provided by CCT. 
Connections with building contractors who dump rubble/bricks in Sweet 
Home. Local knowledge of at-risk households and affected people. 
Sweet 
Home 
Street 
Committee 
Residents Community hall (keys/access owned by community, but built by local ward 
councillor) for temporary shelter and/or central distribution of relief. Very 
strong capital with residents and local knowledge of at-risk households and 
affected people.  
Ubuhle 
Bakha 
Ubuhle 
(UBU) 
NGO Very strong social capital with residents and knowledge of residents’ 
unique needs and priorities. Access to resources (e.g., sandbags) via 
external funding. Specialised skills and capacities that are being taught to 
residents and developed together with residents. Strong social capital with 
CCT and other NGOs partnering on the project. 
The 
Warehouse 
NGO Very strong social capital in Sweet Home. Relief (e.g., clothes, food parcels) 
provided from donations is distributed throughout the year to Sweet Home. 
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Although it is recognised by nodes in Cape Town that residents also have access to resources, 
such as social capital and local knowledge, the dominant perception by residents and nodes is 
that residents only have access to a small amount of physical/material resources because of 
financial constraints. For example, residents cited material resources that help them to ‘cope’ in 
the short-term with flood impacts, which include wheelbarrows, buckets and 240 litre refuse 
bins, corrugated iron sheeting, canvas and plastic sheets, and small amounts of rubble, stones, 
bricks, and concrete77. Residents discussed (19/03/2013) how limited financial resources 
means that they have to sell, for example, sweets, chips, and chicken feet during the summer 
months, in order to save up and buy a raincoat, wellington boots, plastic sheeting, etc., in 
preparation for winter. 
 
A resident in Sweet Home, who is more economically well-off compared to her neighbours, said 
that it was difficult to ask other residents to follow her example and take preventative measures 
in terms of flood risk; other residents would argue with her and say that just because she can 
afford to take those measures, it does not mean that they can also afford it:  
 
Sweet Home Resident (14/02/2013): “It’s not easy to tell the others [to protect their 
houses from flooding] because they are going to say, ‘where am I going to get the 
money, because I’m not working. […] If I tell them [other residents], ‘you can put the 
concrete in your shack, and maybe you can do the tiling, and having the stoep78 […] 
then they are going to ask me ‘where am I going to get that money to do that?’”  
 
Residents argued that they lack the knowledge and the resources (financial and physical) to 
protect themselves properly from flood risk, and CCT nodes concur that residents lack the skills 
and resources to protect themselves from flooding. One DRMC official (10/04/2013) explains 
how residents lack the skills and access to materials that will enable them to build appropriate 
houses/structures, and to raise their house’s floor levels, as well as the walkways between the 
houses. This official argued that even he, as someone who is educated, has access to finances 
and the right materials, and has theoretical and practical knowledge of DRR, does not have the 
right skills and expertise to raise floor levels, for example. In response, this official argues that 
the private sector needs to be involved as a way to meet their corporate responsibility targets; 
for example, construction companies and hardware stores could provide the necessary 
expertise and cheaper/free materials to help residents build flood-proof houses, in return for 
                                                             
77 For a more detailed description of the types of assets that residents from Sweet Home access and rely on to cope 
with flood risk, see Desportes (2014). 
78 South African term for a small porch/veranda that wraps around the front of a house; normally surrounding the 
front door. 
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tax incentives by local government. This DRMC official also stated that because residents living 
in RDP houses lack financial resources, they are unable to take out insurance against flooding or 
fires; therefore, he argues that insurance companies should also be involved.  
 
As a result of a lack of financial resources, Sweet Home residents (19/03/2013) describe how 
they increasingly rely on social capital to cope with and reduce flood risk. This social capital is in 
the form of neighbours who help them, free of charge, to dig trenches around their house to 
divert stormwater runoff. Many residents (19/03/2013) also describe how they ‘know 
someone’ who drives rubble trucks and can drop off the rubble they require to raise their 
house’s floor levels or the levels of community paths. 
 
In contrast to Edwards’ understanding of how to build resilient communities, Davoudi 
(2012:305) argues that rolling back state support in order to build community resilience is a 
“misguided translation of self-organisation in ecological systems into self-reliance in social 
systems”. I argue that Edwards’ (2009) approach is particularly detrimental in cities of the 
global South where a large number of at-risk communities live in areas that lack critical 
resources such as infrastructure, tenure, and economic capital, and therefore need the support 
that governments and external institutions can offer. Therefore, any support from government 
within these contexts should not be seen as a negative process that might erode community 
resilience, but as an essential part of building community resilience.  
 
Berkes and Ross (2013) argue that an important component of community resilience is the 
individual’s or community’s strengths: individual/community resilience is seen as a continual, 
non-linear personal development process of developing individual or community strengths. 
These strengths include social networks, social inclusion and social support (i.e., social capital), 
learning, readiness to accept change and their outlook on life (mentalities), and leadership 
(Berkes and Ross, 2013). Jones et al. (2010b) takes this further, arguing that increasing a 
community or individual’s adaptive capacity should be central to any local-level adaptation 
interventions (i.e., building a community’s resilience). In the context of building the resilience of 
communities to disaster risk, strengthening the capacity of communities and individuals to ‘self-
organise’ means not only including residents and communities in disaster governance 
processes, but developing the adaptive capacities of communities so that they are able to 
organise themselves when there is a crisis or a potential crisis. In this thesis, self-organising 
refers to communities’ capacity to access and mobilise particular resources and technologies, as 
well as government’s support (i.e., in terms of policies, resources, networks, etc.). Pelling 
(1999:250), for example, argues that the capacity of individuals and groups to adapt to hazard 
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stress is rooted in these actors’ ability to “compete for access to rights, resources, and assets”. 
Cutter et al. (2003) support this, seeing the lack of access to resources, which include 
information, knowledge, and technology, as one of the major factors influencing social 
vulnerability. 
 
 
2.3. Multi-actor networks as central to building community resilience 
 
Berkes and Ross’s (2013) interpretation of community resilience places a lot of the 
responsibility of building resilience on the community and individuals. Although this approach 
recognises that communities do not control all of the conditions that might affect them and that 
communities can change many (but not all) of the conditions that can impact on their resilience, 
this interpretation does not place enough emphasis on the embedded nature of communities in 
broader socio-political, economic, and environmental contexts. In an informal settlement 
context, for example, the ability of communities to strengthen their resilience is highly 
dependent on these broader processes. Informal settlement residents’ ability to voice their 
concerns/needs and access resources is often limited, silenced, or denied because of broader 
socio-political and economic processes. Davidson (2013) argues that discussions on resilience 
need to take into consideration the broader global issues and trends that, for example, heighten 
uncertainty levels and reduce the availability of key physical resources. Davidson (2013) also 
argues for more serious contemplation of system complexity and the over-complex 
interconnectedness of systems (i.e., community-level to system-level); for example, when 
selecting a unit of analysis (e.g., community level), researchers should be cognisant of the fact 
that these units are connected and not independent.  
 
Figure 23 presents how I conceptualise community resilience from a disaster governance 
approach. In this figure, emphasis is placed on the equal role that multiple actors (including 
residents but not limited to the community only) play in building resilience. The networks 
formed between local and national government, the community, NGOs, and other external 
actors are agued to all be equally important in terms of their roles in contributing, accessing, 
and mobilising resources amongst themselves and to the community. In the literature on 
community resilience, the emphasis is often on the role of individuals and communities (top left 
corner of Figure 23), with some authors placing the community and their needs in the centre 
(see: Berkes and Ross, 2013, Desportes, 2014), or others arguing that communities can only be 
truly resilient if they are able to remove any reliance on other actors (Edwards, 2009). I argue 
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that in the context of informal settlements, the broader responsibilities and capacities of actors 
beyond just the community and local government are critical to address the multi-faceted, 
complex, and interconnected issues. Not one actor is equipped fully to address disaster risk; 
resources and adaptive capacities (physical, human, financial, etc.), expertise and knowledge, 
social capital, and policy (institutional structures) are all needed and these cannot all be 
contributed by a single or even a small number of actors.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Conceptualisation of community resilience from a disaster governance perspective 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
 
 
As explored in Desportes’ (2014) thesis on community resilience of Sweet Home informal 
settlement in Cape Town, and our more recent but related paper (Desportes et al., 2015), the 
ability of Sweet Home to withstand and recover from floods is: 
 
1. constrained by broader socio-political and economic processes; and  
2. strengthened when community members are able to interact with and access 
resources from external actors: e.g., CCT departments and politicians (e.g., ward 
councillor), residents and community groups within the community (e.g., 
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savings or church groups), CSOs/CBOs/NGOs, and actors from the private sector 
(e.g., the Media, service providers, retailers, and academic institutions).  
 
Networks with actors outside of Sweet Home therefore enable the community to access and 
mobilise resources that their community lacks otherwise (e.g., pump trucks from Roads and 
Stormwater to unblock stormwater drainage systems). These networks also enable residents to 
benefit from external support (e.g., awareness-raising and health-related activities provided by 
CCT departments and NGOs). Although residents often argued that they lack the resources and 
know-how to reduce their risk to annual flooding, some residents were seen to be more 
‘resourceful’ in terms of using their social capital and savings to address flood risk.  
 
In my conceptualisation of community resilience, which goes beyond looking at communities in 
isolation, external actors such as NGOs, researchers, and the private sector, play a two-fold role 
in mobilising diverse resources. On the one hand, these external actors have access to and can 
therefore mobilise resources that are unavailable to the local government and residents: e.g., 
access to people skilled in facilitation, conflict resolution, DRAs, innovative ideas (e.g., sandbag 
housing by UBU in Cape Town), etc. On the other hand, external actors, particularly NGOs and 
community-based researchers, have social capital, which is an important resource for building 
linkages and maintaining rapport with and trust between actors. These networks, particularly 
with external NGOs and actors outside of the local context, all play a critical role in accessing 
scarce resources that might not be otherwise accessible to local actors.  
 
Stoker (1998) argues that no single node has enough resources to govern; therefore, in any 
governance process, nodes need to exchange or share resources and negotiate their common 
purposes (common goals) in order to achieve the desired outcome. One of the central 
arguments in this thesis is that disaster governance, which is defined as a multi-actor 
networked approach to managing disaster risk, is a better alternative to managing disasters 
than traditional, hierarchical, and state-centric approaches. This argument draws on the 
organisational sociologist Powell (1990), who argues that networks enable multiple actors with 
unique resources to mobilise diverse resources through reciprocal, mutual exchanges. Viewed 
as a network of actors shaping events, I argue that disaster governance is a process that enables 
multiple actors to access and channel diverse resources in a way that helps to address complex 
socio-ecological problems. In governance theory, networks between actors are seen as the 
preferred approach for addressing complex issues because they bring together different actors 
who have access to diverse resources that can then be shared and channelled to actors who do 
not have the same capacities or access (Tierney, 2012). Pieterse (2008:5) packages this idea 
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well, arguing that governance “boils down to questions of control over decision-making about 
how resources are used in a sea of competing and different interests”. Tierney (2012:343) 
argues that networks are best-suited to tackling complex socio-environmental problems such as 
disasters and climate change because they are “flexible, adaptable, and capable of mobilising 
diverse resources”.  
 
In Berkes’ (2007) discussion on the conditions necessary for making a system resilient, he 
emphasises the need for actors to access particular resources. The resources that Berkes (2007) 
argues are critical for building resilience include social and ecological memory from experiences 
of past events (i.e., knowledge and information), a diversity of partnerships (i.e., social capital), 
and scientific and indigenous/local knowledge. Berkes (2007) argues that a resilient system is 
one that creates opportunities for self-organisation and re-organisation, which can be achieved 
by strengthening the capacity of communities (and cities) to socially and politically organise 
themselves in the face of a disaster. This implies that the community (or city) has access to 
physical and financial resources, which will allow them to protect themselves from disasters, 
survive during a disaster event, and eventually recover (to a certain extent) from the disaster.  
 
This understanding of what makes a system resilient also implies that communities (and cities) 
have social and political capital, which allows them to connect with external actors and 
institutions and access and channel external/diverse resources. Case studies at the household 
level in El Salvador (Wamsler, 2007), India (Chatterjee, 2010), and Bangladesh (Jabeen et al., 
2010) highlight how social support networks are critical for these households to increase their 
household resilience. Communities that are part of a network with external actors are argued to 
be more resilient because these networks allow them to access critical resources in the form of 
physical, social, political, economic, natural, and human capital. Access to these resources 
enables communities and households to self-organise and re-organise in the face of a disaster 
event, and strengthen their adaptive capacities, which essentially helps them to prepare for, 
cope with, and recover from disaster events (Berkes and Ross, 2013, Desportes, 2014).  
 
The arguments for whether local government or communities should drive DRR is often based 
on whether either entity has the capacity (in terms of resources) to manage DRR activities or 
whether the reliance on one entity or another erodes their capacity (in terms of resilience). This 
view that it should be one actor’s responsibility to plan and carry out DRR activities, whether 
the community only or the government only, is problematic for several reasons:  
 
CHAPTER 8: THE RESOURCES AND INSTITUTIONS ENABLING NODES TO GOVERN 
 
183 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN                                                                      JOY WADDELL  -  WDDJOY001 
1. the very definition of a disaster is “a serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic, or 
environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own resources” (UNISDR, 2009a). A 
disaster therefore impacts on a community or system to the extent that the 
community/system needs external support; 
2. the complexity and multi-faceted nature of urban disaster risk requires a 
diversity of technologies and resources, which include knowledge, information, 
and expertise, to tackle the problem effectively; and 
3. not one actor has all of the necessary resources (Stoker, 1998), and therefore 
actors need to collaborate in order to pool diverse resources and channel them 
to where they are needed most. 
 
Therefore, a critical shift in thinking and practice needs to take place, particularly in the context 
of Cape Town and cities of the global South, where the government and communities are no 
longer placed on either end of the spectrum (i.e., top-down vs. bottom-up DRR, state vs. 
community’s responsibility, etc.) with an either-or approach to DRM. A disaster governance 
approach, which is polycentric in nature, places the emphasis on the collaborative roles that 
multiple actors should play, equally, in contributing towards decision-making and allocating 
resources. The underlying assumption here is that each actor has a role to play, with access to 
unique resources, and by bringing these multiple actors together, they are able to play the role 
that they are strongest in, and contribute those resources that they have access to: scientific and 
engineering experts, for example, can provide the engineering and scientific know-how and 
technology, while government institutions can provide critical planning, policies, and finances, 
and particular NGOs and private sector actors can provide necessary skills and services. 
 
The ability of communities to self-organise and re-organise should not be seen as a process that 
is removed from the political dimension; since their ability to self-organise is embedded in 
socio-political processes, it is itself a very political process. Welsh (2014:20) argues that the 
reports and campaigns by the UNISDR’s ‘Making Cities Resilient’ and ICLEI’s ‘Resilient Cities’ 
programme based their understanding of resilience on the “normative assumption that 
communities can and should self-organise to deal with uncertainty, that uncertainty is a given 
[and] not something with a political dimension, and the role of government is limited to 
enabling, shaping and supporting, but specifically not to direct or to fund those processes”. I 
argue instead that the role of the government in informal settlements is critical for helping to 
support (through financial and physical resources) communities to build their resilience. This is 
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particularly critical in cities of the global South and in informal settlement contexts because of 
the lack of adequate planning and policies to manage these informal settlements and the lack of 
sufficient critical infrastructure to reduce recurrent risks (e.g., stormwater infrastructure and 
high runoff levels). 
 
 
3. THE (IN)FORMAL STRUCTURES AND POLICIES THAT ENABLE 
NODES TO GOVERN 
 
In the Cape Town case study, majority of the nodes felt very strongly that flood management in 
Cape Town was constrained not only because of resource constraints, but because of 
institutional challenges (e.g., lack of capacity, coordination, and public engagement). Figure 24 
illustrates what CCT nodes perceive the most salient constraints to be in terms of addressing 
flood risk in Cape Town. Although Roads and Stormwater felt that flood management in Cape 
Town was constrained due to both resource constraints and institutional challenges, most 
nodes identified institutional challenges as a key barrier to addressing flood risk across the city.  
 
 
 
Figure 24: Nodes' perceptions of the current constraints to addressing flood risk in Cape Town79 
 
 
The above findings highlight that there are institutions, which are often political or influenced 
by socio-political agendas, that impact on the ability of nodes to govern. Even if the particular 
resources that nodes have or lack are understood, it is also critical to understand which 
institutional structures are available, missing, or not functioning effectively. Added to this is also 
                                                             
79 See Appendix 12 for the original list of questions and responses by nodes represented on the Flood Task Team. 
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the need to understand the socio-political and institutional structures that might enable or 
prevent these actors from mobilising resources and engaging in reciprocal and mutually 
supportive actions. These answers are not simple, especially in the highly politicised and 
complex context of informal settlements, because questions of who should be involved are 
closely related to the types of resources needed, who has access to these resources (which is 
embedded in power relations and politics), and what institutional frameworks exist and/or are 
needed to channel those resources (which are also highly politicised). A discussion on the 
capacities of nodes to govern is therefore not just about the availability of resources, but the 
methods for accessing, mobilising, and channelling resources (i.e., the institutions). From a 
nodal governance approach, I argue that the institutional structures are key to ‘why’ nodes do 
not have access to certain resources, ‘how’ they are able to access resources in particular ways, 
and therefore understanding the conditions needed to enable nodes to share and pool 
resources.  
 
From a nodal governance approach, nodes are understood to draw on particular institutions. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, institutions include the formal and/or informal structures in place 
that shape a node’s mandate (mentality) and enable them to direct resources and technologies 
over time. These institutions include a variety of organisational forms, including legislation and 
policies, and other types of ‘organised’ groups, whether formal or informally recognised by the 
government, and/or temporary or permanent (e.g., the CCT and its overall structure, the Flood 
Task Team, the subcouncil/ward council structure, and the structure of the street committee in 
communities). The concept of institutions in this thesis is extended to include regulatory and 
legislative frameworks (e.g., policies, by-laws, contracts, and acts) because it is recognised that 
these frameworks structure how nodes can direct resources and technologies. 
 
The following subsections highlight examples of institutions from the Cape Town case study 
that I argue are often problematic and impact on the ability of nodes, whether local government, 
communities, or external nodes, to access and channel resources. 
 
 
3.1. Formal versus informal institutions: Problematic forms of public 
participation 
 
Drawing on organisational theory, Lipson (2005) argues that there are both formal and informal 
types of coordination: formal types represent any explicit, formalised assignment of authority 
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and responsibility, and specification (and standardisation) of standards and procedures, 
whereas informal coordination is more spontaneous, developing through ad hoc responses and 
social networks. Formal and informal networks can complement each other, with each network 
depending on the other to function effectively. Lipson (2005) recognises that formal and 
informal networks can be in conflict, as informal networks can disrupt formal measures and 
dysfunctional formal arrangements can inhibit the useful outcomes of informal networks. In the 
case of Cape Town, the formal and informal institutions that nodes rely on to exert influence and 
channel resources are in conflict, with nodes choosing to either bypass the ‘contested’ 
institutions, or create alternative structures to address the problematic ones.  
 
In Cape Town there is much contestation by the various nodes with regard to the recognition of 
some of the institutions that certain nodes invoke. In particular, there is contestation about the 
mechanism through which the CCT should engage with communities, and how communities 
should engage with residents. The most salient example of this is the street committees and 
local, self-elected leaders in informal settlements and how residents recognise this informal 
institution as a viable mode for channelling complaints/demands and resources. While some 
CCT nodes see this institution as a vital and viable channel through which to engage with 
residents, most CCT nodes do not recognise this institution and try to bypass or undermine it. 
Not all officials/individuals in each CCT department agree on how to approach the institution of 
the street committees; there seems to be a general agreement amongst more senior personnel 
(i.e., those that do not necessarily work ‘in the field’ and are placed in a more removed, 
strategic/planning role) that this institution should be avoided, bypassed, or ignored 
completely. On the other hand, CCT officials ‘on the ground’ (i.e., field officers who work at the 
community level to implement and monitor activities/issues) see this institution as critical to 
effective engagement and positive outcomes of activities.  
 
DRMC (01/03/2013) senior official: “[Residents have] got a political structure 
within their environment, […] most of the times… that structure constrains us [CCT 
officials]. You can’t have a structure that’ll bypass my structure as a politically elected 
person of this particular area. […] the [street] committee was elected by community. 
But [at] the end of the day, the committee is not presenting the community as they 
supposed to be.” 
 
DRMC (29/11/2011) field officer: “What the community do… they will inform the 
community leader on the ground. The community leader will inform the ward 
councillor. […] the community leader or the ward councillor [… will] phone the toll-
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free number [107] or the disaster operations centre. […] We would contact the 
community leader or the ward councillor when an official goes out to deal with the 
right person. […] Whatever decision gets taken there, we would do it through the ward 
councillor and community leaders.” 
 
Some CCT officials do not liaise with the local leaders/street committees, but engage directly 
with residents, whether it is to assess risk in particular settlements, implement solutions, carry 
out educational campaigns, or hand out relief. This often leads to conflict between nodes, 
officials or NGO representatives being kicked out of the informal settlements, project delays, 
vandalism of infrastructure, and/or stalemates. On the one hand, committees and community 
leaders are recognised as a mechanism for engaging with communities and solving disputes, but 
on the other hand, they are seen as the source of the challenges, delayed/vandalised services, 
and political interference.  
 
CCT nodes expressed their frustration with the seemingly non-transparent, confusing/complex, 
and/or transient (informal) leadership structures and processes at the community level. This is 
an issue that Drivdal (2014, 2015) explores at length in her research. Although formal 
institutions and the state might seem to have very little or no administrative control within 
informal settlements, Pieterse (2008) argues that informal settlement communities should not 
be seen as ‘ungoverned’. Informal settlements have informal and multiple layers of governing 
that are socially constructed and highly political80 (Pieterse, 2008, Drivdal, 2014, Drivdal, 2015). 
Drivdal (2014, 2015) finds that government officials in Cape Town are confounded by the often 
blurred and internally contested roles of community leaders, which in turn impacts on their 
ability to implement, maintain, and/or collaborate on proposed plans/activities. These transient 
and blurred leadership structures at the community level often result in conflict and 
misunderstandings between residents and within communities, and with CCT nodes and 
external nodes (e.g., NGOs). This conflict is a result of the ‘correct’ local leadership (i.e., as 
perceived by residents) not being consulted or engaged with, or the local leadership being 
avoided completely and bypassed by CCT and external nodes.  
 
CCT nodes prefer to use the ward committee and subcouncils as the formal institution for public 
engagement; the ward committee and subcouncils are recognised by CCT nodes as local 
government’s (and the CCT’s) interface with communities. The ward committees, which are 
made up of rate-payers’ associations and other community organisations, have various 
                                                             
80 See Pieterse (2008:33-34) for examples of these informal types of governing. Also see Drivdal’s (2014) doctoral 
thesis on the governance structures that exist in informal settlements. 
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‘portfolios’ that are managed by individuals who are elected from the community (i.e., not 
involved in the CCT). These subcouncils meet regularly and the ward committees are 
represented at these meetings. In formal, higher-income areas of Cape Town, this institution for 
public engagement is functioning adequately, but nodes recognise that the opposite is true in 
informal settlement contexts. 
 
DRMC (01/03/2013): “My understanding is that it [the ward committee/subcouncil 
structure for public engagement] is not functioning the way it should. […] …in the 
informal settlement environment, where […] the hazards and threats are much higher 
[…] those [public engagement] structures don’t exist. And there’s a frustration for the 
community, that they do not have a voice. And the conversation [that we need to have 
about this] is… how do you actually get their voice heard? And how do you address 
issues of broad representation? How do you address issues of logistics and costs? And 
how do people [from informal settlements] get to the [meeting] when you haven’t got 
bus fares and train fares, etc., etc.?”  
 
Despite legal requirements that ward councillors and ward committees remain non-partisan 
(Piper and Deacon, 2008), the ward councillor and ward committee are highly politicised 
institutions, which one ward councillor saw as the key problem with the current structure. Each 
ward is made up of multiple Voting Districts (VDs); depending on the tally of votes from each 
voting district, a particular political party will ‘win’ the entire ward, even if a minority of VDs 
had majority votes for a competing political party. In the case of Ward 80, where Sweet Home is 
located, majority of the VDs within Ward 80 had voted for the ruling ANC political party and an 
ANC ward councillor. In the case of Sweet Home, the ward councillor knows that he (and the 
ANC political party he belongs to) did not get a majority vote from the Sweet Home VD. Sweet 
Home residents argue that as a result, this ward councillor penalises them for not supporting 
him with their votes; this ward councillor allegedly does not engage with them, does not 
channel critical resources to them, and does not respond to their complaints/issues81. Despite 
FliCCR’s invitations to participate in its workshops and engagement with residents in Sweet 
Home, for example, this ward councillor did not attend/participate. 
 
 As Sacks (2014) argues in his report on this issue, the frustrations that Sweet Home residents 
have felt with regard to their ward councillor, which are compounded by the lack of adequate 
service delivery and regular maintenance of infrastructure (e.g., blocked stormwater drainage), 
have resulted in some community members seeing protest action and marches as their only 
                                                             
81 For a report on this situation, see Sacks (2014). 
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means of ‘being heard’ and demanding resources and services from the CCT. Smit (2004) and 
Graham (2006) find that high levels of contestation, as seen in Cape Town with regard to service 
delivery, result in lots of interruptions, delays, and essentially obstructs any attempts to 
implement long-term strategies.  
 
The above findings highlight the problematic and contested nature of the available formal and 
informal institutions for public participation in Cape Town. In response to these problematic 
institutional structures, nodes often bypass formally recognised institutional structures or 
create alternative, informal institutions that exacerbate instead of solve the underlying 
problems. These contested institutions for public participation impact on the ability of CCT 
nodes to assess and understand the needs and priorities of residents, and prevent CCT nodes 
from channelling critical resources to residents and communities in need. These problematic 
institutions also prevent residents from communicating with local government and from 
accessing the necessary support from government, which I have argued is essential for building 
community resilience. 
 
Closely related to the contested institutions for public participation is the lack of monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms of these problematic institutions. Nodes argued that there is a lack 
of monitoring structures of ward councillors, of contractors providing services on behalf of the 
CCT, as well as the local leadership in the informal settlements. This lack of monitoring creates 
problems of accountability and transparency, as well as nurturing a culture of distrust, 
disillusionment, and blame. On one level, there are no monitoring structures in place to ensure 
that ward councillors, the formal representatives of and interface between the CCT and 
residents, which often results in ward councillors not carrying out their duties and supporting 
the needs of all the residents. 
 
 
3.2. Institutions that undermine collaborative processes 
 
Botha and Van Niekerk (2013:7) highlight from their research in South Africa how “there does 
not seem to be any form of cooperation between the government departments with regard to 
disaster prevention”. This issue of collaborative versus silo-based approaches was raised by all 
of the nodes; with some nodes seeing the Flood Task Team as a great example of how 
departments have managed to work together and cooperate, whilst other nodes still express 
concerns of silo-based approaches despite this multi-actor platform. Some nodes expressed how 
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there might be a certain level of collaboration between CCT departments, but with regards to 
CCT nodes working with external nodes such as NGOs, CBOs, and residents, there is very little 
cooperation:  
 
SA Red Cross (01/03/2013): “There’s a lot that’s been done by various organisations, 
by various practitioners, universities and entities such like that. But I think we not 
talking to each other… I think everyone’s working in silos, and… we are overlapping… 
instead of getting together and finding what the best practices [are].” 
 
CCT nodes highlighted that although they see collaboration between nodes as critical for 
accessing and mobilising diverse resources from multiple actors, there are many institutional 
challenges to overcoming silo-based approaches. Roads and Stormwater (31/01/2013) 
explained how each CCT department has to work with specific objectives (mandates), which do 
not always match other departments’ objectives. Therefore, an issue or activity that might be a 
priority for one department might not be for another, which makes cooperation between CCT 
departments very challenging. DRMC (31/01/2013) explains how this lack of cooperation 
because of mandates is also reinforced by a lack of cooperation and sharing of budgets. 
Individual departments have separate budget allocations and budgetary priorities; even though 
a department might concur with another department on a particular issue (i.e., educating 
communities about flood risk), the department might not be able to prioritise that issue in their 
budget (i.e., Roads and Stormwater’s budget might be dedicated to stormwater system upgrades 
in a particular year, leaving very little budget for education).  
 
The CCT’s legal and institutional framework for guiding procurement processes, such as tender 
processes for new and existing services (e.g., installation of chemical toilets) and projects (e.g., 
EPWP), dictate which external actors CCT departments can establish relationships with, and 
how (De Visser, 2012, Ziervogel et al., 2014b). De Visser (2012) argues that this formal, 
institutional structure can be a barrier to more innovative forms of collaboration between the 
CCT and external actors, especially with external actors not recognised by the CCT. 
 
Another challenging issue highlighted by various CCT nodes is the misalignment of political and 
administrative boundaries across Cape Town; the different CCT departments have divided the 
city into different administrative/operational boundaries or areas, which do not align with one 
another or with the wards and/or voting districts (political boundaries). A senior DRMC official 
(31/01/2013) explains how these boundaries, which were inherited, creates unnecessary 
confusion. 
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DRMC (31/01/2013): “There’s a complete mismatch [between political and 
departmental boundaries]. The subcouncils has got wards and the subcouncils are 
responsible for monitoring and promoting projects and programmes to eliminate risk. 
[…] [But] the different departments within the CCT have different boundaries. For 
example, DRMC has got four boundaries, four major areas. Health has got eight. You 
guys? [talking to another CCT department] 8? It’s all different? [person nods]. It’s 
actually ridiculous! And the subcouncils’ boundaries misaligned to that, layered on top 
of that!” 
 
DRMC (31/01/2013): “When there was re-organisation of the CCT, it was one of the 
issues that was left open. The individual departments were given the opportunity to 
restructure [the city] to their own needs and suggestions. We find in hindsight now 
[…] one shouldn’t have been given that choice. The individual boundaries of the area 
districts should have been pre-decided and enforced on everybody. In our instance, two 
Health districts is equal to one DRMC boundary. The deficiency is that your 
counterparts on that particular service is not always the same. Or you get confused on 
who it should actually be.” 
 
DRMC officials also argued that their placement within the CCT structure as a line function (grey 
box in Figure 25) impacts on their ability to make decisions and implement actions and better 
integrate DRR plans across all sectors and departments. This placement also impacts on the 
nodes’ ability to access particular resources, distribute these resources across departments who 
are attempting to collaboratively address flood risk via the Flood Task Team, and make 
decisions across departments about these resources and day-to-day activities. Although the 
Flood Task Team is a formalised institutional structure for bringing CCT nodes together to 
address flood risk collaboratively, this Task Team is made up of individual departments who all 
have their own reporting and financial structures. Therefore, any decisions or activities made by 
the Flood Task need to be allocated to individual departments who then have to take these 
decisions back to their own department and directorate before they can be actioned. DRMC 
argue that in order for their department to raise their decision-making power and to be able to 
better integrate DRR plans across all sectors, they need to be placed in the City Manager’s office. 
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Figure 25: Formal structure of the CCT82 (‘line functions’, such as DRMC, fall within the grey box 
labelled ‘departments’) 
(Source: Joy Waddell) 
 
 
The above findings highlight how node-specific and non-aligned institutions within the CCT 
create and exacerbate silo-based, non-collaborative approaches. DRMC’s placement within local 
government structures, for example, is an institutional mechanism that limits their capacity to 
coordinate interdepartmental activities, and therefore access and mobilise resources from and 
to multiple actors outside of their department. Although the Flood Task Team is a type of 
collaborative institution that the CCT has created to enable multiple departments to collaborate, 
the department/directorate-specific reporting, financial, and administrative structures 
undermine their ability to collaborate. These findings highlight how even though nodes might 
have access to particular resources and might pool and share resources with multiple nodes 
through networks and a collaborative governance approach, institutional structures play a key 
role in determining the access to and mobilisation of these resources. For example, without 
formalised, recognised communication and public participation channels at the local level, or 
transparency, monitoring, and accountability of existing institutions, problems related to 
sharing critical resources will arise. Therefore, in order to ensure that multiple nodes can access 
and mobilise resources, problematic and contested institutions need to be addressed, and 
institutions that enable nodes to access and mobilise resources need to be strengthened.  
 
                                                             
82 For a more detailed organogram of the CCT and the various departments (line functions) that fall under separate 
directorates, see Appendix 7 and 8. 
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4. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I explored the disagreement that exists in the literature and in Cape Town on 
whether local government or local communities are best equipped to drive the planning and 
implementation of DRR activities. I explored how governance theory recognises that different 
actors have access to different resources and by bringing these multiple actors together via 
networks, a diversity of resources can be pooled, shared, and mobilised more effectively. I 
argued that in the context of informal settlements, the broader responsibilities and capacities of 
actors beyond just the community and local government are critical to address the multi-
faceted, complex, and interconnected issues related to disaster governance. Not one actor is 
equipped fully to address the issue; the resources and adaptive capacities (physical, human, 
financial, etc.), expertise and knowledge, social capital, and policy (institutional structures) are 
all needed and these cannot all be contributed by a single or even a small number of actors. I 
emphasised that communities who are part of a network with external actors are more resilient 
because these networks allow them to access critical resources, which enable them to self-
organise and re-organise in the face of a disaster event, and strengthen their capacity to prepare 
for, cope with, and recover from disaster events. 
 
I demonstrated that no single node has all the required capacities to address flood risk in Cape 
Town; thus, in order to strengthen flood governance, one needs to identify what the constraints 
are in terms of nodes’ resources and capacities, and the institutional structures available (or 
lacking) for accessing particular resources. I claimed that the process of identifying the available 
and missing resources, through a nodal governance approach, can help to strengthen disaster 
governance because it allows one to take a critical look at what resources each actor has and 
needs, and thus which actors need to be included in governance processes to provide and share 
any critical, missing resources.  
 
Finally, I also considered the formal and informal institutional structures that actors work 
within to access and channel resources, and the impact that these structures have on the ability 
of actors to mobilise resources and coordinate activities. I explored how the institutional 
structures that currently exist in Cape Town for nodes to access and channel resources are 
problematic and often contested. In response to these problematic institutional structures, 
nodes were seen to either bypass formally recognised institutional structure or create 
alternative, informal institutions that exacerbate instead of solve the underlying problems. I 
claimed that these contested institutions for public participation impact on the ability of CCT 
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nodes to assess and understand the needs and priorities of residents, prevent CCT nodes from 
channelling critical resources to residents and communities in need, and prevent residents from 
communicating with local government and from accessing the necessary support from 
government. I argued how node-specific and non-aligned institutions within the CCT create and 
exacerbate silo-based, non-collaborative approaches. 
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CHAPTER NINE:  
 
STRENGTHENING COLLABORATION: THE ROLE OF 
MULTI-ACTOR PLATFORMS, INTERMEDIARIES, 
AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter eight, I highlighted how neither local government nor communities in informal 
settlements are fully equipped to drive DRM, but both groups of actors have access to some of 
the key sets of resources. Not only does this mean that both sets of actors need to be brought to 
the table in order to manage disaster risk effectively, but other external actors who have access 
to unique resources that local government and communities cannot access on their own also 
need to be brought in. In this chapter, I argue that bringing multiple actors together does not 
necessarily mean that they will be able to collaborate or share resources because of various 
obstacles that challenge collaboration. Drawing on Ekstrom et al.’s (2011) barriers to 
adaptation framework, I highlight what some of the obstacles to collaborative disaster 
governance are in the Cape Town case study, from a nodal governance approach. I argue that 
understanding the barriers to collaborative governance in the Cape Town case study can 
advance an understanding of the types of barriers that cities in the global South can and do face 
in their disaster governance context.  
 
In this chapter, I consider the role that multi-actor platforms, inclusive partnerships, and 
intermediaries can play in addressing the barriers to collaborative disaster governance that 
were found in Cape Town. I argue that multi-actor platforms can bring multiple actors together 
into spaces that enable dialogue, knowledge-co-production, and collective action. I consider the 
role of multi-actor platforms in connecting multiple actors, and enabling them to articulate their 
diverse needs and capacities and more effectively access and channel resources. The discussion 
is framed using the concept of ‘spaces of participation’ and how inclusive spaces need to be 
created that allow actors, with varying degrees of power, to come together to frame and address 
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disaster governance issues. Insights from the FliCCR project83 are included to reflect on the 
process of bringing multiple actors together into spaces that enabled dialogue on issues of flood 
governance specifically and collaborative governance more broadly. The chapter ends with a 
brief discussion on the need for partnerships with external actors (e.g., NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs), 
who bring with them critical resources such as social capital, and can thus help to play a key 
intermediary role between local government and communities. Finally, the chapter highlights 
the importance of social capital that intermediaries can provide, which I argue is critical for 
enabling collaborative processes to take place.  
 
 
2. ADDRESSING THE BARRIERS TO DISASTER GOVERNANCE 
 
In this thesis, the concept of disaster governance emphasises the diversity of actors working 
collectively towards a common goal (i.e., managing disasters). Although I have argued that 
multi-actor collaboration and networks are essential for strengthening the resilience of at-risk 
communities, my research in Cape Town highlighted that there are many obstacles that inhibit 
these actors’ ability to collaboratively manage risk. Well documented in the literature are the 
challenges of bringing multiple actors together onto common decision-making platforms 
because of ideological differences between these actors, actors not seeing eye-to-eye on 
complex issues, and actors not always having the same priorities (Stoker, 2004, Warner et al., 
2006, Isandla Institute, 2011, Fatti and Patel, 2013). Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis 
highlighted how actors’ mentalities, non-standardised definitions of the nature of the problem, 
unclear roles and responsibilities, a lack of resources, and problematic institutional structures 
can impact on the ability of nodes to collaborate and engage in ongoing consensus-building 
processes.  
 
In order to understand what these obstacles are and how they can hinder collaborative 
processes, I draw on Ekstrom et al.’s (2011) ‘barriers to adaptation framework’ (as explored in 
Chapter Four of this thesis). Barriers are defined by Ekstrom et al. (2011:1) as “obstacles that 
delay, divert, or temporarily block the… [given] process, but which can be overcome with 
concerted effort, creative management, change of thinking, prioritisation, and any related shifts 
                                                             
83 A reminder that this research formed part of the broader Flooding in Cape Town under Climate Risk (FliCCR) 
project. This three-and-a-half-year project (2010-2013) aimed to identify actors involved in inland flood 
management and sea-level rise, and to explore the potential for collaborative mechanisms of flood and sea-level rise 
management, at both municipal and local community levels. How my research fitted within the broader FliCCR 
project is summarised in Chapter Five and details of the workshops conducted as part of the FliCCR project are 
presented in Appendix 6. 
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in resources, land uses, or institutions.” In order to understand what barriers there might be to 
disaster governance, I re-frame an understanding of these barriers from a nodal governance 
approach, as barriers emerging from a node’s mentalities, resources, technologies, and 
institutions. Table 23 presents the barriers to collaborative disaster governance that were 
identified from the Cape Town case study, using the nodal governance framework. 
 
 
Table 23: Barriers to disaster governance in Cape Town from a nodal governance approach 
Barrier 
Type 
Details 
M
e
n
ta
li
ti
e
s 
- Multiple, unclear definitions of the nature of the risk or the disaster/problem by all nodes 
- Insufficient understanding by nodes of each other’s actual needs or priorities; often these 
needs/priorities change, and nodes do not re-assess or keep up-to-date on changing 
needs/priorities 
- Unclear/contested roles, mandates and responsibility within/between nodes 
- Distrust and negative perception of plans/activities implemented by other nodes 
- Unrealistic expectations by residents (i.e., all levels of risk are the government’s 
responsibility)  
- Perception from all nodes that the issue is too complex/overwhelming to address 
- Local government’s fear of vitriolic attacks prevents them from engaging with residents 
R
e
so
u
rc
e
s 
- Nodes lack capacity in terms of appropriate skills for engagement, conflict management, 
facilitation, and leadership skills 
- Nodes lack the human and financial resources for on-going, long-term engagement processes  
- Local government lacks the social capital to engage with and partner with communities 
T
e
ch
n
o
lo
g
ie
s 
- Lack of transparency with regard to processes (e.g., local government not informed about 
who local community leaders are; residents not informed about DRR plans or DRAs) 
- Lack of adequate advertising of important meetings and workshops, resulting in many 
residents missing out on important opportunities to be heard by and to learn from local 
government 
- Participation and engagement is a lengthy, time-consuming process that requires 
commitment and resources from all nodes 
- Local government tries to bypass community-based leadership during planning and 
implementation phases, which results in conflict, delays, vandalism, and stalemates. 
- Residents excluded from problem framing and not consulted during risk assessments; 
residents not allowed to participate on the Flood Task Team 
- DRAs not communicated to residents once finalised 
- Lack of appropriate communication channels between residents and local government; 
channels that do exist are not monitored and requests do not always reach those they should  
- Flood Task Team meetings and higher-level meetings by local government (i.e., especially 
DRMC) are located in places and at times that make it difficult for the urban poor to 
participate and attend; these meetings are also held in English and are very technical, which 
makes it challenging for residents from informal settlements to access this space 
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In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
- Political short-termism and lack of cross-over, which disrupts DRR planning and 
implementation; Mismatch between officials/politicians’ time in office and a lack of 
commitment to follow through the whole process because it’s too resource- and time-heavy 
- Weak monitoring and accountability of participatory and engagement structures 
- No legal recognition of local leadership structures in informal settlements and the role that 
they play in mobilising communities; these channels of communication are informal/ 
transient and often ignored/bypassed by local government, or fail to meet the needs of all 
residents (often they are partisan and corrupt); Local leadership in communities act as gate-
keepers, which can result in miscommunication, delays, nepotism, and corruption 
- Spatially-segregated offices and directorate-based financial and reporting structures make it 
difficult for departments to work collaboratively and overcome silo-based approaches 
- DRMC not ideally placed within the overall government structure to make decisions or have 
authority over other departments with regard to overarching DRR issues 
- Top-down, technocratic approach to managing flood risk, with local government making 
policy decisions and excluding residents’ need, priorities, and local knowledge 
- Ward councillors, who are responsible for channelling resources and communicating with 
residents do not always communicate with, engage with, or request resources for their 
communities 
 
 
Cowan and Arsenault (2008) explain how collaboration might fail or the collaborative process 
might derail because of conflict between different actors, actors disagreeing or changing their 
minds about the goals of the project/process’s goals, or a particular actor or group of actors 
feeling disenfranchised from/during the process. Despite theoretical understandings of how 
beneficial and necessary collaborative disaster governance is for building resilience, the 
previous chapters have highlighted how disaster governance is also very difficult to achieve in 
practice. In practise, these collaborative, decentralised, and inclusive governance approaches, 
which involve actors often outside of taken-for-granted networks, are harder to design, 
implement, and maintain. From my research in Cape Town, it was evident that there were five 
key, overarching barriers that CCT nodes identified as preventing an inclusive and collaborative 
disaster governance approach: 
 
1. It is a lengthy and time-consuming process and often there are more immediate 
and urgent needs; 
2. Local government lacks the resources (financial and human) to engage properly 
with the relevant nodes (especially disgruntled residents and highly-political 
and sensitive situations); and 
3. Local government lacks the necessary skills for facilitation, conflict 
management, and communication; 
4. Individual, node-specific mandates, priorities, and reporting/financing 
mechanisms make it challenging for nodes to collaborate and overcome silo-
based activities; and 
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5. Political agendas, political interference, and political ‘short-termism’ delay, 
divert, or prevent local government officials from planning and implementing 
long-term, on-going engagement processes. 
 
Although identifying and recognising the barriers to disaster governance is one step in the 
process of building resilience, it is also important to think about approaches to overcoming 
these barriers. In order to overcome institutional shortcomings of local government, 
Satterthwaite (2011) argues that there needs to be buy-in and coordination amongst many 
sectoral agencies (within government), and local government needs to support and enhance the 
capacities of households and local organisations through public-private partnerships; this is 
especially important, Satterthwaite (2011:772) argues, for those local governments with 
“limited capacities and finances where a high proportion of housing is within informal 
settlements”. As found in the Cape Town case study, not one entity has sufficient resources and 
capacities to address flood risk; therefore, the institutional structures in place, both formal and 
informal, need to be strengthened to enable nodes to pool critical resources, to channel 
resources effectively, and to ensure that those nodes who need the resources, receive them.  
 
When considering the conditions necessary to address the barriers to collaborative disaster 
governance in cities of the global South, it is also critical to consider what this means for 
building the resilience of cities and systems to respond to and recover from disasters. From 
literature on and definitions of resilience, a recurrent theme is that of ‘bouncing back’ to a 
previous state (Bahadur et al., 2010). Roberts and O'Donoghue (2013) argue that ‘bouncing 
back’, however, is not a useful concept for cities of the global South where the current ‘form’ is 
not one that ‘resilient’ cities should settle with. Instead, the terms ‘bouncing forward’ and 
‘transformation’ are ones that should be applied and integrated into any resilience-building 
processes (Roberts and O'Donoghue, 2013). Disasters in cities of the global South should 
therefore not simply be ‘resisted’, but seen as opportunities to change and learn (Folke, 2006, 
Folke et al., 2010, Roberts and O'Donoghue, 2013).  
 
As Folke (2006) and the IPCC’s (2012) report highlight in their understandings of 
‘transformation’, resilience processes should provide the opportunity for systems to build 
adaptive capacities and develop new trajectories, which include altering fundamental attributes 
of the system, such as legislative, regulatory, and financial structures. In the case study of Cape 
Town and the barriers to collaborative disaster governance that were highlighted, this need to 
‘transform’ is particularly pertinent for altering and strengthening problematic monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms, silo-based reporting and financial structures, insufficient capacities 
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of departments and government officials, and problematic and non-inclusive communication 
and participation channels. All of these elements were either lacking or not functioning as Cape 
Town’s local government intended; therefore, I argue that for there to be any real 
‘transformation’ in the sense of building resilience to disasters, cities of the global South need to 
also identify and then address problematic institutional structures and capacities that create 
barriers to collaborative disaster governance. 
 
Some of the barriers to flood governance in Cape Town highlighted the need for better 
monitoring of personnel, resources, and various processes (i.e., communication, engagement, 
and participation processes), the implementation of policies targeted at ensuring equitable 
participation of civil society and external actors in governance systems, and the need to build 
trust and social capital between residents and local government. There also needs to be a 
transparency of these processes and better monitoring and accountability structures put into 
place for local government, external actors (i.e., contractors and service providers), leaders in 
communities, and residents. 
 
From a nodal governance approach, the following conditions therefore need to be taken into 
consideration when thinking about how a city of the global South, such as Cape Town, can 
address barriers to collaborative disaster governance: 
 
1. Mentalities: There needs to be a shift in understanding the nature of the 
problem and in thinking about solutions; this includes diversifying the types of 
knowledge considered in decision-making and DRAs; 
2. Resources and technologies: Bringing diverse range of actors together to 
better access and mobilise resources and technologies; this includes NGOs and 
other external actors who provide critical social capital and different 
knowledge; 
3. Technologies: Ensuring that information is available to and communicated 
appropriately to multiple actors; this includes the formation of inclusive, multi-
actor platforms that enable multiple actors to reach consensus on issues, share 
resources (including knowledge), and enable collaborative decision-making and 
activities; and 
4. Institutions: Addressing problematic institutional structures (including 
monitoring and accountability, silo-based reporting, and resource allocation 
structures (i.e., funding)); this includes strengthening existing collaborative 
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structures and partnerships between multiple actors, and establishing inclusive 
channels of participation and engagement.  
 
 
3. ENABLING COLLABORATION: ROLE OF MULTI-ACTOR 
PLATFORMS AND INCLUSIVE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
The concepts of resilience and adaptive capacity are particularly important when considering 
the questions of ‘why’ collaboration and partnerships between multiple actors are important, as 
well as ‘how’ collaboration and partnerships should be formulated. In order to discuss how 
collaboration and partnerships can strengthen the resilience of cities and communities to 
disaster risk, I refer again to the key characteristics of a resilient system that Berkes (2007) 
suggests. According to Berkes (2007), a resilient system is able to live with change and 
uncertainty by building social and ecological memory from past experiences. A resilient system 
also nurtures diversity in partnerships between multiple actors and scales, which increases the 
potential for knowledge-sharing, bringing new knowledge, and combining different forms of 
knowledge, including knowledge gained from social and ecological memory (Berkes, 2007). This 
helps to stimulate learning and innovation, bridge gaps in cross-sale and cross-sector 
understanding, and increase the number of available options before, during, and after an event. 
Berkes (2007) also argues that a resilient system creates opportunities for self-organisation and 
re-organisation; this means that communities have the adaptive capacity to organise themselves 
socially and politically in the face of disasters, as well as build networks across scales of 
governance, through multi-level partnerships. Therefore, I argue that collaborative mechanisms 
and partnerships are central to the process of building resilient communities and cities.  
 
Within collaborative governance discourse, collaboration implies the agency for multiple actors 
to communicate and influence decision-making through deliberate, multilateral processes 
(Ansell and Gash, 2007). Implicit in this idea is that multiple actors are brought into the same 
political and decision-making space because they all have the responsibility for deliberating on 
and producing solutions for addressing a common problem. While collaboration was identified 
by nodes in Cape Town as a key component of designing and implementing DRR activities, many 
nodes recognised that collaboration was often lacking in current DRM practice. From a nodal 
governance approach, I see collaboration as a technology that enables nodes to pool and 
channel resources (human, physical, and financial), reach common ground in terms of 
definitions of key terms and understandings of the nature of the problem (mentalities), and 
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ultimately work towards a common goal. Various nodes represented on the Flood Task Team 
identified several key outcomes of collaboration, in terms of strengthening their ability to carry 
out flood-related activities (Table 24). Residents also expressed the need for local government 
to work with them because they have valuable local knowledge that local government could use; 
in addition, if local government collaborates with residents, they could strengthen the adaptive 
capacities of communities. 
 
Table 24: Benefits of collaboration as perceived by nodes on the Flood Task Team84 
Theme Quotes from Flood Task Team officials 
Pool resources 
(human, financial, 
physical) 
 “Scarce resources can be utilised optimally.” 
 “It allows you to pull different resources together.” 
  “More people to assist [you], when you partner with stakeholders.” 
 “Different experiences and skills can be merged together for better results.” 
Share knowledge 
and information 
 “Different departments and NGOs can learn more from each other and how the 
CCT services and operates.” 
 “An opportunity to know more things that you would not have known.” 
 “It will enhance effectiveness of communication about flooding.” 
Social capital 
 “Build relationships.” 
 “It will build confidence [about the CCT] in the community.” 
More holistic 
approach to a 
complex/multi-
faceted problem 
 “Managing any specific hazard requires intense collaboration between the 
different sectors of society, as there are links pertaining to the underlying 
causes and why people are forced to settle in flood risk areas.” 
 “Prevent departments from working in silos.” 
 “You can do more working as a team.” 
Achieve buy-in 
from multiple 
nodes 
 “Collaboration needs to take place between government (at all levels), the 
private business sector (for funding), NGOs, CBOs, and the general community 
in order to achieve buy-in to the interventions.” 
 “Raises awareness with residents; if residents are more aware, they can assist in 
mitigating some of the flood risk.” 
Avoid duplication 
or gaps, and 
delays 
 “To eliminate duplication of certain interventions (over/under-response).” 
 “Less wasteful expenditure, as we avoid duplication of services.” 
  “There may be lots of NGOs/service providers that do the same thing or 
provide the same service, without you knowing. So coming together will allow 
you to be able to bridge the gaps and make sure services are given where it is 
due.” 
  “Save time and money which could be spent on new interventions, when 
working interventions are already in place.” 
Collective image, 
voice, 
understanding, 
and approach 
 “We can all speak with one voice.” 
 “You can project a good image [of unity].” 
 You will know what the next department is doing.” 
 “You will know what residents think in terms of their responsibilities in the 
process.” 
 “You can determine a definition of flooding in order to have a fair/balanced 
approach.” 
 “You will know how residents perceive flooding.” 
 “Between departments, you can have a joint approach.” 
 “With external stakeholders, you can share the same goals.” 
 “So all stakeholders (e.g., departments, NGOs, residents) can work in synergy.” 
 “To work to a common goal and objectives.”  
 
                                                             
84 Responses were provided by nodes during FliCCR’s workshop on the 21st January 2013 (see Appendix 1). 
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GNDR’s (2013) Views from the Frontline report highlights the importance of partnerships and 
interactions between multiple actors within a disaster governance context because these 
multiple actors bring multiple bodies of knowledge with them. These bodies of knowledge can 
complement one another, which increases the potential for solutions and positive disaster 
governance outcomes, or they can contradict, which could also lead to better awareness, 
changed mindsets, and stronger solutions and outcomes (GNDR, 2013). Armitage et al. (2011) 
argue similarly that networks and interactions between multiple actors allow actors to 
contribute and combine a plurality of knowledge sources and types, in order to address a 
defined problem. This type of collaborative, knowledge co-production enables learning, which 
can strengthen an individual or group’s adaptive capacity to cope with the variability and 
uncertainty inherent in complex environmental problems (Armitage et al., 2011). 
 
As found in Cape Town and as argued in the literature, bringing multiple actors together, who 
often have different ideologies and knowledge, is not an easy process (Stoker, 2004, Cowan and 
Arsenault, 2008, GNDR, 2013); especially in countries that have a long history of conflict 
between government and civil society. This is a pertinent issue in South Africa, where the legacy 
of Apartheid has resulted in informal settlement residents who are isolated geographically and 
economically from accessing particular resources and networks, and politically excluded from 
actively participating in local government decisions and plans in terms of DRM. This 
marginalisation highlights the importance of considering power (in)balances between residents 
and state actors, especially when considering how to bring these actors together into mutual, 
consensus-building spaces that aim to collaboratively address disaster risk. As stated in GNDR’s 
(2013:24) report, creating spaces for dialogue on DRR issues should therefore be seen as a long-
term political process, where multiple actors can “debate, negotiate, resist, and decide on DRR 
policies, regulations, and practices”. 
 
In disaster scholarship, multi-actor platforms are seen as an alternative for governing complex 
problems because they are a flexible and participatory method that brings together a diversity 
of actors from different scales of governance to work collectively towards more coordinated and 
integrated DRR activities (UNISDR, 2007, UNISDR, 2010, Djalante, 2012, Tierney, 2012, Tierney, 
2014, Twigg, 2015). These different actors, who perceive the same management problems, are 
brought together voluntarily or statutorily, to interdependently yet collectively agree on 
strategies for solving problems (Steins and Edwards, 1999, Djalante, 2012). Multi-actor 
dialogue, via a multi-actor platform, is not simply a ‘conversation’, but an ‘interactive approach’ 
to achieve a particular aim and/or solve a problem (Warner, 2006). I argue that implementing 
multi-actor platforms is one way to strenghten local DRR and resilience because they can help 
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nurture diversity through partnerships, bring different sources and forms of knowledge 
together, build broader and deeper social and ecological memory, increase capacities for 
information sharing, and empower a broader range of actors to self-organise and re-organise.  
 
The CCT’s Flood Task Team is one example of a multi-actor platform; it brings together multiple 
local government departments and NGOs with the aim of collectively reaching consensus on 
flood risk reduction activities and priorities. The Flood Task Team is recognised by many CCT 
and external nodes as an institutional structure that enables collaboration between CCT nodes. 
Flood Task Team nodes highlighted during FliCCR’s 2013 workshop85 that collaboration 
through the Task Team is important for the following reasons: 
 
1. helps to pool resources; 
2. allows departments from diverse backgrounds to share expertise and their 
experiences; 
3. helps to build a holistic approach to addressing flood risk; 
4. helps to projecting an image of unity (of the CCT and their activities); 
5. helps to improve communication between departments; and 
6. helps to ensure and strengthen buy-in from multiple departments. 
 
CCT nodes represented on the Flood Task Team recognise that they all have different sets of 
resources and that if they partner with one another, they could share those resources and 
ultimately strengthen their capacity to reduce flood risk.  
 
Development Services (31/01/2013): “I could say it [collaboration] improves 
resource capabilities. […] In a sense that, if you collaborate with your NGOS, external 
stakeholders, and other line people, you have more resources. You get more exposed to 
resources that you can use than when you do it yourself. You branch out when you 
have more external people.”  
 
By collaborating, it was recognised that the CCT departments can work towards the same 
goals and responsibilities and are better able to project an image that the various 
departments have the same vision and are united in reducing flood risk and improving 
services across Cape Town. 
 
                                                             
85 Referring to the workshop held with Flood Task team representatives on the 21st January 2013 (see Appendix 6 for 
a list of FliCCR’s workshops). 
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DRMC (31/01/2013): “When you’re [CCT officials] out there in the community and 
we collaboration and sharing the same goals and same responsibilities, you also 
projecting an image that we [CCT departments] got the same vision and we’re 
creating unity. Departments working in silos don’t know what the other one is doing. 
And it [departments collaborating] just projects a better image out there with the 
communities. We are able to say, when I’m out there doing education and awareness… 
I am able to say what Water Works are doing, what Housing is doing, what Solid 
Waste is doing…” 
 
Despite the benefits of this Flood Task Team, which nodes in Cape Town identified, I argue that 
as an institutionalised mechanism for ensuring multi-actor collaboration, the Flood Task Team 
has many shortcomings that instead impact negatively on the resilience of at-risk communities. 
The Flood Task Team is a great example of how departments have managed to work together 
and cooperate on flood-related issues; this is in contrast to other municipalities in South Africa, 
which indicate very little cooperation between departments in terms of DRR interventions 
(Botha and Van Niekerk, 2013). The departments represented on the Flood Task team still 
operate within very silo-based and department-specific financial and reporting structures and 
with very department-specific mandates. In addition, although there might be a certain level of 
collaboration between CCT departments, there is very little collaboration with NGOs, 
communities, and other external actors beyond the select group of NGOs that are ‘activated’ 
during flood events86. Despite the Flood Task Team being a mechanism for communication, 
engagement, and cross-sector participation, this multi-actor platform excludes any non-state 
actors from the meetings, except for those they invite specially (e.g., I was invited to present my 
research during one of their meetings).  
 
In order to understand and theorise the types of spaces available for participation and 
collaborative processes, I refer to the concept of ‘spaces of participation’ (Cornwall, 2002, 
Miraftab, 2004, Gaventa, 2006, Winkler, 2011). These spaces, which are on a continuum from 
‘closed’ spaces on the one end, to ‘invited’ in the middle and ‘claimed’ spaces on the other end, 
are defined as follows (Cornwall, 2002, Miraftab, 2004, Gaventa, 2006, Winkler, 2011): 
 
 Closed spaces: decisions are made behind ‘closed doors’ by a specific set of actors; 
anyone outside of that group is ‘excluded’ from the decision-making.  
 Invited spaces: facilitated/created/legitimised by government and often backed by 
constitutional or legal requirements/guarantees. Civil society (seen as users or 
                                                             
86 For details on these NGOs, see Chapter Six, Section 3.3.1. 
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beneficiaries) is seen as ‘invited’ to participate in these spaces by authorities, be they 
government, NGOs, or international agencies. The space is essentially regarded by the 
authority as being their ‘domain’. These types of spaces are often regularised, and can 
be transient or once-off. 
 Claimed, created, or invented spaces: used collectively by civil society to confront 
authorities and challenge the status quo, with the hope for resisting and overthrowing 
dominant power relations. These spaces are more organic, emerging from a set of 
common concerns and like-minded people mobilising. This is the space where people 
who are ‘excluded’ find a voice and a place; it is a space that is made by participants, 
rather than for participants, as in the case of invited spaces. 
 
In South Africa, engagement and public participation has become institutionalised via the 
various municipal councils, ward committees, and Integrated Development Forums (Isandla 
Institute, 2012). This approach to public participation, in the form of invited spaces, can be 
problematic because it shows little tolerance for other forms of community engagement and 
social mobilisation (i.e., claimed spaces) (Isandla Institute, 2011, 2012). In the South African 
context, and as evident from my research in Cape Town, these institutionalised structures for 
public participation are dysfunctional and susceptible to patronage, factionalism, and 
fragmentation (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008, Sinwell, 2010, Isandla Institute, 2012). It is with this in 
mind that I argue that invited spaces, although the preferred mechanism for public participation 
by local government in South Africa, are not conducive to fair and transparent public 
participation processes that address the needs of the urban poor. Although the government is 
constantly trying to fix the ward committee system, what is really needed is for the wider 
systematic factors inhibiting public participation to be addressed first (Isandla Institute, 2012).  
 
Thompson (2007) argues that in order for participatory governance processes to be effective, 
governments need to view the participatory processes as a vehicle to bring about change. 
Unfortunately, governments usually view participatory processes as a vehicle for legitimacy in 
policy- and decision-making (Thompson, 2007). In addition, although invited spaces enable 
those with enough ‘expertise’ and ‘knowledge’ to challenge government’s decisions and policies, 
these spaces are less open to poor, marginalised groups (Thompson, 2007). Winkler (2011) is 
also wary of ‘invited’ spaces, arguing that although participatory democracy is enshrined in 
South Africa’s constitution and other legislation, state-led participation, via ‘invited spaces’ at 
the local level and ‘closed’ spaces at national level, results in there being no real transformation 
in deliberative democracy. I argue that the same is true in the context of South Africa’s DRM 
legislation, where there has been little progress in terms of enabling public participation in DRM 
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processes, despite legislation that calls for participation. For example, the Flood Task Team is 
actually a ‘closed space’, or on rare occasions, an ‘invited space’ to specific people (and usually 
not poor community residents).  
 
Although multi-actor platforms are argued to be an ideal vehicle for bringing multiple actors 
together to manage conflict, settle disputes, and empower civil society, Warner (2006) cautions 
us about these platforms, arguing that it is also important that these potential ‘outcomes’ are 
not taken for granted. Multi-actor platforms can instead create conflict and marginalise further 
particular groups/actors because they are ‘excluded’ physically from the multi-actor platform or 
they are not given equal status as a result of socio-political differences (Warner, 2006). For 
example, a particular actor or group of actors might not understand the language used or might 
not have the ‘expert’ knowledge or persuasion skills that other actors on the platform have. 
From my research, FliCCR’s March 2013 workshop87 provides an example of people being 
excluded from a multi-actor platform because of socio-political and economic differences. This 
workshop, which was facilitated by an experienced facilitator, aimed to bring multiple actors 
together (into an invited space) to enter into dialogue on issues raised during FliCCR’s research 
on flood governance in Cape Town. One of the informal settlement residents was repeatedly 
silenced by the workshop facilitator because her concerns/issues raised at particular points 
during the workshop did not match the ‘topic’ that was being discussed according to the agenda 
of the workshop, and were therefore ‘interrupting’ the proceedings. This action further 
marginalised this person’s voice as a result of her not following the assumed ‘etiquette’ of the 
workshop and not speaking with the same technical language that dominated the workshop (i.e., 
the workshop was in English, which was not this person’s first language, and academics versed 
in technical language presented the findings).  
 
Logistically, not just politically, multi-actor platforms are challenging. As experienced from 
FliCCR’s March 2013 workshop, only two residents participated; the other thirty invited 
residents failed to secure transport88 to attend the workshop near the centre of Cape Town, 
which geographically and socio-economically speaking, was very far removed from their 
community. On the other hand, CCT officials refused to attend a workshop proposed prior to 
FliCCR’s March 2013 one, which would have been held in/near the informal settlements; 
geographically and socio-economically, but also politically, this was seen as not ideal by CCT 
                                                             
87 For details of this workshop and for a list of FliCCR’s workshops, see Appendix 6. 
 
88 FLiCCR’s plan was to financially compensate any residents from informal settlements for their travel to the venue. 
Despite this, selected residents failed to use available public transport and some residents, who had ‘hired’ a taxi 
minibus for the day, failed to show up at the venue. In hindsight, FliCCR realised that they should have hired a vehicle 
and driver to personally fetch residents from Philippi.  
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officials. The CCT officials refused to take part in these dialogues hosted in Philippi because of 
safety concerns and their fear of being targeted and victimised by residents on service delivery 
issues during a time in Cape Town when service delivery protests were increasing violent and 
volatile. When FliCCR’s May 2013 workshop was hosted in Sweet Home89, with specific CCT 
officials and politicians invited, the turnout of CCT officials was fairly poor and the workshop 
was seen by CCT officials as a platform for propaganda and for them to ‘assure’ residents that 
they were doing everything in their capacity. The power was therefore seen to stay with the CCT 
officials who talked ‘at’ rather than ‘with’ residents.  
 
The two examples highlight a very important issue when thinking about collaborative 
processes, particularly in cities of the global South. Steins and Edwards (1999) argue that 
simply bringing people together onto common platforms does not automatically make them 
equal. Both Warner (2006) and Tseng and Penning-Rowsell (2012) highlight how engagement 
is about politics and power sharing. From collaborative governance discourse, authors argue 
that although collaborative processes are about enabling all actors (i.e., non-state actors 
included) to be directly involved, leadership roles and the ultimate authority on decisions often 
remain with the state and their agencies (Leach et al., 2002, Ansell and Gash, 2007). Warner 
(2006) argues that government is often reluctant to relinquish control and cede power, and in 
some cases, civil society is reluctant to take it. When reflecting on the issue of power sharing in 
engagement processes, Tseng and Penning-Rowsell (2012) argue that often this ‘power’ lies 
with the government, and that during engagement processes, they should ‘devolve’ this power 
to other actors. Tarlock (1999) disputes this however, arguing that collaborative governance 
should not be seen as devolution of power, but rather as ensuring that there is shared 
responsibility for the management of resources. In light of this, I argue that disaster governance 
should not be seen as a way for the state to relinquish (‘devolve’) their responsibility and pass it 
on to non-state actors, which state actors would be reluctant to do anyway, but instead to 
ensure that all actors, at all levels, are given the capacity to actively participate in consensus-
oriented decision-making and assume shared responsibility for reducing disaster risk.  
 
In the case of South Africa, local government is very reluctant to relinquish control to residents, 
but residents are determined to take some of this control; this is evident in the various service 
delivery protests common across South Africa90, and interviewees (residents) describing how 
they always call CCT officials and the ward councillor (through various channels, including 
personal phone numbers) for information, services, and action. This ‘tug of war’ creates conflict 
                                                             
89 This May 2013 workshop was in response to the poor turnout of residents at the March 2013 workshop, as well as 
an opportunity to encourage multi-actor dialogue based on my findings/involvement in Sweet Home. 
90 See Sacks (2012, 2014) for a report and discussion on the protests in Sweet Home. 
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in itself, but I argue that this willingness of residents to take some control (i.e., via claimed 
spaces) is a positive factor; residents holding local government accountable for service delivery, 
requesting support from DRR and DRA activities shows that not all residents are passive 
recipients of DRM, but want to be active actors in disaster governance processes. Part of the 
issue here is that the CCT needs to be empowered to share some of the responsibility; CCT 
officials indicated that they lack conflict management and facilitation skills, and I argue that if 
they had these skills, they might feel more confident relinquishing control and building the 
capacities of residents to take responsibility.  
 
Faysse (2006) identifies circumstances under which multi-actor platforms have unfavourable 
outcomes: high social inequities; a state that is too strong or weak to support the process and 
decisions resulting from the process; disorganised actors/groups; and a lack of financial and 
technical capacities to implement these platforms. Wesselink et al. (2011) argue that 
practitioners need to be realistic when considering participatory processes; instead of seeing 
participation as a way to achieve deliberative democracy ideals, practitioners need to recognise 
the difficulties inherent in policy-making and decision-making processes. Wesselink et al. 
(2011) highlight how the challenges that environmental policy-makers face usually stem from 
political power struggles and not from a lack of participation.  
 
Tseng and Penning-Rowsell (2012) argue that people’s expectations and the reality of what can 
be accomplished can lead to further distrust, conflict, frustrations, and blame. This was evident 
in the Cape Town case study, especially during the May 2013 workshop when residents 
expected to find solutions from the workshop, but CCT officials could not make any promises 
without first consulting senior management. These findings link closely to issues of capacities 
and capacity-building. For example, Matsuoka et al. (2012) argue that a decentralisation of DRR 
activities does not immediately lead to participatory DRR because of constraints in terms of 
capacities at local levels. In the Cape Town context, residents lack the resources (time, financial, 
and education) to participate properly in engagement processes, and local government 
sometimes lacks the capacity and resources to facilitate ongoing, long-term engagement 
processes. Engagement processes mean that poorer participants have to take time off from 
work, which could be a barrier to their ongoing, long-term participation. This highlights the 
need for local government and residents to be supported in terms of capacities, including 
financial and human resources, as well as authority and decision-making powers.  
 
I argue that collaborative governance is a process that requires engagement across various 
social and institutional boundaries, with inclusive partnerships and multi-actor platforms 
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recognised as one way to overcome traditional, silo-based approaches. However, these inclusive 
partnerships and multi-actor platforms will only address barriers to collaborative processes as 
long as they are complemented by better monitoring and accountability of these processes and 
more deliberate, systematic approaches to fostering collaboration between multiple actors. This 
highlights the importance of creating/strengthening institutional structures that enable and 
build collaboration; for example, strengthening monitoring and accountability mechanisms, and 
creating inclusive communication channels and participatory approaches. A ‘multi-actor’ 
platform is not sufficient and will not necessarily result in collaboration; there also needs to be 
these other participatory/inclusive structures to support the process. Winkler (2011) argues 
that for any real transformation to take place, such as in the South African context, we need an 
approach that recognises the tension that exists between claimed and invited spaces. Citizens 
need to be able to claim a space that challenges public policy, and state actors need to respond 
to these claimed spaces by changing current institutional structures to ones that are more 
inclusive, responsive, and effective (Winkler, 2011). 
 
 
4. THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES: BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS 
WITH SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
I have highlighted the role that multi-actor platforms can play in building and supporting 
collaborative processes. The role of external actors, such as NGOs, researchers and scientists, 
and the private sector, is also important because they can mobilise diverse and scarce 
resources, provide social capital, and provide information and knowledge that can help to 
inform decision-making. I argue further that external actors are particularly important in 
sensitive contexts where issues are highly contested and some of the actors are socio-politically 
marginalised, as is the case in many of South Africa’s informal settlements.  
 
Social capital, in the form of trust, accountability, and networks, is argued to be necessary for 
ensuring high levels of coordination and cooperation between multiple actors (Mayunga, 2007, 
Bahadur et al., 2010). I argue similarly that social capital is critical for there to be collaboration 
between actors and effective disaster governance processes. In addition, over time, 
collaboration between multiple actors also helps to build social capital because this 
collaboration builds trust and fosters reciprocity (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008). Therefore, not 
only is social capital critical for there to be collaboration, but social capital is also a key outcome 
and benefit of collaboration (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008).  
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In the literature, external actors who play a role in enabling/supporting collaborative processes 
have many names, such as ‘bridging organisations’ (Folke et al., 2005), ‘intermediaries’, and 
‘intermediary organisations’ (Nambisan, 2009, Hodson and Marvin, 2010, Hamann and April, 
2013). Folke et al. (2005) emphasise the role of ‘bridging organisations’ in ecosystem 
management, arguing that these organisations, which can include NGOs and CBOs, or even 
scientists, are necessary for providing a ‘bridge’ between local actors and communities, with 
other scales of organisations. These types of organisations are able to bring resources, 
knowledge, and other incentives to the table, as well as provide arenas for building trust, sense-
making, learning, conflict resolution, and vertical/horizontal collaboration (Folke et al., 
2005:461). Furthermore, Folke et al. (2005) describe how bridging organisations can also use 
their networks of actors to “mobilise knowledge and social memory in turbulent times”. 
 
Intermediaries, much like bridging organisations, are understood to be those organisations, 
individuals, departments, or groups of individuals who strive to broker relationships between 
actors, with the aim of helping those actors to engage and enter into dialogue on particular 
issues (Folke et al., 2005, Nambisan, 2009, Hodson and Marvin, 2010, Hamann and April, 2013). 
Hamann and April (2013) highlight how a wide variety of organisation, which range from 
government agencies to lobbyists, may fulfil the role of a collaborative intermediary 
organisation. Intermediaries are described by Howells (2006) to be a type of broker or agent 
that facilitates the process of knowledge transfer across people, organisations, and industries. 
This role is not just about linking people, organisations, and industries, but about being a 
knowledge repository, in terms of having expertise and access to particular knowledge, as well 
as being able to access other actors who possess particular knowledge; other actors can 
therefore use this knowledge and potential networks to help provide solutions that are a 
combination of existing ideas by other actors.  
 
Chatterjee (2010) argues that in order for the urban poor to build their resilience to 
environmental change, these communities need to incorporate innovative networks of support. 
I argue here that an example of an innovative network is the type of networks that communities 
can form with and through intermediaries and bridging organisations; these 
individuals/organisations bring important social capital and connections with multiple actors, 
as well as enable communities to access particular resources that they would not be able to 
access otherwise. Leonhardt (2012) argues that networks contribute towards a community’s 
resilience by:  
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1.  helping to break the isolation of low-income communities; 
2. providing communities with access to resources, such as financial resources; 
3. helping to legitimise communities and catalyse effective action (i.e., by 
demonstrating social mobilisation, enhancing their reputation in negotiations, 
and promoting shared aspiration and solidarity in the face of problems); and 
4. helping to capacitate communities in terms of increasing horizontal learning 
and providing opportunities for skills and knowledge exchange. 
 
Although the Flood Task Team was identified by CCT nodes as a key mechanism through which 
CCT departments are able to collaborate inter-departmentally, the Flood Task Team still lacked 
the capacity (especially in terms of human resources) to engage with communities and nodes 
outside of the Flood Task Team. It was highlighted during FliCCR’s March 2013 workshop that if 
the CCT partnered with NGOs like Ikhayalami91 and the Mustadafin Foundation92, they would be 
able to collaboratively strengthen the resilience of communities to disasters. These NGOs and 
CBOs were recognised as having the know-how (e.g., expert knowledge in particular 
developmental issue), social capital (e.g., strong ties and rapport with communities), and were 
seen as being well placed to support disaster governance processes because they are already 
involved in pro-poor, development- and disaster-related activities. 
 
From my research in Cape Town, there were two examples of innovative, polycentric 
partnerships that aimed to build the capacity of residents, but also recognised that support from 
local government is critical: the re-blocking activities by Ikhayalami, and the sand-bag houses by 
UBU93. The difference between these partnerships and the multi-actor platform provided by the 
Flood Task Team is that these NGOs have strong, established relationships and a history with 
particular communities, and have community-centred approaches. These NGOs essentially have 
social capital with community members, which I argue is critical for engagement processes.  
 
When thinking about the role of intermediaries in collaborative processes, it is also important to 
consider the role of researchers, especially in terms of influencing decision-makers and how 
they define their interests (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). Researchers can help to fill any 
communication gaps between communities, local government, and scientists (Innocenti and 
Albrito, 2011, Shannon et al., 2014, Baudoin and Wolde-Georgis, 2015). As a research-based 
project, FliCCR’s findings were influential in shaping the dialogue between the multiple actors 
                                                             
91 Ikhayalami is an NGO active in Philippi, Cape Town. For more information on this NGO, see Chapter Six, Section 
3.3.2. 
92 The Mustadafin Foundation is an NGO active in Philippi, Cape Town. For more information on this NGO, see 
Chapter Six, Section 3.3.1. 
93 UBU is an NGO active in Sweet Home. For more information on this NGO, see Chapter Six, Section 3.3.2. 
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involved in flood risk management activities in Cape Town. The FliCCR project helped to shape 
the agenda and actively bring multiple actors together into a common space, to enter into 
dialogue and begin discussing the more pertinent issues highlighted by FliCCR’s research. The 
FliCCR project tried to bring multiple actors together into common spaces; essentially 
transforming negative claimed spaces where community actors confronted/disputed with local 
government, into positive claimed spaces that enabled multiple actors to engage and deliberate 
with local government.  
 
As a result of FliCCR’s multi-actor workshops, actors were able to make networks and 
connections that went beyond the scope of the project. From networks and contacts made by 
UBU during the multi-actor workshop and my involvement/research in Sweet Home, UBU was 
able to meet and then partner with CCT departments on their community-based housing project 
in Sweet Home. FliCCR’s research also showed how actors in Cape Town from different levels of 
governance were not talking to one another and that there was very little overlap and sharing of 
best practices. Researchers can play a critical role in collecting, analysing, and disseminating 
information, such as best practices. I argue that researchers and the types of dialogues we 
enabled through our research can be instrumental for building the capacities of communities to 
mobilise, in the form of claimed and even invited spaces.  
 
Based on the discussion presented in this chapter, I argue that inclusive partnerships and multi-
actor platforms are a good mechanism for enabling collaborative governance, as long as they are 
complemented by better monitoring and accountability of inherent processes, and more 
deliberate, systematic approaches to fostering collaboration between multiple actors. As seen 
from the Cape Town case study, simply having multi-actor platforms or inclusive partnerships 
does not automatically result in collaboration between multiple actors, especially across vertical 
scales (i.e., state and communities). As a result of the various challenges I highlighted with 
regard to multi-actor platforms, it is critical that broader institutional structures are also 
implemented and strengthened, which support rather than undermine collaborative, inclusive 
approaches to disaster governance. This is particularly pertinent for informal settlement 
contexts where often the local actors are marginalised geographically, socio-economically, and 
politically. This is particularly relevant to cities of the global South where local governance is 
characterised by a lack of monitoring and accountability mechanisms, silo-based reporting and 
financial structures, a lack of capacities and resources, and problematic communication and 
participation channels (Satterthwaite, 2011). Systematic approaches are therefore needed 
enable these actors to have a voice and to ensure that processes and actors are monitored and 
held accountable, especially when such processes might be more ‘informal’ and transient. In 
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addition, intermediaries and bridging organisations are necessary to provide the social capital, 
knowledge, and communication channels that can help multiple actors, despite their ideological 
and socio-political differences, to claim spaces for productive dialogue. 
 
 
5. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I highlighted how although multi-actor collaboration and networks are essential 
for strengthening the resilience of at-risk communities, there are many obstacles that inhibit 
actors’ ability to collaboratively manage risk. In order to understand what barriers there might 
be to disaster governance, I re-framed an understanding of these barriers from a nodal 
governance approach, as barriers emerging as a result of nodes’ mentalities, resources, 
technologies, and institutions. I emphasised further how addressing the barriers to 
collaborative disaster governance in cities of the global South should be seen as an opportunity 
for systems to build adaptive capacities and develop new trajectories, which include altering 
fundamental attributes of the system, such as legislative, regulatory, and financial structures.  
 
In this chapter, I argued that disaster governance is a process that requires engagement across 
various social and institutional boundaries, with inclusive partnerships and multi-actor 
platforms recognised as one way to overcome traditional, silo-based approaches. Although 
multi-actor platforms and inclusive partnerships can enable and strengthen collaborative 
governance, they need to be complemented by better monitoring and accountability of inherent 
processes, and more deliberate, systematic approaches to fostering collaboration between 
multiple actors. I discussed how the Flood Task Team is an example of a multi-actor platform 
with potential for bringing multiple actors together into invited spaces, but it is failing because 
it excludes residents and non-state actors and fails to move beyond a ‘closed’ space. UBU’s sand-
bag houses and Ikhayalami’s re-blocking activities, on the other hand, were argued to be 
examples of partnerships between communities, NGOs, and local government that successfully 
used social capital to build the adaptive capacity of residents through community-driven 
approaches. This chapter also highlighted the importance of external actors, such as 
intermediaries and bridging organisations. The example presented in this chapter was the 
FliCCR project, which facilitated dialogue between multiple actors and enabled these actors to 
form networks and partnerships that went beyond the limited scope of the project. 
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CHAPTER TEN:  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
1. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
The premise of my thesis was that socio-environmental problems, such as those associated with 
urban disaster risk and climate change, have become too complex to be managed by traditional, 
centralised approaches, or individual organisations and hierarchical forms of organisation. 
Addressing complex socio-environmental problems requires not only a range of approaches to 
reduce risk, but the involvement of multiple actors and sets of actors beyond the confines of 
individual organisations and institutions, who bring with them various skills-sets, tools, 
knowledge, and understandings of the problem. My understanding of what this type of multi-
actor, collaborative disaster management looks like in theory was informed by governance 
literature and Tierney’s (2012) concept of ‘disaster governance’. Governance, which is defined 
broadly as the intentional shaping or management of the flow of events within a social system 
(Burris et al., 2005, Ansell and Gash, 2007, Wood and Shearing, 2007), considers the plurality of 
actors and how they can collaboratively manage events. Disaster governance, however, applies 
the concept of governance to DRM; it emphasises the decentralisation of DRM activities and that 
DRM is no longer limited to state-oriented hierarchies, but also belongs together networks and 
actors outside of the state sphere who have become increasingly involved in providing services 
and managing disaster risk and events (Tierney, 2012). This theoretical shift in DRM from state-
centred management to multi-actor governance also reflects broader societal changes, such as 
the rise of contracting and outsourcing, new forms of collaboration, and the replacement of 
hierarchical, bureaucratic systems of control with more decentralised, networked forms of 
organisation.  
 
Collaborative governance recognises the importance of a diversity of actors working collectively 
towards a common goal, as well as the reality that a diversity of actors brings a wider range of 
mentalities and resources to decision-making. I argued in this thesis that collaborative disaster 
governance is particularly pertinent for managing urban risk with multiple underlying risk 
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factors, particularly in cities of the global South, which have high levels of inequality and 
informality. By shifting focus from the activities and outcomes of DRM processes, to the 
governance of disaster risk by multiple actors, this research sought to understand the unique 
characteristics of the diverse sets of actors governing disaster risk in the case study city of Cape 
Town, questioning whose actions have a bearing on DRM outcomes, and how.  
 
In order to map the diversity of actors who are (and should be) involved in disaster governance, 
and to explore their capacities for managing disaster risk, I adopted a nodal governance 
approach. Nodal governance recognises that actors (called ‘nodes’) differ in their ability to 
shape and govern events, as a result of their different mentalities, access to resources and 
technologies, and institutional structures enabling them to govern (Burris et al., 2005). By 
analysing these four ‘characteristics’, I was able to better understand how nodes govern, what 
constrains or enables them to make decisions and implement interventions, and what influence 
they exert on the world and the social system they are governing. By exploring the nodes and 
their various capacities or lacking capacities, I argued that decision-makers could understand 
where to combine unique strengths and capacities, what resources to mobilise more efficiently, 
and which problematic institutional structures to address in order to strengthen inclusive, 
collaborative outcomes. Therefore, the aim of this research was to explore how a nodal 
governance approach can be used to identify and understand the potential barriers and 
opportunities to disaster governance. In this thesis, the conceptual re-framing of disaster 
governance through a nodal governance framework encouraged a fresh look at the unique 
characteristics and capacities of the multiple actors involved in disaster governance and how 
these capacities could be opportunities for, or barriers to, collaborative processes. 
 
In order to achieve the overall aim of this thesis, the following objectives were presented and 
addressed: 
 
1. I identified and understood the actors integral to, and the nature of, the disaster 
governance system investigated (i.e., the case study of flood governance in Cape 
Town.  
2. I drew on the nodal governance approach to help identify the unique 
mentalities, resources, technologies, and institutions that shape the perceptions 
and actions of the multiple actors identified as governing disaster risk in the 
Cape Town case study. 
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3. I analysed these four nodal governance characteristics and how they interact, in 
order to determine the barriers and opportunities for collaborative disaster 
governance. 
4. I identified some of the conditions required to address the potential barriers in 
a way that would help inform a more inclusive and collaborative approach to 
disaster governance in the case of Cape Town. 
5. I contributed towards the emergent discourse on disaster governance by 
fundamentally enhancing the debate to include issues of nodal governance and 
barriers to governance.  
 
 
2. KEY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
One of the contentions in this thesis was that although disaster discourse and rhetoric highlight 
the need for bringing multiple actors together to collaboratively address disaster risk, simply 
bringing multiple actors together to govern risk will not automatically result in these actors 
working collaboratively. I demonstrated that in practice, a collaborative, decentralised, and 
inclusive disaster governance approach, which often involves a range of actors outside of taken-
for-granted networks, is harder to design, implement, and maintain, especially in cities of the 
global South. As Stoker (2004) argues, although collaborative governance can help solve 
conflicts about the distribution of resources, it cannot resolve the often deeply-entrenched 
ideological differences between actors, which often lead to conflicts and barriers in 
collaborative processes. Although public participation and multi-actor collaboration are 
recognised in the literature as essential for strengthening resilience of at-risk communities, I 
argued that there are a number of barriers that can inhibit society’s ability to collaboratively 
govern risk. Recognising that there are barriers constraining nodes from governing, I drew on 
Ekstrom et al.’s (2011) barriers to adaptation framework to inform my understanding of the 
types of barriers that can impede or prevent collaborative governance processes from taking 
place in the Cape Town case study. I argued that the process of identifying and understanding 
the barriers in and to collaborative processes could enable decision-makers to begin addressing 
and overcoming identified barriers; thereby potentially strengthening the collaborative disaster 
governance process itself. 
 
With current rhetoric and theory arguing that disaster governance needs to move beyond the 
confines of local government to including local communities and non-state actors, my research 
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aimed to question what this means in practice, in cities of the global South, which are often 
characterised by development backlogs, lack of critical services and infrastructure, weak 
governance, and marginalised (politically and physically) poor and informal communities. Cities 
of the global South are currently stifled by top-down, hierarchical, and technocratic approaches 
to DRM, with solutions sought without the participation of local communities, who often have a 
better understanding of localised hazards and local politics. By considering instead the benefits 
of networked, multi-actor, and collaborative disaster governance, I questioned the traditional 
hierarchical and centralised approach of DRM by the state. I explored the disagreement that 
exists in the literature and in Cape Town on whether local government or local communities are 
best equipped to drive the planning and implementation of DRR activities. On the one hand, the 
responsibility of DRM was argued to be local government’s because of their influence on local 
policies, access to resources, and existing mandates for service delivery and maintenance. On 
the other hand, I showed that some authors see a community’s reliance on government and 
external actors as something that would erode their resilience and capacity. I argued that local 
governments in cities of the global South lack the necessary governance structures and 
resources to effectively govern and manage urban risk. In the Cape Town case study, for 
example, there is a lack of formally recognised structures that enable residents and CCT nodes 
to channel and access resources effectively, as well as provide residents with opportunities to 
contribute local knowledge and access other knowledge (e.g., from technical experts); those 
structures that are in place, are informal, political, and often problematic. 
 
I explored how governance theory recognises that different actors have access to different 
resources and by bringing these multiple actors together via networks, a diversity of resources 
can be pooled, shared, and mobilised more effectively. I argued that bringing multiple actors 
together and diversifying partnerships within a disaster governance framework will in turn 
enable actors to build, diversify, and share knowledge in a way that will strengthen the capacity 
of communities and cities to self-organise and re-organise in the face of disasters; essentially 
strengthening their adaptive capacity to manage and respond to disasters and climate change. I 
argued that in the context of informal settlements, the broader responsibilities and capacities of 
actors beyond just the community and local government are critical to address the multi-
faceted, complex, and interconnected issues related to disaster governance. Not one actor is 
equipped fully to address the issue of urban disaster risk; resources and adaptive capacities 
(physical, human, financial, etc.), expertise and knowledge, social capital, and policy 
(institutional structures) are all needed and these cannot all be contributed by a single or even a 
small/restricted number of actors. I emphasised that communities who are part of a network 
with external actors, including state and non-state actors (e.g., NGOs and CBOs), are more 
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resilient because these networks allow them to access critical resources, which enable them to 
self-organise and re-organise in the face of a disaster event, and strengthen their capacity to 
prepare for, cope with, and recover from disaster events. 
 
I also considered the formal and informal institutional structures that actors work within to 
access and channel resources, and the impact that these structures have on the ability of actors 
to mobilise resources and coordinate activities. I explored how the institutional structures that 
currently exist in Cape Town for nodes to access and channel resources are problematic and 
often contested. In response to these problematic institutional structures, nodes were seen to 
either bypass formally recognised institutional structure or create alternative, informal 
institutions that exacerbate instead of solve the underlying problems. These contested 
institutions for public participation impact on the ability of CCT nodes to assess and understand 
the needs and priorities of residents, prevent CCT nodes from channelling critical resources to 
residents and communities in need, and prevent residents from communicating with local 
government and from accessing the necessary support from government. I argued how node-
specific and non-aligned institutions within the CCT create and exacerbate silo-based, non-
collaborative approaches. DRMC’s placement within local government structures, for example, 
is an institutional mechanism that limits DRMC’s capacity and potential to coordinate 
interdepartmental activities, and therefore access and mobilise resources from and to multiple 
actors outside of their department. I argued that any discussion on the capacities of actors to 
govern needs to also consider the institutional structures that inform, guide, and constrain the 
ability of actors to access and channel resources. These institutional structures are key to why 
particular actors or sets of actors do not have access to certain resources and why they cannot 
access them in a particular way. 
 
I demonstrated through the Cape Town case study that collaborative governance is challenging 
in practice because of the multiple mentalities, ideologies, and priorities that multiple actors 
bring with them. My findings suggested that a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities, 
unclear and non-standardised definitions of flooding, a lack of human resources, and 
problematic institutional structures are significant barriers to collaborative flood governance in 
Cape Town. I argued that addressing these barriers, through multi-actor platforms and inclusive 
partnership, is one approach to creating a more inclusive environment for local disaster risk 
reduction in Cape Town’s informal settlements.  
 
Multi-actor platforms were argued to be a more flexible and participatory governance method, 
whereby different actors perceiving the same management problems are brought together 
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voluntarily or statutorily, to collectively explore strategies for solving problems (Steins and 
Edwards, 1999, Djalante, 2012). Although bringing together multiple actors with divergent 
priorities, mentalities, and knowledge might create conflict and contradictions, this diversity 
and contradiction can also enable learning, change mindsets, produce knowledge, and lead to 
stronger and more diverse solutions and outcomes (Armitage et al., 2011, GNDR, 2013). Multi-
actor platforms can strengthen local DRM because they can help nurture diversity through 
partnerships, bring different sources and forms of knowledge together, build broader and 
deeper social and ecological memory, increase capacities for sharing information and co-
producing knowledge, and empower a broader range of actors to self-organise and re-organise. 
I highlighted the key role that intermediaries, bridging organisations, and the science 
community can play in bringing multiple actors together into dialogue and helping to coproduce 
knowledge. I demonstrated, however, that in Cape Town there is limited involvement of these 
intermediaries in providing social capital and resources that can enable local government and 
communities to collaborate on disaster governance processes. I concluded that in order to 
strengthen collaborative disaster governance in the context of cities of the global South, 
inclusive partnerships and multi-actor platforms need to be complemented by strengthened 
institutional mechanisms and more deliberate, systematic approaches to fostering collaboration 
between multiple actors. If the institutional structures that create barriers to and/or undermine 
collaborative governance are not addressed, then establishing multi-actor platforms and 
inclusive partnerships will not be sufficient to build and strengthen collaborative governance; 
these institutional deficits will limit the potential for multi-actor platforms and inclusive 
partnerships.  
 
 
3. TOWARDS A DISASTER GOVERNANCE APPROACH IN CITIES OF 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
 
My research contributes towards the emerging scholarship around the concept of disaster 
governance: what it means in theory and practice, what the challenges and barriers are to 
adopting a disaster governance approach in cities of the global South, and how to strengthen 
disaster governance in these cities. I contribute towards this scholarship by providing a 
theoretically informed research approach to analyse the capacities of a case study city in terms 
of its actors’ ability to manage a particular disaster risk. I argued that a deeper understanding of 
the city’s actors and their capacities to manage disaster risk can be achieved using nodal 
governance. This is an important step towards understanding the potential gaps in capacities 
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and barriers to collaborative disaster governance; by understanding the barriers, decision-
makers can then begin to explore the conditions necessary for strengthening collaborative DRM 
approaches and thus how to strengthen the city’s ability to manage complex disaster risk. Since 
my research only looked at a single case study city, similar research could be conducted in other 
cities of the global South in order to compare and contrast the findings from Cape Town, and 
ultimately expand an understanding of the barriers to collaborative governance that cities of the 
global South face, and the conditions necessary to address these barriers and strengthen 
collaborative disaster governance. It is hoped that the empirical research presented in this 
thesis will also contribute to developing a methodology for exploring disaster governance and 
contribute more broadly towards the emerging theoretical understanding of disaster 
governance. 
 
This research is relevant at the local context in Cape Town because it provides insight into and 
deeper understanding of how flood risk is governed by Cape Town’s municipality and by 
communities living in informal settlements that experience flooding; therefore, this research 
contributes towards a new and theoretically-informed understanding of an issue that affects 
Cape Town and its urban poor on an annual basis. The findings from this research can also 
inform DRM policy and practice in Cape Town and South Africa; the findings highlighted the 
need for decision-makers to implement skills development processes at the municipal and local 
level, in order to ensure that actors in key decision-making and operational positions are able to 
manage conflict in informal settlements, facilitate participatory and inclusive DRM processes, 
and assess the needs of local communities on a more long-term, ongoing basis. This research 
highlighted the need for implementing policy that will enable government departments to 
collaborate better with at-risk communities and local NGOs and actors already conducting DRR 
and education activities in informal settlements; this can ensure that resources are used and 
shared more efficiently and that capacities are used more effectively. The case study and related 
findings presented in this thesis are also useful on a broader scale to other South African cities 
and cities of the global South because it provides an understanding of how the process of 
mapping actors within a governance process, understanding actors’ capacities, and identifying 
the potential barriers to collaborative processes can help inform a country’s DRM policy and 
practice and potentially strengthen their collaborative disaster governance.  
 
In this thesis, I demonstrated that actors’ ability to access and mobilise resources is crucial for 
determining whether they are equipped to govern. From the case study, I argued that neither 
local government nor local communities are fully equipped to govern flood risk. Although each 
set of actors has access to important, but different resources, such as financial, physical, human, 
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and social, neither set of actors has access to the whole range of resources needed. For example, 
although local government has access to finances, expertise, and human capital, they lack the 
social capital, local knowledge, and particular human resources (i.e., in terms of number of staff 
and facilitation and engagement skills) to assess and address risk and priorities across all 
communities; this is especially challenging in highly contested and sensitive informal 
settlements, which are constantly growing and expanding, and are spread across a large 
geographical area, as in the case of most cities of the global South. I also highlighted how 
communities cannot build and strengthen their own adaptive capacities without external 
support from and networks with local government and other actors (e.g., NGOs, CBOs, etc.). The 
empirical research presented in this thesis highlighted how DRM policy and practice needs to go 
beyond the state and communities, and include actors such as NGOs, researchers, and other 
intermediaries because they can contribute key resources that local government and 
communities might lack: social capital, expert knowledge, and facilitation, engagement, and 
conflict management skills. Further research needs to be conducted in the Cape Town context, 
as well as other cities of the global South, to explore the capacity of these external actors for 
supporting both local government and communities, and their role as intermediaries and 
bridging organisations in collaborative governance processes. 
 
Proposing disaster governance as a way to improve and strengthen DRM in cities of the global 
South is a sensitive and complex process that needs to recognise the conflicting ideologies, 
agendas, priorities, and capacities of the multiple actors involved. Better understanding of the 
actors who are and should be involved, as well as their unique characteristics can highlight 
those areas that create opportunities and challenges to disaster governance. In understanding 
those opportunities and challenges, I have argued that cities of the global South can move 
towards finding options and solutions for strengthening collaboration and disaster governance 
outcomes. Although my research has suggested potential approaches to address the barriers to 
collaborative governance identified in Cape Town, more research should be conducted on 
identifying the conditions necessary for enabling and strengthening multi-actor engagement 
across various social and institutional boundaries. More research also needs to be conducted on 
the types of systematic approaches needed for strengthening and addressing problematic 
institutional structures in cities of the global South and for fostering collaboration and 
engagement between multiple actors.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX 1:  
Community researchers: Photo-reporting information sheet 
 
 
Aim: 
To gain an insider* view into the multiple uses of the stormwater drainage system in Sweet 
Home Farm, through the use of photography, descriptive reporting, and reflexive writing. 
 
*’Insider’ here refers to someone who lives in Sweet Home Farm, and to whom these issues 
form part of their lived experience.  
 
 Intended Outcomes: 
1. Get some data on the current status of the stormwater drainage system in Sweet Home 
Farm. 
2. Get insight into local perspectives and understanding of stormwater drainage systems. 
3. Establish illustrated and descriptive points of reference for on-going discussions with 
Sweet Home Farm residents, community leaders and City officials, on flood risk in Sweet 
Home Farm and the status of stormwater drainage systems in informal settlements. 
4. Empower the community of Sweet Home Farm, in the form of engaging community 
leaders as researchers; giving them work experience and payment for work, and helping 
them gain insight into the role of stormwater drainage systems for reducing flood risk. 
 
Time Commitment and Duration: 
This research exercise will have two phases: 
1. The first phase will help gather data on the current status of stormwater drainage 
systems and the multiple uses of these systems by the community, prior to the winter 
rain season, when flood risk is at its lowest: December-January. 
2. The second phase will help gather data on flooding incidents and the impact that 
stormwater drainage systems have on these incidents, during the winter rainfall season, 
when flood risk is at its highest: May-June. 
 
The community researchers will be expected to complete a report and take 2 relevant photos, 
for each session. The sessions would last about 2 hours, and it is expected that each community 
researcher carry out 2 sessions a week, for 6 weeks. This would result in 12 completed reports, 
and about 24 photos.  
 
Phase 1  
Duration: 17th December 2012, until 25th January 2013. 
Evaluation Meeting: First week of February 2013. 
 
Phase 2 
Duration: 13th May 2013, until 21st June 2013. 
Evaluation Meeting: Last week of June 2013. 
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Community Researcher Tasks: 
 One complete report should be filled in for each session. 
 Each session includes taking a photo, writing down what the picture is about, writing 
observations about what is happening, and writing your thoughts about the situation. 
 Take pictures of the drain. Note down the date and what the picture is about, on the report 
sheet.  
 Observe what is happening and write notes about this on the report sheet. 
 Write extra notes about their own thoughts on the drainage system, or about how it is 
related to flooding, on the report sheet. 
 If anyone asks what the researchers are doing, it should be explained to them. If they have 
any comments, these must be written on the report sheet as well. 
 
Evaluation: 
These meetings will take place at the completion of each phase. These meetings are an 
opportunity for the researcher and the community researchers to discuss the findings, to 
evaluate the process, and to explore any issues arising from the fieldwork and the overall 
process. This will also be an important time to consider any issues related to the write-up of the 
individual reports, and to clarify any misunderstandings or incomplete reports. 
 
Payment: 
Each community researcher will receive payment for their work. [amount paid has been 
deleted]. This payment will be made during the evaluation meetings at the end of each work 
phase. 
 
Materials Provided: 
Each community researcher will be provided with 15 copies of blank report sheets. 12 of these 
are to be completed and handed back to the head researcher during the evaluation meetings. 
Each community researcher will also be provided with a disposable camera that takes 27 
photographs. These cameras will also be handed back to the head researcher during the 
evaluation meeting. Any camera lost and not handed back will result that particular researcher 
receiving [Rx] less from his/her total payment at the completion of the work. 
 
Contact of the Head Researcher: 
If you have any problems or questions, you can contact the researcher responsible: Joy Waddell 
(email and telephone provided in acceptance letter). You can also contact the community leader 
who is supporting this project and will be the central contact person in Sweet Home Farm: Siya 
and Pamela James (telephone number provided). Any queries that Siya and Pamela cannot 
answer, will be referred to Joy Waddell.  
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APPENDIX 2:  
Community researchers: Photo-reporting activity #1 
December 2012 - January 2013 
 
 
Activity Aim: 
To understand the state of the drains in Sweet Home Farm, how the community uses these 
drains and how these drains deal with flooding issues; through the use of photography, and 
descriptive reporting. 
 
Job Description: 
Duration: 17th December 2012 to 25th January 2013 (6 weeks) 
Work 2 times a week, for about 2 hours each time, for 6 weeks. 
 
What to do: Walk around Sweet Home Farm, looking for examples of people using the drains, of 
people fixing or damaging the drains, and of the drains causing, or reducing flooding problems. 
 
When there, do the following: 
 Take pictures of the drain (if people are using it, if the drain looks very bad/good, of people 
fixing or damaging the drain, or of flooding from/around the drain). Note down the date, 
where the picture was taken, and what the picture is about, on the sheet. 
 Observe what happens and write notes about this on the sheets. You can fill the sheet out 
there, before or after you have taken the pictures. 
 2 photos should be taken each time you fill in a sheet. 
 2 sheets should be filled out each week. 
 If anyone asks you what you are doing, explain it to them. If they have any comments, you 
can write these down on the sheets. 
 You can also write extra notes about your own thoughts about the situation, on the sheets. 
 Remember! It is better to write a lot than to write nothing. Even if you feel that what you 
write might not be that good. 
 
Outcomes: You will deliver 2 sheets, every week, for 6 weeks. This is a total of 12 sheets. You 
will also deliver the camera (with about 24 photos that have been taken). 
 
Evaluation: The first week of February 2013, we will have a meeting where we will discuss what 
you found during the 6 weeks of research. At this meeting, you will give Joy the 12 sheets you 
completed, and the camera. 
 
Payment: You will be paid during the evaluation meeting, once you have given the completed 
report sheets, and the camera. [amount paid has been deleted]  
 
Contacts: If you have any problems or questions, you can contact the researcher responsible: Joy 
Waddell (phone number provided). You can also talk to Siya and Pamela James, and they will 
contact Joy. 
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DRAINS AND THEIR USES: 
 
Sheet #: _________  Place: __________________________________ Date: _____________ 
 
Pictures: Take a picture and make notes about it: 
 
Picture 1:  Date:    What is it about? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
Picture 2:  Date:    What is it about? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
Picture 3:  Date:    What is it about? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
Describe the Situation: 
 
1. How does the drain look? Is it blocked? What is it blocked with? What does it smell like? 
How does the area around the drain look?  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
2. Is anyone near the drain, or using the drain? Who are they and what are they doing? Has the 
drain been changed in any way? Describe those changes. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
3. Who should do something about the situation and what should they do? Write your own 
thoughts, but also ask people in the area for their thoughts. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
4. Write down comments from residents and people in the area, about the situation. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Note your own thoughts; what do you think about this situation? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
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Examples of feedback provided by community researchers: 
 
Sheet #: One 
Place: Sweet Home Vlei 
Date: Monday 17 December 2012 
 
Pictures: Take a picture and make notes about it: 
 
Picture 1: 
 
 
Blocked drain and toilets that are blocked in Sweet Home 
 
Picture 2:  
 
 
Is about blocked drains 
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Describe the situation:    (** Answers are captured exactly as the participant wrote them) 
 
1. How does the drain look? Is it blocked? What is it blocked with? What does it smell 
like? How does the area around the drain look? 
It looks like a dam. It looks so disgusting and full of flies around it. It is blocked by the things 
people they put it inside the drain, for example, food, or use the rough papers when they using 
the toilet. It smell like the… The area around the drain look very bad. You can’t even breath.  
 
2. Is anyone near the drain, or using the drain? Who are they and what are they doing? 
Has the drain been hanged in any way? Describe those changes. 
The people are using the drain they are complaining that the municipality come and fix it for 
one day after that the drain blocked again. So now the people decide to close the drain because 
it blocked everyday. The people put the stones and sand to close the drain. 
 
3. Who should do something about the situation and what should they do? Write your 
own thoughts, but also ask people in the area their thoughts. 
The municipality should do something, like to change the drain pipes and put the big pipes for 
drain, because those small one is easy to blocked. 
 
4. Write down comments from residents and people in the area, about the situation. 
The residents comments about the situation because it affects children. Children get sick 
everyday because childrens playing with that dirty water, even the adults are sick. Most of the 
people here in Sweet Home they are sick or suffering with TB because they breath dirty air.  
 
5. Note your own thoughts; what do you think about this situation? 
In my own thought, I think the municipality must change all the drains and make the new drain. 
And in that new drain must put the big pipes for toilets and drains. I think it will be better. 
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APPENDIX 3:  
Community researchers: Photo-reporting activity #2 
May - June 2013 
 
 
Activity Aim: 
To understand the state of the drains in Sweet Home Farm, how the community uses these 
drains and how these drains deal with flooding issues; through the use of photography, and 
descriptive reporting. 
 
Job Description: 
Duration: 13th May 2013 to 21st June 2013 (6 weeks) 
Work 2 times a week, for about 2 hours each time, for 6 weeks. 
 
What to do: Walk around Sweet Home Farm, looking for examples of people using the drains, of 
people fixing or damaging the drains, and of the drains causing, or reducing flooding problems. 
 
When there, do the following: 
 Take pictures of the drain (if people are using it, if the drain looks very bad/good, of people 
fixing or damaging the drain, or of flooding from/around the drain). Note down the date, 
where the picture was taken, and what the picture is about, on the sheet. 
 Observe what happens and write notes about this on the sheets. You can fill the sheet out 
there, before or after you have taken the pictures. 
 2 photos should be taken each time you fill in a sheet. 
 2 sheets should be filled out each week. 
 If anyone asks you what you are doing, explain it to them. If they have any comments, you 
can write these down on the sheets. 
 You can also write extra notes about your own thoughts about the situation, on the sheets. 
 Remember! It is better to write a lot than to write nothing. Even if you feel that what you 
write might not be that good. 
 
Outcomes: You will deliver 2 sheets, every week, for 6 weeks. This is a total of 12 sheets. You 
will also deliver the camera (with about 24 photos that have been taken). 
 
Evaluation: The last week of June 2013, we will have a meeting where we will discuss what you 
found during the 6 weeks of research. At this meeting, you will give Joy the 12 sheets you 
completed, and the camera. 
 
Payment: You will be paid during the evaluation meeting, once you have given the completed 
report sheets, and the camera. [amount paid has been deleted]  
 
Contacts: If you have any problems or questions, you can contact the researcher responsible: Joy 
Waddell (phone number provided). You can also talk to Siya and Pamela James, and they will 
contact Joy. 
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FLOOD EVENT: 
 
Sheet #: _________  Place: __________________________________ Date: _____________ 
 
Pictures: Take a picture and make notes about it: 
 
Picture 1:  Date:    What is it about? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
Picture 2:  Date:    What is it about? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
Picture 3:  Date:    What is it about? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
Describe the Situation:  
 
1. Describe the flooding: where is it, how deep is it, what is causing it? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
2. How many houses have been affected? What else has been affected?  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
3. What are different people doing about the flooding? Who is doing what? Observe, but also 
ask questions and note their answers. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
4. Are there people from the government, NGOS, or other organisations coming to help? Who? 
What are they doing? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
5. Is there a drain nearby? Is it good or bad for the flooding? How? Why? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
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6. Who should do something about the situation and what should they do? Write your own 
thoughts, but also ask people in the area for their thoughts. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
7. Write down comments from residents and people in the area, about the situation. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
8. Note your own thoughts; what do you think about this situation? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
 
 
Examples of feedback provided by community researchers: 
 
Sheet #: One 
Place: Sweet Home  
Date: Sunday 26 May 2013 
 
Pictures: Take a picture and make notes about it: 
 
Picture 1: 
 
 
It is about the floods in Sweet Home. And the house that are affected by the flooding. 
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Describe the situation:     (** Answers are captured exactly as the participant wrote them) 
 
1. Describe the flooding: where is it, how deep is it, what is causing it? 
It is here in Sweet Home Farm. It is very deep because the houses are full of water. It caused by 
the rain and the conditions of the shacks, example, the place where the house build. 
 
2. How many houses have been affected? What else has been affected? 
Many houses are affect in this floods. 
 
3. What are different people doing about the flooding? Who is doing what? Observe, but 
also ask questions and note their answers. 
The is no different people come to help people who are affected. 
 
4. Are there people from the government, NGOs, or other organisations coming to help? 
Who? What are they doing? 
No people from government, NGO come to help. The is nothing government done to help the 
people. 
 
5. Is there a drain nearby? Is it good or bad for the flooding? How? Why? 
The is no drain that’s why the houses are flooded. If the were drains maybe the floods were not 
that much. 
 
6. Who should do something about the situation and what should they do? Write your 
own thoughts, but also ask people in the area for their thoughts. 
The government should do something. The government make the drains so that when it raining, 
the water can go into the drain. 
 
7. Write down comments from residents and people in the area, about the situation. 
The residents comments about the government. they say government doesn’t listen they 
complaints. They say if the government can build the houses it will be better. Some people say 
the government should makes drain, and bring the sand so that the houses not be affected by 
the floods.  
 
8. Note your own thoughts; what do you think about this situation? 
Me I think the government must help people by bring the sand so that people must can put their 
houses up. And the government should open more drain so that when its winter the floods 
doesn’t affect people. 
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APPENDIX 4:  
Information sheet provided to students attending the school programme 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR STUDENTS 
 
Part of the “Flooding in Cape Town under Climate Risk” (FliCCR) Project  
- University of Cape Town, South Africa 
Flood Awareness and Reporting Activity for Grade 11 Learners,  
at Sinethemba High School. 
I would like to invite you to take part in this afterschool, high-school based activity 
on flooding and flood awareness. You should read the information below about the project before deciding to 
take part. It is voluntary and if you decide not to take part, you will not be disadvantaged in any way. Before 
deciding, you should understand what the project is about and what you will have to do if you take part. Discuss 
this letter with your parents/guardians/teachers to make sure you understand everything.  
Background 
Joy Waddell is a PhD research student at the University of Cape Town, looking at how the City of Cape Town 
manages flooding in some of Philippi’s informal settlements. Her research also tries to understand how residents 
living in these informal settlements cope with flooding and what they do to reduce their risk of flooding, and what 
they expect the City of Cape Town to do about the flood risk.  
This activity, taking place with selected Grade 11 learners at Sinethemba High School, aims to help learners 
raise their awareness of flood risk and flooding impacts, in their communities. This project uses various activities 
to help learners explore what their experiences of flooding have been, and how they can reduce flood risk in their 
communities. This activity will help the researcher (Joy Waddell) with her own research, but mainly, it will help 
Grade 11 learners to have a better understanding of their own situation; with flood risk and how to reduce flood 
impacts. 
Important Details about the Project 
This project will take place over 3 weeks, during May 2013. Each lesson will take place after school, from 3pm 
until 4.15pm, 2 afternoons each week, for a total of 5 afternoons. Learners who decide to take part in this project 
need to commit to attending all 5 of those afternoons.  
The activities during the afternoon lessons will start by looking at learners’ experiences of flooding and how 
learners and their families have coped with flooding. The learners will then work in groups of 3, to design a 
research project. This research project will be displayed in the form of a poster at the end of the 5 afternoon 
lessons. Each group will be provided with a disposable camera, and 3 notebooks, to capture information after 
school, in their own communities. The research questions and theme for this will be decided during lesson times, 
by the learners, with help from the researcher. A very important part of this research is letting learners voice their 
own opinions and telling the researcher (Joy Waddell) what is important to them. 
Information from these workshops will be used by the researcher to write a report about how Grade 11 learners 
living in/around Philippi experience and manage flooding. This report will be made available to learners and their 
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teachers. Each group of learners will also design a poster to be displayed in the school, at the end of the 5 
afternoon lessons. Photographs developed from the disposable cameras will be given to the groups of learners 
for their personal use and/or for displaying on their posters.  
Contact 
If you decide to take part, please keep this information sheet and hand in the signed consent form. If you have 
any further questions, please feel free to contact the researcher, your geography teacher or school principal. 
Questions can be emailed directly to the researcher on: [email address and phone number provided] 
Potential session dates and times 
Session 1 (Wednesday 8th May 2013) 
3pm – 4.15pm 
Session 2 (Mon/Tues 13th/14th May 2013) 
3pm – 4.15pm 
Session 3 (Wednesday 15th May 2013) 
3pm – 4.15pm 
Session 4 (Mon/Tues 20/21 May 2013) 
3pm – 4.15pm 
Session 5 (Wednesday 22nd May 2013) 
3pm – 4.15pm 
Outcomes and Expectations 
 45 students will be selected from the Grade 11 geography class to take part in this project. 
 Students selected will need to commit for the 3 weeks. Consent forms will need to be signed so students 
know what is expected of them, and they understand that some of the information from these sessions will 
be used in the researchers PhD at the University of Cape Town. 
 The researcher will produce a summary report at the end of the project for any student and teacher who 
would like to have a copy. Any work and photos by students during the project will be used in this report. 
 A poster will be produced at the end of the 3 weeks. These materials will remain at the school for use by 
teachers and students. 
 1 disposable camera will be given to each group. These cameras need to be returned to the researcher 
during the 2nd session. Photos developed from these cameras will be given to the group of students for use 
on their posters. 
 Each student will be given a notebook to collect information, take notes and keep a research diary. This 
information will be used on the posters.  
 All materials and snacks for the sessions will be provided by the facilitator.  
 The sessions and writing will all be in English.  
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APPENDIX 6:  
Details FLiCCR’s workshops (2011-2013) 
 
 
 
Date Workshop Aims Nodes in Attendance 
Number of 
Attendees 
9 
Nov 
2011 
Validate data collected on current 
and ideal flood management 
interventions. Discuss how 
departments understand the 
nature of flooding and current 
responses. Unpack challenges and 
opportunities for strengthening 
flood governance. 
City Health Directorate 2 
Disaster Risk Management Centre 11 
Environmental Resource Management Dept. 2 
Fire and Rescue Services 1 
Informal Settlements Management Dept. 3 
Provincial Disaster Risk Management Centre 1 
Roads and Stormwater Dept. 2 
Traffic Services Dept. 1 
21 
Jan 
2013 
Review and assess the Flood Task 
Team’s activities in 2012. Unpack 
challenges with current and past 
activities. Discuss challenges with 
collaboration and ways to 
strengthen collaboration. 
Development Services Dept. 1 
Disaster Risk Management Centre 9 
Environmental Health Dept. 1 
Informal Settlements Management Dept. 1 
Roads and Stormwater Dept. 2 
Water and Sanitation Dept. 1 
21 
Feb 
2013 
Present findings from the FliCCR 
research to residents who 
participated in the research. Allow 
residents to raise issues and 
explore ways to address flood risk 
at the community level. 
Residents from five informal settlements: 
Egoli, Graveyard Pond, Kosovo, Sheffield 
Roads, and Sweet Home 
+/- 50 
University of Cape Town – FliCCR colleagues 5 
Xhosa Translators/Facilitators 2 
1 
Mar 
2013 
Present findings from the FliCCR 
research to multiple actors central 
to flood governance in Cape Town. 
Provide a multi-actor knowledge 
platform to encourage dialogue 
and engagement between actors. 
Allow actors to raise issues key to 
addressing flood risk in Cape 
Town. 
Community Leader from Egoli and Sheffield 
Rd. Informal Settlements 
2 
Community Public Health Worker 2 
Disaster Risk Management Centre 5 
Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning Dept. 
1 
Environmental Health Dept. 1 
Ikhayalami (NGO) 1 
Informal Settlements Management Dept. 2 
Roads and Stormwater Dept. 1 
The Jungle Theatre Company (NGO) 1 
The Mustadafin Foundation (NGO) 2 
The South African Red Cross Society (NGO) 1 
The Warehouse / UBU (NGO) 1 
Transport, Roads, and Major Projects Dept. 2 
University of Cape Town – FliCCR colleagues 9 
Ward Councillor 1 
21 & 
22 
May 
2013 
Provide a platform for Sweet Home 
residents and CCT officials to 
discuss flooding. Encourage 
participants to explore ways of 
working together to address 
flooding issues in Sweet Home. 
DRMC 3 
Environmental Health Dept. 1 
Informal Settlements Management Dept. 2 
Residents from Sweet Home Informal 
Settlement (including community leaders) 
12 
Roads and Stormwater Dept. 1 
Solid Waste Management Dept. 2 
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APPENDIX 9:  
Membership list for the Flood Task Team 
 
 
DEPARTMENT NAME 
On the 
membership 
list* 
Receives 
communication 
of plans* 
107 Public Emergency Communications Centre (PECC)  √ 
112 Emergency Call Centre  √ 
Catchment, Stormwater, and River Management 
Department 
 √ 
Health Directorate (including Environmental Health 
Department) 
√ √ 
City Manager  √ 
City Parks Department √ √ 
Corporate Call Centre  √ 
Disaster Risk Management Centre (DRMC) √ √ 
Electricity Services Department √ √ 
City Emergency Services √ √ 
Executive Directors: Safety and Security; Transport, 
Roads, and Stormwater; Human Settlements; Service 
Delivery Integration; City Health 
 √ 
Fire and Rescue Services √ √ 
Human Settlements Directorate (largely Informal 
Settlements Management Department and Development 
Services Department) 
√ √ 
Law Enforcement and Security Services √ √ 
Media and Communication Department √ √ 
Metropolitan police √ √ 
NGOs: HDI Support; SA Red Cross Society; The 
Mustadafin Foundation; The Salvation Army; SANZAF; 
The Trauma Centre; The Jungle Theatre Company 
√ √ 
Provincial Department of Education √ √ 
Provincial Department of Social Development √ √ 
Provincial Disaster Risk Management Centre √ √ 
Provincial Emergency medical Services  √ 
Provincial Traffic Services  √ 
SA Police Services √ √ 
Social Development Department  √ 
Solid Waste Management Department √ √ 
Specialised Technical Services – Fleet operations  √ 
Sports and Recreation Department √ √ 
Technical Operations Centre (TOC)  √ 
Traffic Services √ √ 
Transport Planning and Traffic Signals  √ 
Transport, Roads, and Stormwater Directorate 
(including Roads and Stormwater Department) 
√ √ 
Water and Sanitation Department √ √ 
* Source: DRMC, 2012 
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APPENDIX 10:  
Maps showing the location of Sweet Home in Philippi, within Ward 80 
 
 
Sweet Home, which is located in the suburb of Philippi on the Cape Flats, is shown in the far left-
hand centre of the map below (Image source: CCT, 2013a).  
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Sweet Home is shown in the top right-hand corner of Ward 80, in the map below (Image and 
data source: CCT, 2013). 46,151 people living in this ward. 55 per cent of houses in Ward 80 are 
informal dwellings (shacks) while 10.6 per cent of houses are shacks built in the backyard of a 
formal house.  
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APPENDIX 11:  
Examples of educational material, which are distributed by the CCT, on 
floods and the causes of floods 
 
1. Pamphlets distributed by the National Disaster Management Centre on four types of risk: 
fires in informal settlements, floods, thunderstorms, and veld (bush) fires: 
 
 
 
 
2. Stickers and pamphlets distributed by the Water and Sanitation department on (1) the 
numbers to call to report issues, (2) the causes of blockages to sanitation systems: 
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3. Pamphlets distributed in multiple languages (e.g., Xhosa, Afrikaans, and English) by the 
DRMC on (1) and (2) how to protect yourself from floods, (3) how to prepare your family for 
a disaster, and (4) the emergency number: 
 
 
 
 
4. Posters by the Environmental Health department (1) outlining the services they offer, and 
(2) illustrating the conditions that reduce access to clean and functioning sanitation 
facilities: 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
275 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN                                                                      JOY WADDELL  -  WDDJOY001 
5. Zibi, the Solid Waste Management department’s mascot for raising awareness on litter: 
 
 
 
 
6. Pamphlet from the Roads and Stormwater department on flooding: 
 
 
 
 
* All material was photographed/scanned by Joy Waddell 
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APPENDIX 12:  
CCT departments’ perceptions of their responses to flooding and 
understanding of flood risk 
 
During the workshop held in November 2011 with Flood Task team representatives (and with 
follow-up during individual interviews), each department was presented with a number of 
questions and asked to place themselves on the axis in the position that best represented their 
department. Some of these questions and responses are presented below: 
Key: 
 
 City Health 
 Disaster Risk Management Centre 
 Informal Housing (Informal Settlements Management) 
 Development Services 
 Roads and Stormwater 
  
 
1. What is the nature of the problem when it comes to flooding in Cape Town? 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
2. Is the nature or scale of the flooding problem currently changing? If not please leave blank, if 
yes then mark what is seen as the main cause of the change. 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
3. Who is currently responsible for tackling flood risks?  
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
Flooding is mostly a 
problem of excess 
water but also about 
people being in the 
wrong place 
Flooding is mostly a 
problem of people 
being in the wrong 
place but also of excess 
water 
 
Flooding is a problem of 
excess water 
Flooding is a problem of 
people in the wrong place 
 
Flood risk is changing 
because of a changing 
climate 
Flood risk is changing 
because of changing 
urbanisation patterns 
 
Flood risk is changing 
mainly because of changes 
in the climate, but also 
due to urbanisation 
Flood risk is changing 
mainly because of 
urbanisation, but also due to 
changes in the climate 
 
It is the State’s 
responsibility to 
manage all flood risk 
It is the 
responsibility of 
residents to manage 
their flood risk 
 
It is mainly the State’s 
responsibility to 
manage flood risks, but 
residents also need to 
help 
It is mainly the 
responsibility of residents 
to manage flood risks, 
with some help from the 
State 
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4. What measures to tackle flood risks are currently prioritised within your department?  
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. What currently constrains effective flood risk management? 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Should civil society members and organisations be involved in managing flood risks? 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. What measures to tackle flood risks should be prioritised within your department in the 
next 10-15 years?  
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
Reducing people’s 
vulnerability to flood risk 
through social and 
institutional measures (e.g., 
Early Warning Systems) 
Technical responses 
to reduce flood risk 
(e.g., sewers, 
drainage) 
 
Mainly social and 
institutional measures, with 
some more technical and 
engineering measures 
Mainly technical and 
engineering measures, with 
some social and 
institutional measures 
Flood management is 
constrained because of 
limited financial 
resources 
Flood management is 
constrained because 
of institutional 
challenges (e.g., 
capacity, 
coordination, public 
engagement, etc.) 
 
The constraints are mainly 
financial, but there are also 
some institutional barriers 
The constraints are mainly 
institutional, but there are 
also some financial barriers 
 
Civil society should lead 
in developing strategies 
for flood management 
Civil society should 
not be involved in 
developing strategies 
for flood 
management 
 
Civil society should be 
centrally engaged in 
developing strategies 
for flood management 
Civil society should be 
consulted about flood 
management strategies 
Reducing people’s 
vulnerability to flood risk 
through social and 
institutional measures (e.g., 
Early Warning Systems) 
Technical / 
engineering 
responses to reduce 
flood risk (e.g., 
sewers, drainage) 
 
Mainly social and 
institutional measures, with 
some more technical and 
engineering measures 
Mainly technical and 
engineering measures, with 
some social and 
institutional measures 
